Articles for tag: Europäische KommissionKonditionalitätsmechanismusNext Generation EU

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

The Commission needs to get its message out to Hungarians loud and clear that it is trying to fight corruption in Hungary so that EU money can be used to benefit the Hungarian people and not just Orbán’s circle of cronies. Hungarians would definitely appreciate that if they knew it. But the Commission’s press release today has been drowned out by Orbán’s use of state funds to flood the zone with his message that the Commission doesn’t care about the Hungarian people and is responsible for all of the economic pain they feel.

Same, Same but Different?

The Commission’s decision to release a significant amount of EU money is a testament to some serious pitfalls in the mechanism, which governs the unblocking of frozen EU funds. To recall, Hungary’s endowments are blocked via two different channels, based on two different conditionality criteria, which have some overlapping points. Both prescribe reforms to preserve the independence of the judiciary, which according to the Commission’s justification has been successfully accomplished by Hungary.  The Commission has, however, never published a detailed plan that would attach a specific amount to be released to every sufficiently satisfied conditionality criterion. In this blog post, I showcase that the overlap between the two conditionality mechanisms and the absence of a robust ex-ante blueprint for releasing frozen funds make the unblocking process highly obscure. This lack of transparency both decreases the efficiency and robustness of conditionality, and increases the tendency for inter-institutional conflicts.

Orbán’s Veto Play – The Subsidiarity Card

Viktor Orbán is known to use veto threats in the European Council to get his way. This time, he was keen to see that after months of tense exchanges with the Commission, Hungary gets access to EU funds that had been blocked in order to achieve compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights conditionality. So, PM Orbán saw it fit to loudly contest Ukraine’s accession and the financial aid package of 50 billion Euros. This may be PM Orbán’s strongest veto play to date.

Trick and Treat?

Almost a year has passed since the European Union decided to block the payment of EUR 27 billion in union funds to Hungary under several instruments. Access to the largest part of the frozen funds - altogether EUR 13 billion - depends on whether Hungary complies with its undertakings to strengthen judicial independence. The government claims to have met all four of the so-called super milestones by adopting a judicial package in May 2023 and requests access to the blocked funds under Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) and ten different operative programmes. However, upon taking a closer look at the preconditions to the payments and the nature and implementation of the proposed reforms, it becomes clear that Hungary is still playing tricks to avoid compliance.

The Commission’s missed opportunity to reclaim competition law for the Rechtsstaat

On 30 November 2022, the European Commission took two important decisions to protect the EU budget against possible breaches of the rule of law in Hungary. First, the Commission concluded that the conditions for applying the Conditionality mechanism in Hungary remain and Hungary needs to take further and more credible action to eliminate the remaining risks for the EU budget. Second, the Commission has assessed Hungary’s Recovery and Resilience Plan and froze the disbursement of the RRF until the full and effective implementation of 27 ”super milestones” has taken place. Unfortunately, with these measures, missed opportunity to reclaim the importance of competition law in the Rechtsstaat.

Trusting Hungary with Billions of Euros

It’s crunch time for the Conditionality Regulation at the European Commission. In its College meeting on 22 November, the Commission is scheduled to discuss whether Hungary has actually made the 17 changes it proposed in order to avoid cuts to its Cohesion Funds. What the Commission chooses to do will depend on whether it believes that Hungary’s anti-corruption program will in fact allow Hungary to be entrusted with billions of Euros without having a sizeable fraction of those Euros pocketed by cronies. We believe that Hungary’s reforms are designed to be ineffective and will not even begin to halt the massive corruption that is the hallmark of Hungary’s kleptocracy.

With or Without Hungary

By December 2022, the Council must vote on the Commission's proposal to withdraw EU budgetary funds from Hungary under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation. Without a legal basis for its exclusion, Hungary will cast its vote on that proposal. Obviously, the participation of a Member State in a vote that decides on the consequences of its own rule of law violations seems paradoxical. There should be a general Treaty rule that prevents a Member State from voting in the Council when their own alleged misconduct is at stake.

Testing judicial independence

Despite the recent abolition of the Disciplinary Chamber, the crisis in the Polish judiciary is still far from resolved. The main reason for this is that the status of judges appointed at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary have not yet been addressed. As a result of the lack of a systemic solution, the problem of irregular judicial appointments must be dealt with by courts in concrete cases. For that purpose, the Supreme Court developed a test aimed at determination of the impact of irregularities in the appointment of judges on the legality of the composition of the court. The most recent amendment to the Act on the Supreme Court introduced a new test and raises serious concerns.