On 13 January 2016, exactly four years ago today, the Commission activated its rule of law framework for the very first time with respect to Poland. This (two-part) post will highlight the main developments, primarily from the point of view of EU law, which took place in 2019.
USA, Iran, Germany, Poland, India, Austria, Chile, and a whole lot more
The Polish rule of law saga took yet another turn for the worse. The Parliament is working on a bill to prevent judicial review of the previous judicial reforms as well as to neutralize the effects of adverse CJEU judgments. The bill is blatantly unconstitutional but without a functioning Constitutional Court it does not matter much. It is also contrary to EU law.
The Polish legal system is infected by a virulent pathogen, viz. the neoKRS, which spreads its spores with each judicial appointment. The only deduction to be drawn from the recent CJEU verdict and the subsequent ruling of the Polish Supreme Court is that the neoKRS is an illegally constituted body that illegally appoints judges who deliver invalid judgments. The more illegally appointed judges, the greater the number of invalid judgments. Any government that valued the integrity of the nation’s legal system would set about healing such a sick system without delay.
Ever since the European Commission initiated a third infringement procedure in respect to the recurrent attacks on the rule of law by Polish authorities last April, the situation has continued to seriously deteriorate. It is now upon the Commission to promptly submit to the European Court of Justice an application for interim measures in the infringement case C-791/19 Commission v Poland now pending before the Court of Justice.
The need for a rapid EU response in the rule of law crisis in Malta is evident: Every aspect of Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination case is susceptible to political interference from the Office of the Prime Minister. The police force is politically controlled, the magistrate is politically appointed, any pardons which may be granted to extract further information are within the gift of the Prime Minister, as are the chief prosecutors’ career prospects. The question of judicial independence, acute as it is, is just the tip of a rather large iceberg.
Just days away from a new Commission taking office that proclaims to put rule-of-law protection centre-stage, this may be a good time to suggest some ways forward based on the energy generated by, and experiences with #WithWoj. I suggest there are three elements, and each may be counterintuitive and/or confrontational.
Der ehemalige Bundesminister des Innern und jetzige MdB Thomas de Maizière hat kürzlich unter anderem eine umfassende Reform der Justiz und ihrer Verwaltung gefordert. Die den Vorschlägen zugrunde liegende ökonomistische Sichtweise auf die Justiz scheint jedoch manchmal Effizienz mit Effektivität zu verwechseln und droht, die fein austarierte Gewaltenteilung der Verfassungsordnung zu untergraben.
The Hungarian Government has officially abandoned its plans to reform the administrative court system. However, the plan to subdue the judiciary is pursued as relentlessly as ever: On 12 November 2019, the Hungarian Government introduced an omnibus legislation which would extend political influence over the judiciary and guarantee judicial decisions favorable to the Government in politically sensitive cases.
Last week the EU Court of Justice replied to Polish Supreme Court’s preliminary references regarding the independence of judges of its Disciplinary Chamber. The good news is that the ECJ gave to all Polish courts a powerful tool to ensure each citizen’s right to a fair trial before an independent judge, without undermining the systems of judicial appointments in other Member States. The bad news is that the test of appearance may easily be misused or abused.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters