Articles for tag: Europäischer Haftbefehl, judicial independence, Poland, Rechtsstaatlichkeit

Luxembourg’s Unworkable Test to Protect the Rule of Law in the EU

A key rule of law case illustrating the conversation taking place between national judges and the Court of Justice about the how-to of rule of law protection is the CJEU’s LM ruling dealing with the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant. In it the CJEU developed a test to balance mutual trust and individual rights, particularly the right to a fair trial. The Rechtbank Amsterdam and the Karlsruhe Oberlandesgericht applied Luxembourg’s LM test with respect to Polish suspects in a series of recent (interlocutory) rulings. This national case-law is interesting both for its immediate outcome (suspension of surrenders) and its implicit message to Luxembourg: “Sorry, we tried, but your test is unworkable.”

18. April 2020

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Corona Constitutional #9: Bildschirm-Justiz

Wie wirkt sich der Lockdown auf die Justiz aus? Wie muss man sich eine Justiz im Lockdown überhaupt vorstellen? Ist das ein Problem, wenn die Exekutive plötzlich die Judikative herunterfährt? Sind digitalisierte Gerichtsverhandlungen möglich, und könnte die Krise insoweit sogar eine Chance sein? Darüber spricht Max Steinbeis mit dem Sprecher des Bundesvorstands der Neuen Richtervereinigung CARSTEN LÖBBERT.

15. April 2020

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Ukraine’s Presidents and the Judiciary: An Uneasy Relationship

On March 11, 2020, Ukraine’s Constitutional Court issued a decision dealing with the judicial reform of President Volodymyr Zelensky. The Court cooled down the reformist zeal of the presidential office by proclaiming major changes to the legislation on the judiciary unconstitutional. The Court’s decision strengthens judicial independence in Ukraine which is tainted with the legacy of politicization of past presidencies.

24. März 2020

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An Election in the Time of Pandemic

In Poland, the Law and Justice (PiS) government has opted not to use its constitutional power to declare a state of emergency due to the COVID-19 spreading. As Wojciech Sadurski explained, its motive is simple: not to postpone the Presidential election in Poland and thus increase the chances of the President-in-Office to win the second term. The question is whether the pandemic may cause invalidity of the election. If the answer is yes, as I suggest, the problem is who should be the judge of it. The chamber of the Polish Supreme Court that is empowered by law to do so does not give an ‘appearance of independence’, following the PiS’s so-called ‘reform’ of the judiciary.

24. März 2020

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Open Letter to the President of the European Commission regarding Poland’s »Muzzle Law«

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The current procrastination is akin to dereliction of duty: Waiting to bring infringement actions and to fail to simultaneously seek interim measures when the rule of law in a Member State is so obviously and blatantly deteriorating on an industrial scale only means that the Commission faces a far more serious and intractable problem to deal with later.

9. März 2020

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Muzzling Associations of Judges

Art 88 a of Poland's so-called "muzzle law" law prescribes that judges must disclose their membership in associations, their functions performed in non-profit foundations and membership in parties before they became judges. The provision applies to memberships in all kinds of associations, including associations of judges. In this form, the provision violates the European Convention of Human Rights as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

5. März 2020

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You Can’t Forbid Judges to Think

The Polish judiciary is split apart. One part adheres to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the EU of 19th November 2019, another does not. This legal chaos and catastrophe was caused by the recent judicial reforms and it deprives citizens of the most important right – to be certain what their legal situation in court is.

5. Februar 2020

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