Articles for tag: EU, Joined Cases C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, judicial independence, Judicial remunerations

Paying Judges Properly

On 22 February, several thousand marched in Budapest for an independent judiciary, including fair pay for judges. Three days later, the CJEU issued a decision in Joined Cases C‑146/23 and C‑374/23, setting out the EU law criteria for judges’ remuneration. The decision sets general minimum criteria for the remuneration of judges to guarantee their independence and is highly relevant for Hungary, where the salary pathway for judges is not set by law, it is not judicially enforceable, and the entire system lacks foreseeability.

7. März 2025

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Judicial Independence and the EU-Switzerland Framework Treaty

The European Union is about to finalise a package of sectoral treaties with Switzerland. Its goal is to institutionalise five existing treaties and to conclude three new ones. At the core of these agreements lies the dispute settlement mechanism, modelled after the EU’s agreements with the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This mechanism would grant the European Commission the unilateral right to bring Switzerland before an ‘arbitration tribunal’.

28. Februar 2025

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Carte Blanche for Judicial Appointments?

In the recent Valančius judgment, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice or ECJ), ruled on Union law requirements for the judicial appointment procedure to the EU General Court. Having previously clarified the Union law requirements for the selection procedures of national judges, the Valančius case at first sight confirms the applicability of these requirements to the selection procedure of EU General Court judges. However, a closer look reveals that the judgment risks effectively giving carte blanche for Member States to design the national stage of the appointment procedure regarding EU General Court judges.

31. Januar 2025

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The US Supreme Court and Plutocracy

Populist authoritarianism is a global phenomenon. However, the US is the only so-called consolidated democracy where its ascent has been eased by the systematic dismantling of legal limits on campaign donations. US elections are now not only the world’s most costly, but they are also directly subject to the inordinate influence of wealthy individuals and corporations. The Supreme Court of the United States’ 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission ruling has paved the way for the emergence of so-called “super” PACS (political action committees) that, while formally barred from coordinating with candidates or parties, can accept unlimited corporate contributions.

24. Januar 2025

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Targeting Disciplinary Courts

Hungary has faced significant challenges to judicial independence in recent years. The incumbent Chief Justice appears to have been working for some time to take control over disciplinary proceedings. In a recent development, the sweeping outrage of judges against planned structural reforms may have created the political opportunity to further silence dissenting voices. The Chief Justice’s New Year Greetings made it clear that the threat is real. Hungary could be on the verge of a full-scale judicial capture.

16. Januar 2025

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Georgian Dream as a Nightmare for Democracy

The Georgian Dream Party has been declared as winner of the parliamentary election in Georgia. Independent observers, however, identified a large-scale, multi-faceted election-rigging scheme in favor of Georgian Dream, prompting calls to annul the results. These allegations triggered protests and sparked a debate about the future of democracy, and the rule of law in Georgia. Due to the absence of effective judicial oversight to address evidence of electoral fraud, public resistance and external pressure are crucial to preventing power capture by Georgian Dream and halting Georgia’s autocratic shift.

21. November 2024

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The Spanish Amnesty, the Conflict with Catalonia, and the Rule of Law

The Spanish amnesty for the Catalan independence movement is a victory for the rule of law, rather than a defeat. It is not an exemption from punishment otherwise due, but instead a reflection of the fact that the acts now amnestied should never have been subject to criminal prosecution in the first place. It is thus also a way for Spain to return to compliance with its obligations under European and international human rights law.

20. März 2024

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Presidential Dismissals of Judicial Officers in Tunisia

The situation unfolding in Tunisia serves as a stark example of blatant executive overreach into the realm of the judiciary. On February 12, 2024, Youssef Bouzakher, one of the most senior judges in Tunisia, submitted an individual communication against Tunisia to the UN Human Rights Committee. Through a series of presidential decrees adopted during 2021-2022, he was removed from his position as High Judicial Council member and President and was later dismissed from his judicial position together with 56 other magistrates. In this blog post, I will analyze the centrepiece of the assault on the Tunisian judiciary by President Kais Saied, namely presidential decree 2022-35, in light of international standards on judicial independence, and particularly, the ones from the African system.

5. März 2024

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Too little, too late

A few weeks after the ECtHR first stepped into the ring for the fight against rule of law backsliding in Poland via its Xero Flor judgment, it has now dealt a new blow to the Polish judicial reforms. In its Broda and Bojara ruling, the issue at hand was not the composition of the Constitutional Court, but the termination of judges’ mandates as court (vice) president. In its judgment, the Court showed once more its commitment to the safeguarding of domestic judges and the procedural protection they should enjoy. Yet, one can wonder whether the judgment will really have an impact and if it is not too little too late.

26. Januar 2024

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One-sidedly Staffed Courts

In Poland, the new parliamentary majority elected on October 15 is confronted not only with a president brought into office by the PiS party but also with a constitutional court made up exclusively of judges elected under the aegis of PiS. Any effort to restore the rule of law in the Polish judiciary is likely to meet resistance from these veto players. The difficulties to be expected for the new majority in dealing with the rule of law deficiencies that have piled up in the Polish justice system, and especially in the Polish Constitutional Tribunal since 2010 (on these difficulties here, pp. 227 ff., and here) draw attention to an underlying problem to be witnessed not only in Poland, and not only in other countries where democracy and the rule of law have deteriorated or never existed: the problem of courts, and in particular constitutional courts, with a blatant lack of political balance in their composition.

8. Januar 2024

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