Articles for tag: DemokratieReferendumVerfassungsreform

Imitating Democracy

Russia is moving fast with its constitutional reform. On 10 March, the State Duma supported an amendment, which, if it enters into force, will allow Putin to participate in the presidential elections 2024. Although the amendment is constitutionally questionable – substantively as well as procedurally – Russia’s Constitutional Court is likely to give its approval.

Herrschaft über die Verfassung

Die Nachricht kam überraschend. Am Mittwoch unterbreitete der russische Präsident Putin in seiner jährlichen Botschaft an die Föderalversammlung einen Katalog von Vorschlägen zu einer Reform der Verfassung. Und nur fünf Tage später brachte Putin einen entsprechenden Änderungsvorschlag in die Duma ein. Die Änderungsvorschläge wirken aus verfassungsjuristischer Sicht widersprüchlich und kaum durchdacht. Obwohl die Bedeutung des Vorrangs der Verfassung in Putins Rede stark betont wird, zeugen die Ausführungen von einer Geringschätzung ihrer freiheitsschützenden Inhalte und wirken in Teilen gar „sarkastisch“.

Personal instead of Institutional Power

The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies.

Between Constitutional Romance and Real-World Politics

The Chilean process for a new constitution is a reminder that constitutional processes are not necessarily ideal scenarios of high deliberation, but processes that can include risks, self-interested politicians, the threat of violence, and competing views that try to defeat each other. In Chile, the romantic notion of constitution-building as a sort of new beginning quickly faced the challenges of real-world politics in a situation of institutional fragility.

A Constitution Borne Out of Actual Bullets

When Sergio Verdugo published his post "The Chilean Political Crisis and Constitutions as Magic Bullets", Chile’s President Sebastián Piñera’s approval rate was at 14%. Less than a week later, polls suggest a worrying and unprecedented 9% support. Although President Piñera has adopted significant measures, people are still protesting. It is not likely that this will change until the people have had the opportunity to participate in constitutional deliberations – and it is now upon the President to act.

The Chilean Political Crisis and Constitutions as Magic Bullets

Chile is currently experiencing the most severe crisis since the dictatorship. One of the proposals to solve this crisis is to replace the current Constitution. Proponents of a constitutional replacement should consider two caveats: First, the constitution-making process should not weaken the representative institutions but strengthen them, and second, the promises need to be realistic as Constitutions are not magic bullets capable of instantaneously responding to social demands.

Resentment, Populism and Political Strategies in Italy

After Matteo Salvini announced his plan of holding snap elections, the former Italian prime minister (Presidente del Consiglio), Matteo Renzi launched the idea to postpone elections by forming a transistional government supported by the Partito democratico and the MoVimento 5 stelle, amongst others. Renzi knows that, according to the polls, Salvini’s political party (the Lega) could win the elections and form a government with Fratelli d’Italia, a post-fascist and still far-right party or with Forza Italia, the party created by Silvio Berlusconi. But would this move prevent a populist government?