Fast möchte man sagen: endlich! Regierung und Opposition wollen gemeinsam versuchen, das Bundesverfassungsgericht besser vor einer möglichen Einflussnahme durch Feinde der Demokratie zu schützen. Dafür wollen sie die Verfassung anpassen. Allerdings zeigt ein Blick in die Länder, dass entsprechende Vorhaben nicht umsonst zu haben sind. Sie können demokratische Kosten und bisweilen kontraproduktive Wirkungen zeitigen.
In Polen ist die am 15. Oktober gewählte neue Parlamentsmehrheit nicht nur mit einem von der PiS ins Amt gebrachten Staatspräsidenten konfrontiert, der ihr das Leben schwer machen kann, sondern auch mit einem Verfassungsgericht, das inzwischen von lauter unter der Ägide der PiS gewählten Richtern besetzt ist. Die Schwierigkeiten rechtsstaatlicher Bewältigung der Rechtsstaatswidrigkeiten, die sich seit 2010 in der polnischen Justiz und speziell auch beim polnischen Verfassungsgerichtshof aufgetürmt haben, lenken den Blick auf ein zugrundeliegendes Kernproblem, das nicht nur in Polen zu besichtigen ist, und auch sonst nicht nur in Staaten, die von wirklich demokratischen und rechtsstaatlichen Verhältnissen noch oder wieder weit entfernt sind: Das Problem politisch einseitig besetzter Verfassungsgerichte.
It is never a good sign when Viktor Orbán celebrates the election results of another country. Last Wednesday was one of those days. For the first time in the history of Dutch politics, a far-right party became by far the biggest party in the Dutch parliament. It is bad news in many respects, and even more, because the Dutch constitutional system knows a lack of formal rule of law safeguards. In contrast to countries such as Italy or Germany, the Dutch constitutional system is not prepared for a democratic move to the anti-liberal far right.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court has handed down a highly controversial decision lowering the minimum age requirement for presidential candidacy. It raises further alarms about the Court's independence, as the petitioner sought to allow President Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run in the 2024 presidential elections. Worse, the current Chief Justice is married to the President's younger sister, and the Court's legal reasoning it not sound.
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is described as one of the few success stories of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In contrast to the state-level legislature, the Court’s decision-making process in principle cannot be vetoed. Voting rules do not condition the presence of all three ethnic groups. This has made it difficult for Republika Srpska’s (RS) political leadership to block, boycott or undermine the work of the Court compared to other state-level institutions. However, recent months saw the RS identifying and seizing a rare moment of vulnerability with potentially severe consequences. If RS does not elect new judges in the meantime, not even a Court’s small chamber will be able to operate.
The Turkish Constitutional Court demonstrates the resistance-deference paradox as a pattern in its judicial behavior under autocratic pressure. The docket management strategies including prioritization and late responsiveness are also employed in politically sensitive cases. The deferring stances of the Court legitimize autocratization when core issues of the regime are at stake. In these cases, the Court develops an autocratic partnership that makes itself an unreliable actor without any commitment to judicial ethos. The resistant stances of the Court trigger the political backlash and clashes with the judiciary, leading to further contestation of political autocratization.
The very first step of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after its 2010 electoral victory towards an ‘illiberal’ constitutional regime was to substantially limit the once very broad review powers of the Constitutional Court. The Fidesz government also started to pack the formerly activist Court with loyalist. By 2013 was appointed by Fidesz. Before 2013, the Court used some cautious strategies to keep a certain autonomy in the midst of threats to lose its independent status altogether by becoming part of the Supreme Court.
It is a relatively uncontroversial opinion that the Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro has undermined the rule of law and its constitutional institutions. This contribution concentrates on the Brazilian apex courts to show how a mix of resilience in day-to-day work and a few confrontational positions played an important role in safeguarding the autonomy and independence of the judicial branch in Brazil during Jair Bolsonaro’s term.
Nur Polen kann Polen aus der EU werfen. Oder drinbehalten.
On 16 October 2021, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine will celebrate its 25th anniversary. The Court’s anniversary falls in the middle of a constitutional crisis of unprecedented scale and with no clear prospects of solution.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters