Brexit as Fate
On Boris, the seven plagues of Brexit and other matters of constitutional myth-making
On Boris, the seven plagues of Brexit and other matters of constitutional myth-making
Last week, together with two colleagues, Daniel Sarmiento and Sir Jonathan Faull, we published a plan which could avoid a no-deal Brexit. It is to one reaction, attributed in the Press to anonymous Commission sources that I wish to react. And I do not do this solely or even mainly in order to defend the viability of our particular Proposal. I do so because I fear that this same reaction of these anonymous EU officials will meet any proposal for "alternative arrangements" to be put on the table by the UK government.
The British government yesterday secured a prorogation of Parliament from the Queen. Parliament will stand prorogued no earlier than Monday 9th September and no later than Thursday 12th September 2019 to Monday 14th October 2019. For many commentators the weeks from now until 12 September and from 14 October to 31 October (the day the United Kingdom exits the European Union) were crucial. It tipped the balance of the prorogation from blindingly unconstitutional to constitutionally dubious, but permissible. Regardless of whether one finds this line of reasoning convincing, there is a threat that this prorogation can be extended indefinitely that has been largely overlooked: the Prorogation Act 1867.
We have received many comments and questions to our Proposal on avoiding a No-Deal Brexit. The following are the most frequently asked questions with our replies.
The EU reasonably expects a guarantee that Brexit will not compromise the integrity of its customs and regulatory territory. Hence its insistence on the Backstop. The UK reasonably expects a guarantee that it will not be locked into a permanent Customs (and regulatory) Union with the EU. Hence its rejection of the Backstop. The resulting deadlock is hurling both parties into a No-Deal Brexit. This proposal, which includes features which have never been discussed, will guarantee the integrity and autonomy of the EU’s and UK’s respective customs and regulatory territories, and will require neither a Customs Union between the two nor a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic.
There are 15 weeks left until the UK’s scheduled departure from the EU. A new leader of the Conservative party, and so de facto Prime Minister, will be chosen by party members and presented to Parliament just before it plans to rise for summer recess on 25 July. A point of distinction between the two candidates for Conservative leadership is on the exercise of a power to prorogue Parliament in order to ensure the UK’s withdrawal on 31 October 2019: Jeremy Hunt will not use the power, Boris Johnson will not rule it out. The threat of prorogation, if serious, could prove a catalyst for constitutional crisis.
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde’s work has received extensive scholarly attention beyond Germany in recent years, with incisive discussions of his legal and constitutional theory, his theorization of the relation between politics, law and religion, and his intellectual mentors. But amid Brexit and the run-up to the European elections in May 2019, it is worthwhile returning to some of the finest moments of Böckenförde the public intellectual.
Should MPs be able to legislate contrary to the wishes of the government of the day? The Cooper Bill has raised fundamental questions over the relationship between law and politics in the United Kingdom.
Unless the Withdrawal Act is adopted after all, the UK will need to elect MEPs in May. It is unlikely, however, that European Parliament elections will help to resolve the political impasse in Westminster. Hence, something else will have to move.
The decision of the Prime Minister Theresa May to stand down if the Parliament approves the Withdrawal Agreement has led a number of passionate proponents of Brexit including Boris Johnson to change their view of the deal. Still, the Democratic Unionist Party said on Wednesday that the Brexit deal and in particular the backstop posed ‘an unacceptable threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom.’ This is significant not only because the DUP is in a confidence-and-supply arrangement with the Government but also because a number of ardent Brexiteers such as Jacob Rees-Mogg have said that their stance towards the deal depends on DUP’s position. In light of another meaningful vote, one has to wonder whether the DUP’s fears concerning the threat of the backstop to the constitutional integrity of the UK are justified.