In seinem Beschluss vom 21. Januar 2020 findet das Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart Mut und dogmatische Lösungen, eine Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die öffentliche Hand zu verbessern (17 K 5255/19). Es bricht nicht nur mit der Praxis, die das Zwangsgeld letztlich in der öffentlichen Hand belässt, sondern schließt auch eine Zwangshaft gegen Amtsträger als ultima ratio nicht aus.
Writing a year ago, we warned that the situation in Poland “has deteriorated further to the point of threatening the functioning of the whole EU legal order and therefore, the future of the EU’s internal market itself.” This is no longer a mere threat but a clear and present danger. Stalling for time would be irresponsible. On current trajectory, it is only a matter of time before Poland’s rule of law default eventually triggers a knock-on process of legal disintegration.
Writing at the end of 2019 it must be clear that art. 7 TEU is not a viable political option at all. However, the Treaties do contain legal mechanisms to enforce the rule of law against the member states. Art. 7 is not, and must not, be the center of the rule of law world in the EU. Poland’s refusal to obey the Court’s judgments and its readiness to do everything possible to circumvent it strike at the very heart of the EU rule of law. The challenge is to use what is legally available rather than keep finding excuses for not using the mechanisms already in place.
While a transnational conception of the rule of law requires the engagement of and commitment to the EU project from all actors involved, this begs the question as to what happens when the assumptions underlying art. 2 TEU are no longer applicable? For the rule of law, 2019 has been of fundamental importance because we have been taught important constitutional lessons and started getting answers to some of the most crucial constitutional questions. While much still remains shrouded in mystery and question marks are aplenty, at least the judicial trajectory for the rule of law in 2020 has been set in 2019.
The Polish rule of law saga took yet another turn for the worse. The Parliament is working on a bill to prevent judicial review of the previous judicial reforms as well as to neutralize the effects of adverse CJEU judgments. The bill is blatantly unconstitutional but without a functioning Constitutional Court it does not matter much. It is also contrary to EU law.
Ever since the European Commission initiated a third infringement procedure in respect to the recurrent attacks on the rule of law by Polish authorities last April, the situation has continued to seriously deteriorate. It is now upon the Commission to promptly submit to the European Court of Justice an application for interim measures in the infringement case C-791/19 Commission v Poland now pending before the Court of Justice.
The need for a rapid EU response in the rule of law crisis in Malta is evident: Every aspect of Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination case is susceptible to political interference from the Office of the Prime Minister. The police force is politically controlled, the magistrate is politically appointed, any pardons which may be granted to extract further information are within the gift of the Prime Minister, as are the chief prosecutors’ career prospects. The question of judicial independence, acute as it is, is just the tip of a rather large iceberg.
Just days away from a new Commission taking office that proclaims to put rule-of-law protection centre-stage, this may be a good time to suggest some ways forward based on the energy generated by, and experiences with #WithWoj. I suggest there are three elements, and each may be counterintuitive and/or confrontational.
The former president of the EFTA Court, Carl Baudenbacher, lashes out at more or less the entire Norwegian legal community in his attempt to explain how Norway’s social security authorities (‘NAV’) have come to misinterpret Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems for years, and how public prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, academics and the EFTA Surveillance Authority all failed to reveal this. This reply challenges his narrative and attempts to explain how use of the “room for manoeuvre” that EU/EEA law leaves to the national legislator can very well be combined with loyal fulfilment of EEA law obligations in an EEA based on the rule of law.
Professor A. von Bogdandy in his recent piece published at Verfassungsblog analyzes difficulties regarding enforcement of the EU values. He argues that the application of Treaty provisions relating to EU fundamental values should be cautious in order to avoid controversy or pressure. However, the ‘national identity argument’ is not convincing in the Polish case. It cannot be used by a Member State in an arbitrary or blanket way without being checked and confirmed.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters