Articles for tag: Authoritarian Equilibrium, European Council, Konditionalität, Rechtsstaatlichkeit

Paradoxes and Dilemmas in Compliance and Enforcement

Scholars have relentlessly argued for tougher EU action against illiberal governments whose actions erode constitutional checks and balances. The panoply of EU tools is large and it comprises mechanisms for compliance via dialogue and engagement, the several infringement procedures and other ECJ cases with RoL implications, and procedures seeking enforcement. Yet, EU action remains inefficient since, to date, none of these mechanisms, jointly or individually, have been able to extract substantial compliance but rather what Agnes Batory called “symbolic and creative compliance” designed to create the appearance of norm‐conform behavior without giving up their original objectives. This poor performance reveals a crucial paradox on rule of law compliance: the EU is a community of law that lacks the last enforcement mechanism; i.e coercion.

26. Dezember 2020

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How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism?

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The principle of a proportionate financial measure enshrined in the new EU rule of law mechanism should be informed by an improved EU Justice Scoreboard (EUJS) drawing on rule of law indices. Thereby, the sensitive matter of determining the amount could be supported also by quantitative data. This is important, because the Commission will face high political pressure when acting under the new rule of law mechanism.

22. Dezember 2020

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Ein Freund, ein guter Freund

Der Kompromiss mit den Regierungen Ungarns und Polens bezüglich des Rechtstaatsmechanismus hat eine Menge – berechtigter - Kritik erfahren. Das Appeasement von Regierungen, die gegen die Grundwerte der EU verstoßen, ist zwar in der Logik der Institutionen und des politischen Handelns in der EU tief verwurzelt. Aber die zahme deutsche Reaktion auf die Eskapaden der ungarischen Regierung hat durchaus strukturelle Gründe, die weit über die Logik der EU-Entscheidungsprozesse hinausgehen. Der perpetuierte Empörungsloop über das ungarische Regime in deutschen Feuilletons und Polit-Talkshows, an dem regelmäßig auch Regierungspolitiker teilnehmen, verbirgt die Realität: Nämlich, dass die deutsche Regierung, und vor allem die deutsche Wirtschaft, sich längst mit dem ungarischen Regime zum gegenseitigen Interesse und Nutzen arrangiert hat.

22. Dezember 2020

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To Save the Rule of Law you Must Apparently Break It

The interpretative declaration of 10 December 2020 is set to go down in history as a dark page for the rule of law in the Union legal order. Regardless of whether this document will be challenged before Court in the coming sixty days, it represents an unprecedented attempt by the Member States to disregard the rule of law as their dominant organisation principle. The Union being a “Community based on the rule of law”, its members paradoxically seem to have damaged the Union in their effort to save it.

11. Dezember 2020

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LawRules #12: We need to talk about Financial Sanctions

As our podcast comes to an end, the year and the German presidency of the European Council do too. One of the foremost projects of the German presidency has been to link EU funding and compliance with rule of law standards. The mechanism is going to be a part of the next long-term budget of the Union, starting from 2021 – that is, if Hungary and Poland vote in favor of it, which is increasingly unclear at the moment, or if a way is found to circumvent their veto. The connection of rule of law violations and EU money, the advantages and shortcomings of financial sanctions for member states as well as how things stand on the current proposal – that’s what we discuss in this week’s final episode of We Need to Talk About the Rule of Law that we wrap up with an outlook on the current state of the Union, rule of law wise.

9. Dezember 2020

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