Articles for tag: CETADemokratieGemischte Abkommen

Whittling Down the Collective Interest

On Friday 31 July, the Cypriot parliament voted against the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This latest development in the ratification process of CETA illustrates perfectly how facultative mixity continuously frustrates our collective interest in seeing the development of a European public sphere by forcing the discussion on European issues in isolated national public spheres.

Some Thoughts on Facultative and Obligatory Mixity after Singapore and COTIF, and before CETA

The conclusion of agreements as ‘mixed’, that is jointly by the European Union and its Member States, is a legal phenomenon peculiar to the EU legal order. Notwithstanding the almost complete silence of the Treaties on the point, mixity quickly became common practice for the Union and was, in most instances, readily accepted by its contractual partners. That does not mean, however, that mixity has not given rise, to date, to lengthy and often heated debates within, between and before the EU institutions.

Kupierte Frei­handels­abkommen: Verfassungs­rechtliche Heraus­forderungen einer neuen Unionsstrategie

Bisher wurden die Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen gemischter Abkommen bei allen Freihandelsverträgen der Union mit Drittstaaten eigenständige Vertragsparteien. Der Freihandel war damit keine ausschließliche Domäne der Union. Mit dieser Tradition wird die EU-Kommission unter ihrem Präsidenten Juncker nun brechen, wie sich aus unmissverständlichen Hinweisen in der Rede zur Lage der Union erkennen lässt. Was steht hinter diesem Paradigmenwechsel? Und ist er noch vereinbar mit dem Karlsruher Rechtsspruch, dass die mitgliedstaatliche Rechtssubjektivität nicht zu Gunsten einer staatsanalogen Union zurückweichen darf?

The Singapore Opinion or the End of Mixity as We Know It

Last week on Tuesday, with its decision in Opinion 2/15, on the Union’s competence to conclude ‘new generation’ EU trade and investment agreements, the Court dropped a bombshell. The Court’s ruling is set to significantly simplify the EU’s international economic relations with third countries. If the Commission, the Council and the member states had demanded clarity as to which institutions may legitimately pursue the Union’s external action objectives in its commercial relations: clarity is what they earned. The decision indeed has the potential to greatly facilitate an ‘EU-only’ signing and conclusion of future EU trade agreements. At the same time, as we argue below, the Court’s reasoning entails a number of contradicting elements that may add confusion over the legal parameters of post-Lisbon EU external relations conduct.

The Singapore Silver Bullet

Is the CJEU's Opinion on the Singapore free trade agreement a boost for Brexit? After reading the Opinion my feeling is exactly the opposite. The Court has made a clever juggling exercise with Christmas presents for everybody. But in fact, the Court has saved the best Christmas present for itself. And there are hardly any gifts for Britain. In fact, the Opinion contains a paragraph that could blow up the entire Brexit process.

Shared powers: the elephant in the room in the division of powers-debate

The saga surrounding the signing of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has again brought the issue of the division of foreign affairs powers between the EU and its Member States to the centre of attention of many an EU lawyer. How far do the EU’s exclusive powers to conduct a ‘common commercial policy’ reach? Do implied powers supplement the EU’s express exclusive powers in this area? Is it appropriate to apply a so-called ‘centre of gravity’ test when assessing the vires of a particular EU action on the international scene, or should a piecemeal approach be followed, whereby the inclusion of a single provision that reaches beyond the scope of the EU’s exclusive powers requires a proposed international agreement to be adopted as a ‘mixed’ agreement?

Endstation Karlsruhe? Was von der CETA-Verhandlung vor dem Bundes­verfassungs­gericht zu erwarten ist

Die emotionsgeladene öffentliche Debatte um CETA und TTIP steuert auf einen vorläufigen Höhepunkt zu: Am morgigen 12. Oktober 2016 befasst sich das Bundesverfassungsgericht mit mehreren Anträgen, die es dem deutschen Vertreter im Rat verbieten sollen, dem Abschluss des CETA-Abkommens mit Kanada zuzustimmen bzw. durch sein Abstimmungsverhalten die vorläufige Anwendbarkeit des CETA zu ermöglichen. Was sind die verfassungsrechtlichen Maßstäbe? Und wie wird das BVerfG voraussichtlich entscheiden?