Articles for tag: Austeritätspolitik, Brexit, EU-Reform, Eurozone

10 (pro-EU) reasons to be cheerful after Brexit

As the dust continues to swirl around the momentous Brexit referendum result a month ago (and doesn’t show any signs of settling anytime soon) I suspect many EU sympathisers will be somewhere in the middle of the various stages of the Kübler-Ross Grief cycle: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance. So, somewhat incongruosly, are the ‘leavers’. Whereas there are almost as many emotions being experienced on all sides as there are potential options on what will happen next both in terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU as well as the future of the EU itself, in this post I want to set out a number of (pro-EU) reasons – some obvious, some optimistic, others wildly speculative – to be cheerful amidst the uncertainty created by the Brexit vote.

22. Juli 2016

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Conditionality through the lens of the CJEU: a “blurry” view

From the very beginning of the Eurozone crisis, conditionality progressively entered into the vocabulary and the normative sphere of the EU economic governance. At the time of the first assistance package to Greece, conditionality was just an emergency tool set in the bilateral Loan Agreements, signed by Greece and other Members States. However, after the establishment of emergency funds like the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and especially after the creation of a permanent institution, a sort of “European mirror image of the IMF” – the ESM – conditionality has become a sort of leitmotiv of the European response to the economic crisis or, even, a necessary requirement according to the ECJ.

30. Juni 2016

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President Tusk’s Proposal for a New Settlement for the UK in the EU: Fueling – not Taming – EU Disintegration

The European Union is at the crossroad. On 17 February the European Council will deal with the United Kingdom’s request to renegotiate the terms of its EU membership. The British Conservative government has committed to holding a referendum on withdrawal from the EU before the end of 2017. At the same time, the British Prime Minister has opened negotiations with its European partners, asking for a “new deal” between the UK and the EU. In particular, Mr. David Cameron advanced four requests: the UK should be legally exempted from participating to the project of “an ever closer union”; national parliaments ... continue reading

3. Februar 2016

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Cameron’s EU reforms: political feasibility and legal implications

David Cameron, the UK’s Prime Minister, has set out his objectives for EU reforms in a speech at Chatham House on 10 November 2015 – objectives which he later clarified in a letter to the President of the European Council Donald Tusk. Cameron’s demands fall in four categories – i) safeguarding Britain’s position in the Union’s ‘variable geometry’; ii) strengthening the competitiveness of the Union’s internal market; iii) bolstering the democratic authority of the EU by strengthening the role of national parliaments in the EU’s decision-making process; and iv) ensure changes to the principles of free movement and equal treatment of Union citizens in access to welfare systems in the host state. The political feasibility and legal implications of these objectives differ quite significantly. More crucially, each of the stated objectives can be interpreted and implemented in different ways. Generally, it seems, Cameron’s success seems to depend on presenting reforms that at the same time address British domestic issues as well as strengthen the EU’s functioning.

10. November 2015

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Greece: a constitutionalist’s two (euro)cents.

Greece is obviously at the forefront of many EU scholars’ minds over the past number of weeks. There has been an avalanche of commentary and analysis on the Greek bailout negotiations both from those with intimate knowledge of the situation and familiarity with Greek politics, the EMU and sovereign debt crises as well speculation from the sidelines from those of us more ignorant of these matters. Therefore as someone whose credibility in the debate (such as it is) is limited to the expertise of the constitutional lawyer with a good familiarity of EU law generally, I have limited my two (euro)cents on the topic to a number of (mostly factual) propositions related to the crisis for what they are worth. Most I think are obvious and (hopefully) few are contentious but I think that they are worth (re)stating in the context of the war of words and recrimination from all sides present in the debate in recent days.

17. Juli 2015

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The Euro Summit deal: defeat or victory? A response to Robert Howse

Avoiding Grexit is, of course, the important achievement of the Agreement. But this counts as a success no more than surviving self-inflicted wounds: Concrete discussions on Grexit revived only in the last months and especially after the recent referendum. They are actually the product of the negotiation strategy itself. If we are looking for success then, we are left with debt relief and the new conditionality.

16. Juli 2015

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The Deal on Greek Debt: Political Gamechanger for Europe, Tactical Retreat (not Surrender) by Tsipras

The conventional wisdom, delivered before anyone could really ponder the fine print of the Greek debt deal, is that Tsipras surrendered to the creditors in a humiliating defeat. His referendum and prior tenacity in negotiations proved futile,according to the predominant account that has emerged in the media and the twitter and blog worlds. Wrong on all counts. And here's why.

13. Juli 2015

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Eine Schuldenrestrukturierung setzt keinen Grexit voraus!

Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäubles Behauptung, Griechenland könne wegen Art. 125 AEUV nur außerhalb der Eurozone seine Schulden gegenüber anderen Euro-Staaten und EFSF bzw. ESM restrukturieren, beruht auf einem Denkfehler, wenn nicht gar auf einem Taschenspielertrick. Die Pringle-Rechtsprechung des EuGH zeigt: Das Europarecht schaufelt sich nicht sein eigenes Grab. Man muss es nicht erst umgehen, um die Ziele der Union wahrhaft zu verwirklichen.

12. Juli 2015

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Merkel, Tsipras und die Schwierigkeit, das offensichtlich Richtige zu tun

In dem aktuellen Drama um Griechenland sehen sich zwei europäische Politiker mit der Erwartung konfrontiert, etwas offensichtlich Richtiges, aber gleichzeitig offenkundig Unmögliches zu tun. Alexis Tsipras soll aus Griechenland endlich einen funktionalen Staat machen, Angela Merkel soll Griechenland endlich aus der Schuldenfalle rauslassen. Wenn das so offensichtlich ist, warum tun sie es dann nicht? Ein großer Teil der Öffentlichkeit übt sich in personalisierender Kompetenz- und Motivationsdiagnostik. Ich halte einen anderen Punkt für interessanter.

8. Juli 2015

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