Articles for tag: Common Foreign and Security PolicyEuropean Council

Is the Hungarian Block Really a Legal Issue?

This post engages with the exchange between Spieker and von Bogdandy and Dawson and van den Brink over the Hungarian block in the European Council (EUCO) and Council on CFSP issues. The issue at the heart of this debate is not one of fantasticalness but of formal legal orthodoxy. The Hungarian block is not a legal constitutional issue but a political one; one that has been reinforced by the 30 June 2025 Council decision to extend the sanctions. Accordingly, any suggested response ought to be political rather than legal.

In Favour of the Hungarian Council Presidency

On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States.

Why an EU Country under the Surveillance Procedure (Article 7.1 TEU) Should not Chair the Council Presidency

In accordance with the Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, from July 1 of this year the office is to be held by Hungary. This occasion will mark the first time that the Presidency will have been held by a Member State that has been subject to the “surveillance” procedure in Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, having been launched by the European Parliament in September 2018. It would now be both prudent and sensible for the Council to delay the Hungarian Presidency to such a time when the Article 7(1) TEU surveillance procedure will have been successfully concluded. Such a postponement should not be considered as a sanction against Hungary, but rather a simple precautionary measure to preserve the smooth functioning of the European Union.

Between Continuity and a Perforated ‘Cordon Sanitaire’

Fears of a radical right-wing wave dominated the debates leading up to the European Parliament (EP) elections. As the final votes are tallied across the 27 EU Member States, it has become evident that the predictions of pre-election polls have partially come true: Far-right parties secured about a quarter of the popular vote. What are the implications? While the current results likely indicate by-and-large continuity in the European Parliament, including an ongoing shift to the right on contested issues such as migration or climate policy, they had heavily disruptive consequences on the national level, which in France has resulted in snap parliamentary elections. This will have pronounced impact on the balance of power in the (European) Council and on the EU as a whole.

Politisches Microtargeting vs. Rechtsaufsicht

In der letzten Woche ist bekannt geworden, dass die EU-Kommission, konkret der amtliche Account der Kommissarin für Inneres, Microtargeting auf X (vormals Twitter) nutzte, um Schwung in ein festgefahrenes Gesetzgebungsvorhaben zu bringen. Es handelt sich um eine gezielte Beeinflussung der gesellschaftlichen Debatte rund um die sogenannte „Kinderschutzverordnung“, auch bekannt als „Chatkontrolle“ durch datenbasierte Zielgruppenansprache (zur Berichterstattung und Analyse). Diese Posts sollten Druck auf mitgliedsstaatliche Regierungen ausüben, um doch noch eine Mehrheit für das Vorhaben zu beschaffen. Dieser Vorgang ist auch abseits der inhaltlichen Debatte um die „Chatkontrolle“ bemerkenswert, schließlich zeigt er neben den systemischen Risiken von Plattformen und dem Bedürfnis nach effektiver Durchsetzung von Plattformregulierung auf, dass die Kommission sich in einem Spannungsverhältnis der Funktionen als Aufsichtsbehörde und als politische Akteurin befindet und somit das systeminhärente Risiko besteht, dass sie ihre Funktion als Aufsichtsbehörde zugunsten politischer Ziele vernachlässigt.

Human Rights Violations to Deflect Refugees

The Council of the European Union (EU) recently reached a negotiating position (‘mandate’) on two significant elements of the ‘reform’ of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The vision hailed as a ‘historic’ agreement by national governments is a direct threat to the right to asylum. The Council not only maintains all structural flaws of the CEAS intact but proposes a quagmire of asylum procedures marred by unworkable, unnecessarily complex rules, that are in clear violation of key human rights standards.

The National Case for Reforming the EU Treaties

Four arguments of either explicit or implicit importance in encouraging states to engage in Treaty reform in this ‘reform period’ are of decisive importance again now. Many of these arguments have already found their way into political discourse (for example into the cautious opening of the German government to Treaty reform) while others have not. The key to making the national case for Treaty reform may therefore lie in demonstrating to the Member States that these factors make opening-up the Treaties in their national interest.

Untying the Ties that (don’t) Bind

In his letter to MEP Daniel Freund of 17 June 2022, European Council President Charles Michel argued that neither he, as President, nor the European Council have the power to exclude democratically unaccountable representatives of a Member State from that institution. But President Michel’s apparent recourse to a literal reading of Article 15(2) TEU – which fails to consider its relationship with other provisions relating to the composition of the European Council – is not convincing.

A More Complex Union

Based on the new legal history of European integration that has come out over the last decade, I will offer a different interpretation of the role of law in the EU than the one typically offered by legal scholarship. The central conclusion is that there is an unresolved tension in the relationship between law and politics in the EU that will most likely shape the Union’s response to the Polish crisis. To conclude, I will offer several alternative scenarios of how the EU may react to the Polish crisis.

A(nother) lost opportunity?

The October meeting of the European Council (EUCO) was its first occasion to react to the declaration by the Polish “Constitutional Tribunal” that several provisions of the Treaty on European Union are incompatible with Poland’s Constitution and consequently inapplicable to the country. The express denunciation of fundamental provisions of EU primary law by one of its members (with the support of another), while insisting on his country remaining part of the Union, is a situation the EUCO could hardly overlook. And yet, not a word about the unfolding constitutional crisis was included in the EUCO Conclusions. Various elements may explain the restraint. However, the complete muteness from the EU crisis-manager-in-chief is more questionable and may carry a disquieting message.