Der Konflikt zwischen der EU und Polen ist bereits viel weiter eskaliert, als man bis vor kurzem für vorstellbar gehalten hätte. Und immer noch ist kein Ende in Sicht. Aus dem innerpolnischen Verfassungskonflikt um Rechtsstaat und unabhängige Justiz ist ein europäischer Verfassungskonflikt um den Vorrang des EU-Rechts geworden. Wie konnte das passieren? Was für Kräfte sind da am Werk? Und wie kommen wir da wieder heraus?
The adoption of EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism in March 2017 has profoundly changed the landscape of European counter-terrorism law. The primary aim of this Directive was to further harmonise the legal framework under which terrorist offences are prosecuted across EU Member States by establishing minimum rules and standards. However, the adverse consequences for the rule of law and human rights have been overlooked from the very outset by the EU institutions. Now, five years after its adoption, it is time for a thorough revision.
Today ends the deadline for stakeholder consultations for the 2022 EU rule of law report. The report is a welcome addition to the EU’s rule of law toolbox but it is missing a vital element: the non-implementation of judgments of international courts, including both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights.
On January 16, Serbian citizens voted in a referendum on constitutional changes concerning the guarantees of the judicial independence and organization of the judicial sector. According to preliminary results, 57, 4% of citizens voted for the reforms, while 41,6% voted against, with a turnout of not more than 30% of all registered voters. I would argue that constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary should have been postponed for two reasons.
If the constitution-making and amending by Fidesz with their legally obtained two-thirds majority counted as illegitimate, constitutional revision with a simple majority cannot be acceptable. If the sudden redesign of institutions gave reason for serious concern eleven years ago, it cannot be welcomed now.
I will, in what follows, seek to answer the overarching question of this symposium, starting from a cautionary Romanian rule of law (RoL) reform tale. Other things being equal, its lessons may be extrapolated to the specific case of hopefully post-Orbánite Hungary. The specific context of Hungary presents, at least apparently, the Romanian problem in reverse, namely, the transition from an authoritarian nationalist regime to a pluralist, European, rule of law order.
Am 16. November fand vor der Großen Kammer des EuGH die mündliche Verhandlung im Verfahren C-562/21 PPU statt. Es ging um den europäischen Haftbefehl in Zusammenhang mit der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Polen – einen europarechtlichen Dauerbrenner. Wie alle Fälle mit Bezug zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Polen hat auch dieser wieder einmal große politische Brisanz. Dennoch fand das Verfahren in der Öffentlichkeit relativ wenig Beachtung. Der EuGH könnte dabei wegen der langen Inaktivität der politischen Akteur:innen im Konflikt mit Polen und auch aufgrund seiner jüngsten Rechtsstaatsrechtsprechung eine tragische Rolle spielen, die sich aus der starken Verrechtlichung des Konflikts um die Rechtsstaatlichkeit ergibt.
The third act, but not the end, of the ongoing „game of Courts” between the Romanian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice came on 9 November 2021, with a letter by the Romanian Constitutional Court to assist the acting minister of justice with a reply to the EU Commission's concern about primacy of EU law. I will not comment again on the arguments, already developed by the Constitutional Court in its decision, but I will try to emphasize, through relevant quotes, the disregard of the rule of law requirements stated in the CJEU judgment as well as the absence of the capacity of a true dialogue with the European Court.
The European Court of Justice has recently delivered a judgment in the Pinxten case. The decision specifically concerned a question of financial misappropriation at the European Court of Auditors, but its significance goes far beyond this single case. It reveals multiple misfunctions at the top of the European Court of Auditors. Curiously, however, the judgement won't be published and has thus (against the Court’s own rules) not been translated. Most people will therefore never know about it, even though the Court of Justice gathered most exceptionally a full court to deal with this case.
The case of the disciplinary proceedings against the Bulgarian judge Miroslava Todorova (Requête no 40072/13) which has recently been examined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) caught the eye of those following the rule of law decay in the European Union. On the surface, it appears that the recent ECtHR judgment on Todorova’s case is a mere example of the ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ legal maxim – after all, the application was submitted in 2013 and the Court ruled against Bulgaria only in 2021. However, a closer look reveals that the ECtHR found in favor of Bulgaria on the two most worrisome questions.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters