Israel’s Minister of Justice has published memorandums outlining the (first) major steps in the constitutional overhaul planned by Netanyahu’s new government – an overhaul at the epicenter of the rise of constitutional populism in Israel. The paradoxes of Israeli constitutional law make it vulnerable to such a populist attack, which occurs within a specific ethno-national context involving ongoing military occupation.
Israel is rapidly undergoing a regime change/constitutional revolution - Hungary style - as reflected by various draft bills placed on the Knesset’s agenda during the past days, accompanied by a grand plan of reform presented by the Minister of Justice on January 4th. The new Israeli government only took office a few weeks ago, but these plans, evidently, were prepared carefully over several years. If successful, Israel may fully lose its democracy.
In 2019, anticipating that Israel might one day adopt an express override mechanism that would enable the Israeli legislature (the Knesset) to override the Basic Laws (Israel’s Constitution), I developed a novel theoretical framework to limit the override power. With the new hard-right government, my theory might be tested in practice. I therefore want to make this theory available in English for international audiences.
Israelischer Alarm und deutsche Gemütlichkeit
Following the 2022 elections to Israel’s legislature (Knesset), a hardcore right wing coalition is in the process of forming. Each of the potential partners in this coalition fantasizes about introducing an override clause into the Israeli constitutional system for different political motivations. However, the result would be the same. It would allow the Knesset to disproportionally infringe upon constitutional rights.
On June 20, 2022, Israel’s PM Naftali Bennet announced that he has decided, together with Yair Lapid, Israel’s foreign minister and Alternate Prime Minister, to disperse the Knesset. Bennet explained that the dissolvement was necessary to avoid “constitutional chaos”. But what was this pending “chaos”? What Bennet was referring to in such dramatic terms is the prospect of the expiration of the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria—Adjudication of Offenses and Legal Assistance), which were set to expire as a result of the Knesset failing to pass a law extending them. What are these regulations? And how can the expiration of regulations, let alone emergency regulations, amount to a constitutional crisis?
Wie jedes Jahr werden weltweit Demonstrationen stattfinden, die an die Nakba erinnern, und dieses Jahr wird auch der Tod Abu Akles Thema sein. Nicht allerdings in Berlin, zumindest nicht legal. Denn die Polizei hat gleich fünf angemeldete Demonstrationen untersagt; Verwaltungsgericht und Oberverwaltungsgericht haben die Verbote aufrechterhalten. Ein Verdacht drängt sich auf: Sollte der Verbotsgrund darin liegen, dass „diese Klientel“ dem Staat besonders unangenehm ist?
Israel recently saw a bout of terror attacks, including three assaults in a single week in late March 2022, and more since. The Israeli Government, in an attempt to curb the violence, decided among other steps to administratively detain without trial not only suspected possible terrorists from the Occupied Territories (as it regularly does) but also possible suspects among Israeli citizens. The use of administrative detentions without trial is a good example of the permanent mindset of emergency, as they are utilized as a regular means of government: when in doubt, the Israeli government detains.
On July 8, 2021, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the petitions challenging Basic Law: Israel as the Nation of the Jewish People, enacted almost three years earlier. The so-called Hasson decision not only raises important questions about the relationship between legal and political struggles, it also calls into question the constitutional foundations of equality and democracy.
Israel’s response to the pandemic took place in an unstable and highly polarized political climate. This affected the decisions taken in several ways. First, throughout the crisis, it was difficult to achieve agreement within the government on required actions. In addition, decisions often reflected political rather than professional considerations, a problem that was exacerbated by the instability of the coalition. The prospect of additional elections also effected the political will to enforce restrictions, in particular in the Ultra-Orthodox sector, as Ultra-Orthodox parties are perceived by Netanyahu as necessary partners in any government coalition.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters