Das Drama der Demokratie
Theater in Berlin und Erfurt
Theater in Berlin und Erfurt
Italien diskutiert gerade eine wichtige Reform seiner Verfassung: die Einführung der Direktwahl des Regierungsoberhaupts. Sie soll zusammen mit der Wahl beiden Parlamentskammern stattfinden. Zusätzlich soll die Zusammensetzung der beiden Kammern mit einem in der Verfassung neu zu verankernden „Mehrheitsbonus“ maßgeblich beeinflusst werden. Mit einer Stärkung der Macht des Ministerpräsidenten zulasten staatsoberhäuptlicher Garantiefunktionen würde Italien also nichts an demokratischer Stabilität gewinnen, dafür aber vieles an Ausgewogenheit und checks and balances im politischen System verlieren.
A constitutional responsibility.
Eine verfassungsrechtliche Verantwortung.
Improvisation, Unvernunft und provokante Grausamkeit.
Improvisation, Irrationality, and Provocative Cruelty.
Die für Ende Februar 2024 angesetzten Präsidentschaftswahlen im Senegal ließ der jetzige Präsident in einer Ankündigung aus Gründen von Streitigkeiten über das nationale Wahlgesetz ad interim aussetzen. Dagegen stellte sich daraufhin Mitte Februar 2024 vehement die senegalesische Judikative. Der senegalesische Verfassungsrat (Conseil constitutionnel) erklärte die präsidial angekündigte Wahlverschiebung für verfassungswidrig.
It is no secret that the rule of law in Bulgaria has been fragile for a long time, like in many other post-socialist states. Still, what has been going on in the last days in Bulgaria is extraordinary in a number of ways. It could be seen as an attack against the very constitutional foundations of the state. In this brief post, I will just focus on the last development concerning the disregard of the constitutional principle of the rule of law by one of the highest authorities in the state, namely the General Prosecutor.
Judgments by the Strasbourg Court are binding on Turkey and furthermore are the primary source for interpreting the European Convention of Human Rights, a treaty to which Turkey is party and which, according to Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, prevails over national laws such as Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code on insulting the President, in the event of conflict. ECtHR jurisprudence clearly indicates such a conflict between Article 299 and the Convention. But are Turkish courts aware of this?
The recent crisis surrounding the Italian President’s refusal to appoint a Finance Minister considered likely to pursue an agenda of ‘Italexit’ has sparked a great deal of constitutional commentary. Two particular threads of opinion are identified here and some doubts cast about them. On the one hand, there are those who consider legitimate the President’s discretionary use of power, partly in light of the pressure that would be brought to bear by the financial markets should Italy opt for exiting the single currency. On the other hand, there are those who doubt its wisdom, and offer a broader indictment of the pressure brought to bear on the Italian government as a result of being in an overly rigid Eurozone. This gets closer to diagnosing the condition, but in its ambiguity about the pressure point, fails to underscore that this is essentially a crisis made in Italy, and, if at all, to be resolved there, including a full and frank debate about membership of the single currency and even the European Union.