Articles for tag: Europäische Kommission, Malta, Staatsbürgerschaft

Citizenship for Sale (Commission v Malta)

The Maltese “passports for sale” (Golden Passports) was big news a year or two ago but has now disappeared below the radar of public attention. Yet, the mills of justice might grind slowly, but grind they do. The case brought by the Commission against Malta is scheduled to be heard by the CJEU sometime later this year. So, Malta offers passports for sale. Quelle Horreur! I hear you sniffing with disgust and indignation. They sell their citizenship, and hoopla – automatically these new citizens, ipso facto and ipso jure are European Citizens enjoying all the rights and duties which attach to such.

14. April 2024

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Risky Recommendations

2024 will see numerous elections, including the European Parliament Elections in June. The Digital Services Act (DSA) obliges Big Tech to assess and mitigate systemic risks for “electoral processes”. The Commission published Draft Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes and sought feedback from all relevant stakeholders. While the protection of election integrity is a laudable aim, the Guidelines as proposed would not rebuild but further erode citizen trust in the digital environment and democratic processes. The recommendations are too vague, too broad and too lenient as regards the suggested cooperation between Big Tech, civil society and public authorities.

28. Februar 2024

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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

This blogpost unpacks some of the ‘democratic paradoxes’ that come with the ‘Defence of Democracy’ package (DoD package), which the European Commission published on Tuesday, 12th of December. While a Recommendation on promoting civic engagement and citizen participation (Civil Society Recommendation) reflects positive changes in the Commission’s conception of democracy, the ‘Directive establishing harmonised requirements in the internal market on transparency of interest representation carried out on behalf of third countries’ (Foreign Funding Directive) directly contradicts this emphasis on a more citizen-centred model and is illustrative of a broader dilemma: how to defend democracy in the EU’s multi-level constitutional space, while keeping the sensitive legal tools for doing so out of the hands of the enemies of democracy that are already – and for the time being irreversibly – on its inside.

19. Dezember 2023

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“This Is Not a Foreign Agents Law”

On Tuesday, 12 December 2023, the Commission adopted its long-awaited Defence of Democracy package, which includes a Proposal for a Directive on Transparency of Interest Representation on behalf of Third Countries. Dubravka Šuica, Commissioner for Democracy and Demography seemed eager to clarify what the Directive is not. Šuica emphasised that the Directive “is not a foreign agents law”. But the more a statement is repeated, the less credible it appears. Rather, the opposite appears to be true. And so, the devil is not in the name, it lies in enforcement. Despite the Commission’s assertion that full harmonisation of the Directive prevents Member States from gold-plating or potentially worse activities, the Commission has limited control over how Member States apply and enforce their national laws. This is the biggest risk of the proposal.

19. Dezember 2023

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Orbán’s Veto Play – The Subsidiarity Card

Viktor Orbán is known to use veto threats in the European Council to get his way. This time, he was keen to see that after months of tense exchanges with the Commission, Hungary gets access to EU funds that had been blocked in order to achieve compliance with the rule of law and fundamental rights conditionality. So, PM Orbán saw it fit to loudly contest Ukraine’s accession and the financial aid package of 50 billion Euros. This may be PM Orbán’s strongest veto play to date.

15. Dezember 2023

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The Future of the Rule of Law in the EU

With systemic threats to and violations of the rule of law not subsiding, notwithstanding the expected end of backsliding in the case of Poland, the future of the rule of law in the EU is likely to be one of retrenchment accompanied by increased gaslighting to mask an increased gap between EU rhetoric and EU action. This means that the Commission’s decision to unlock € 10 bn of EU funding previously frozen on rule of law grounds to “sway Viktor Orbán on Ukraine” should not be seen as a once-off aberration but as prefiguration of a new abnormal normal.

14. Dezember 2023

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At a Snail’s Pace

By 1 April 2018, member states had to transpose an EU Directive on ‘the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings’. Bulgaria has not fully transposed it to this day, and consistently undermines it. Now, finally, the Commission has launched infringement proceecings. Preceding the announcement, the Commission rejected Rasosveta Vassileva's reasoned complaints on the same issue, as late as 2022. Her odyssey is a concerning tale on how EU institutions handle citizen alerts.

18. Oktober 2023

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The Price of Transatlantic Friendship

While the citizens of most EU Member States enjoy visa-free travel to the US, citizens of Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus do not. Following the Commission’s repeated refusal to activate the reciprocity mechanism in EU visa law to remedy this inequality in access to visa-free travel, the European Parliament asked the CJEU whether the Commission was under an obligation to do so. The Court answered in the negative, holding instead that the Commission had wide discretion in this regard. Its reasoning centers the sensitive political nature that visa retaliation vis-á-vis the US implies, while failing to instill a sense of urgency in working towards equal treatment of EU citizens. This threatens to perpetuate a situation in which the advantages of supranational integration in the context of the Schengen acquis are permanently withheld from nationals of Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus.

12. September 2023

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Reinventing a Broken Wheel

On 16 July, the European Commission and the Tunisian government signed a new strategic partnership on migration, sparking outrage by European parliamentarians, researchers and civil society actors given Tunisia’s autocratic turn since 2021 and the recent flaring up of racial and xenophobic violence. The deal is emblematic of the blind spots of trans-Mediterranean migration cooperation over the past decades: First, a growing reliance on informality and symbolic politics at the expense of accountability; and second, a persistently Euro-centrist perspective that overlooks the dynamics South of the Mediterranean, with dire policy consequences.

5. September 2023

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Team Europe’s Deal

On 16 July 2023, the European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement and Tunisia’s Secretary of State of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Migration and Tunisians Abroad signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on a ‘strategic and global partnership’ between the European Union (EU) and Tunisia. The signing followed a meeting in Tunisia between Tunisian President Kais Saied and ‘Team Europe’ (European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte). The deal is part of the growing trend to externalise migration control. Against this background, this blog post first clarifies what was agreed before explaining why the agreement is problematic both in terms of substance and form.

21. August 2023

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