Articles for tag: coping strategies, Türkei, Verfassungsgericht

The Resistance-Deference Paradox

The Turkish Constitutional Court demonstrates the resistance-deference paradox as a pattern in its judicial behavior under autocratic pressure. The docket management strategies including prioritization and late responsiveness are also employed in politically sensitive cases. The deferring stances of the Court legitimize autocratization when core issues of the regime are at stake. In these cases, the Court develops an autocratic partnership that makes itself an unreliable actor without any commitment to judicial ethos. The resistant stances of the Court trigger the political backlash and clashes with the judiciary, leading to further contestation of political autocratization.

28. September 2022

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How Many Times Can the ECtHR Turn its Head

In the ruling Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey of 13 April, the European Court of Human Rights did not find an ulterior motive in the prolonged pre-trial detention of a journalist in Turkey. The Court also refused to find “pattern and tendency” in the treatment of civil society and independent journalism in Turkey. This approach is not limited to Article 18 case law: The Court’s entire jurisprudence on Turkey lacks systematic analysis.

21. April 2021

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Turkey’s Constitution of 1921 and Turkey’s Culture Wars of 2021

2021 marks the centennial of Turkey’s so-called ‘Constitution of 1921’. Interestingly, both academics and politicians, who don’t often see eye to eye, describe the document in praiseworthy terms. An interesting picture has emerged as a consequence: Two diametrically opposed worldviews (largely secular constitutional law scholars on the one end and AKP officials and supporters on the other, to put it crudely) drawing inspiration from the same document but with different motivations and in order to reach different outcomes.

7. April 2021

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An Unconstitutional Setback

After almost 10 years after ratification, President Erdoğan issued a decision on Saturday, 20 March, withdrawing Turkey from the Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence. This withdrawal constitutes an unconstitutional setback, not only in the protection of at risk women, but also in terms of President Erdoğan’s usurpation of legislative powers.

22. März 2021

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Year One: Reflections on Turkey’s Legal Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic

Ever since the first officially reported COVID-19 case in the country in March in 2020, Turkey, like most of the world, has taken measures to control the pandemic. The measures taken by Turkey included limitations on freedom of movement, closing schools and moving to online teaching at schools as and universities, restrictions on business opening hours, cessation of prison and detention visits, prohibition of resignation for healthcare staff, and, more stringently, the introduction of curfews.

16. März 2021

A Turkish Fairy Tale About a ‚New, Civilian Constitution‘

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is once again calling for a 'new, civilian constitution', although the previous round of far-reaching constitutional amendments have only been in force for 2.5 years. Due to declining approval rates, the AKP is turning to well-proven populist strategies, initiating debates on the constitution while referring positively to the inclusive constitution of 1921. Despite this rhetoric, the ruling AKP is not interested in a new constitution at all, but rather in specific modifications that will secure their own power.

19. Februar 2021

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The Final Death Blow to the Turkish Constitutional Court

On 22 January 2021, Turkish President Erdoğan appointed Mr. İrfan Fidan to the Turkish Constitutional Court. Besides his alleged close ties to Erdoğan, Fidan was the prosecutor of many high-profile criminal cases that have been at the heart of the current backlash against democracy and human rights violations in Turkey - many of which the Constitutional Court overturned. Fidan would be the final blow to shift the balance to fully serve Erdoğan’s interests.

28. Januar 2021

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“Is the Turkish Central Bank Independent?” as an Uninteresting Question

Yes, the Turkish Central Bank’s independence has been eroded in recent years. Yes, from 2016 until now, the Bank has had four different presidents (or governors, as they are called), which is unusual by all accounts. No, the Bank is therefore probably not independent — or as independent — as its Western counterparts. I do not find these somewhat trite but true statements about the Bank’s independence (or the lack thereof) terribly interesting. Not that they are unimportant, but because I think the erosion of the Bank’s independence is illustrative of deeper and far more curious attributes of competitive authoritarian regimes and how they sustain themselves (or fail at doing that).

18. November 2020

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