Articles for tag: Israel-Gaza-Krieg, IStGH, Staatsräson, Völkerstrafrecht

Staatsräson vor Völker(straf)recht?

Am 20.5.2024 hat Karim A.A. Khan, der Ankläger des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, Haftbefehle gegen den israelischen Premierminister Netanyahu und Verteidigungsminister Gallant sowie drei Hamas-Führungsfiguren in der Palästina-Situation beantragt. Die Bundesregierung argumentiert in ihrer am 9.8.2024 veröffentlichten Stellungnahme, dass Israel die echte Möglichkeit und mehr Zeit gegeben werden müsse, um selbst strafverfolgerisch tätig werden zu können. In der Stellungnahme zeigt sich eine starke, fast bedingungslose Unterstützung Israels, die einem Primat der Politik über das Recht nahekommt

19. August 2024

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Why the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction Doctrinally Attaches to Israeli and Russian Nationals

As the storm of ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan’s request for arrest warrants loomed and landed on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, ardent supporters of Israel within the U.S. and U.K. governments and beyond appear to have seized upon a jurisdictional objection. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is reported as saying that the “ICC has no jurisdiction over this matter.” The U.K. Foreign Secretary David Cameron is reported to have said the same thing. There is a basic flaw, though, in the treaty-based objection to the ICC jurisdiction as has been made. It ignores the nature of the mandate of international criminal tribunals as mechanisms for the effective preservation of the basic fabric of the international order.

8. Juli 2024

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All Eyes on Sudan (too)

This article is an attempt to add layers to the discussions of ongoing mass atrocities committed in several parts of the world by discussing an under-reported situation of large scale violence unfolding in Sudan since April 2023, in the hope that the ‘international community’ can address multiple catastrophic situations with similar urgency, mobilise for justice for all peoples, end the culture of impunity, and eventually shift the discourse towards the structural causes of such large-scale violence in different parts of the world.

4. Juli 2024

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Without Fear or Favour

Germany, like any other State Party to the Rome Statute, would be obliged under international law, and would be capable under German law, to arrest any person against whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant, be it President Putin or, in future, perhaps one of the Hamas leaders, Defence Minister Gallant or Prime Minister Netanyahu. The opposing view not only misrepresents the current state of international law, but it also contradicts the Nuremberg legacy, which must be upheld particularly by Germany.

14. Juni 2024

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Anträge mit Sprengkraft

Am 20.5.2024 hat der Chefankläger des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs bekannt gegeben, dass er in der „Situation Palästina“ mehrere Haftbefehle gegen ranghohe politische und militärische Führungspersonen beantragt hat. Dass der Ankläger zeitgleich gegen Mitglieder der Hamas und der israelischen Regierung vorgeht, bedeutet nicht, dass er eine Terrorgruppe mit einer demokratisch legitimierten Regierung gleichsetzt. Er bringt vielmehr zum Ausdruck, dass das Völkerstrafrecht für alle Konfliktparteien gilt und bemüht sich um einen ausgewogenen und (soweit in diesem Konflikt überhaupt möglich) neutralen, zumindest entpolitisierten Ansatz. Damit wird der Grundstein für eine gleichmäßige Anwendung des Völkerstrafrechts gelegt.

21. Mai 2024

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Accountability for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

Two years have passed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine – an act of aggression which 141 states of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) condemned as such shortly after. This crime of aggression has brought unimaginable suffering to the people of Ukraine. As this blog will highlight in the following, a reform of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning the crime of aggression is necessary and long overdue. The current jurisdictional regime leaves accountability gaps, which have become painfully visible in the past two years. Plausible suggestions for the reform are already out there – it ultimately “all depends on the political will” of the 124 ICC state parties.

24. Februar 2024

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Fighting Impunity Through Intermediaries

The 24th of February 2022 lastingly altered Europe’s security architecture. The European Union and its member states have continued to support Ukraine in a multitude of ways, including direct financial assistance, political support in relevant international fora, far-reaching sanctions against Russian citizens and businesses, and massive arms supplies. What has, however, remained ambiguous is within which (legal) framework the EU has provided different means of support towards Ukraine. In other words: what legal principle – that may also be derived from its treaty framework – determined and guided EU support towards Ukraine? This contribution argues that at least certain streams of EU assistance for Ukraine in countering the Russian Federation’s aggression – namely those aimed at ending impunity for international crimes – have been organized within a distinct rule of law context.

3. November 2023

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Bemerkenswerte Haftbefehle aus Den Haag

Die Haftbefehle des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs in Den Haag vom Ende letzter Woche haben schnell die Runde gemacht und sind weltweit als Eilmeldung verbreitet worden. Auch in der deutschen Presselandschaft sind die Haftbefehle gegen den russischen Staatspräsidenten sowie seine Kinderrechtsbeauftragte bewertet worden. Einige bemerkenswerte Aspekte der Entscheidung, die bislang keine Aufmerksamkeit erfahren haben, sollen hier beleuchtet werden.

21. März 2023

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What can(’t) international criminal justice deliver for Ukraine?

One year ago, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, committing an act of aggression in violation of the UN Charter. Many more incidents of international crimes followed, adding to an already large number of unaddressed crimes going back to 2014. While investigations are underway, the failures to pursue accountability for international crimes committed by Russia in the past still need to be addressed in this context.

24. Februar 2023

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A Ukraine Special Tribunal with Legitimacy Problems?

The call for a Special Tribunal for the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine ('UkrTrib') is also getting louder in the German political discourse. The proposal goes back to an initiative by the British international lawyer and writer Philippe Sands, who was quickly joined by a number of prominent politicians and international (criminal) lawyers), but this is misleading for several reasons, not least because the IMT was a consequence of the defeat of Nazi Germany and the following regime change, which in the case of Russia is unforeseeable.

6. Januar 2023

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