Is constitutionalization a process that Law and Political Economy should strive for? So far, this debate has mainly been conducted in the US context. There, promoting a version of popular constitutionalism based on an egalitarian economic vision is clearly an “uphill battle.” But what about Europe and Germany? Is constitutionalism here a way of transforming LPE’s critical perspective into a positive agenda?
Again, the Commission and EU Member States are talking about new sanctions against Russia. The focus, according to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, should be on tackling sanctions circumvention and loopholes. In a scoop, however, it was also uncovered that the Commission has drawn up a non-paper “on the generation of resources to support Ukraine from immobilized Russian assets”. The idea behind this non-paper is to invest the immobilized assets of the Russian Central Bank in EU Member States’ bonds and bills and use the proceeds to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. The plan, as the non-paper indicates, is fraught with a number of legal and technical issues. These do not only relate to the question of whether or not such an investment of immobilized assets is compatible with international law and EU law, but also to the question of who should undertake and oversee these investments.
The EU Treaties oblige the European Central Bank to support the broader economic policies in the EU. Yet, the ECB has long ignored this part of its mandate. In the recently concluded monetary policy strategy review it only gets a brief mention. As we argue in a new report, this neglect of the ECB’s secondary mandate is illegal and should end as soon as possible.
Der mit dem PSPP-Urteil des BVerfG wieder aufgeflammte Streit um die Anleihenkaufprogramme des Europäischen Systems der Zentralbanken ist in die nächste Stufe eingetreten. Nachdem man zeitweise den Eindruck (oder jedenfalls die Hoffnung) haben musste, dass der Ton der Debatte nicht schärfer werden könne, ist jüngst von einem „Angriff, der nicht unwidersprochen bleiben darf“ und einer „rechtlich falsche[n]“, „äußerst gefährliche[n] Einlassung“ die Rede. Wer schwingt dieses scharfe rhetorische Schwert – und gegen wen?
The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the European Central Bank’s PSPP program did not come as a shock. All the critical arguments of that decision can be found explicitly or implicitly in the BVerfG’s referral to the Court of Justice of the EU on 18 July 2017. The real object of the decision of the BVerfG is the economic governance of the Eurozone or rather the big bet of European solidarity and European integration, in the midst of a pandemic even.
I cut my teeth studying the German Constitutional Court’s relationship with the European Court of Justice. A recent article in the Financial Times used the metaphor of a dance to explain the GCC’s history of pushing back against the ECJ’s authority. In 2001, I called it a game of chicken. I don’t worry that playing chicken with the ECJ inevitably leads to European disintegration. The GCC’s ECB ruling is, however, the wrong decision issued at the wrong time. Economic policy-makers will and should ignore the ruling, and for this reason I expect the GCC to step back from the brink, once again. But harm is nonetheless being inflicted on a tottering global economy, a fragile European project, and a disintegrating popular support for the rule of law.
„Legal nationalism“, „BVerfG goes nuclear“, „konfuses Urteil“ – trifft die schrille Kritik wirklich den Kern dieses Urteils? Nüchtern betrachtet bleibt es ein aufsehenerregendes Urteil, das aber weder einen kategorialen Bruch des gewachsenen Kooperationsverhältnisses zwischen Karlsruhe und Luxemburg bedeutet, noch der EZB eine ordoliberale Zwangsjacke verabreicht.
Christine Lagarde verband die Ankündigung ihres ersten, moderaten Rettungspakets mit der Aufforderung an die Mitgliedstaaten, fiskalische Hilfen bereitzustellen. Die Märkte scheinen sich das Vertrauen in die Fiskalpolitik indessen abgewöhnt zu haben. Da starke geldpolitische Signale zunächst ausblieben, ging die Talfahrt weiter, bis Lagarde im zweiten Versuch in die Fußstapfen ihres Vorgängers trat und die Schleusen öffnete.
When Christine Lagarde announced her first, moderate rescue package, she called upon member states to provide fiscal aid. But the markets showed to have lost confidence in fiscal policy. In the absence of strong monetary policy signals, the slide continued until Lagarde in her second attempt opened the floodgates.
In the face of rising global tensions the free flow of direct investment capital across borders is in dispute. The self-evidence of free capital movements since the start of the euro can no longer be taken for granted. Concerns have emerged about the intentions of foreign investors acquiring domestic key industries.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters