Wir sind Viktor Orbán
Rechtsstaatsmechanismus am Limit
Articles for tag: Bundeskanzler, Olaf Scholz, Orbán, Viktor, Rechtsstaatsmechanismus
In Hungary, the Law Changes Every Day but It Doesn’t Get Better
The EU Commission has agreed with us that the laws that we have analyzed in our series of four blogposts did not in fact constitute an effective anti-corruption plan. And the Commission has attached a €13.3 billion price tag to non-compliance. Now the Hungarian government is scrambling to unlock this cash by introducing two additional laws that attempt to address the Commission’s concerns. But these new laws repeat the errors of the prior laws. They create the appearance of an independent corruption-fighting system while digging in political allies at all of the chokepoints and tying up whistleblowers and anti-corruption fighters in red tape. The new laws do not make things better and they may even make things worse.
Useless and Maybe Unconstitutional
In part III of our analysis of the anti-corruption framework, we will look at another aspect of the Hungarian “reforms”: a new procedure that seems to allow the general public to challenge in court the decisions of Hungarian public prosecutors to drop corruption cases. The new procedure is nearly impossible to use and adds little value to existing controls on the public prosecutor. In addition, the Hungarian Constitutional Court may declare it unconstitutional in any event.
How NOT to Be an Independent Agency
The Hungarian government is trying to convince EU institutions that it is taking adequate steps to ensure proper spending of EU funds going forward. At the center of this effort is a new ‘Integrity Authority’. The law establishing this authority, Bill T/1260, just passed the Hungarian Parliament on 3 October 2022. We have carefully read the laws enacted so far that establish a new anti-corruption framework and can confidently say that neither the Commission nor the Council should accept what the Hungarian government is offering because the proposed changes do not begin to alter business as usual in Hungary. In this blogpost, we will analyze the ‘Integrity Authority’ which forms the centerpiece of the government’s program, showing that it is not independent from the government nor are its powers real.
Will the Commission Throw the Rule of Law Away in Hungary?
The Hungarian government is publicly saying that it is nearing a deal with the European Commission to unlock the Recovery Funds that have been withheld because the Commission has not yet approved Hungary’s plan for spending those funds. Apparently, Hungary has agreed to four conditions that will allow the €7bn worth of grants and about €8bn in low-interest loans to be approved. But if those are any indication of the price that the European Commission will extract for comprehensive violation of the rule of law, the European Commission is making a colossal mistake.
Untying the Ties that (don’t) Bind
In his letter to MEP Daniel Freund of 17 June 2022, European Council President Charles Michel argued that neither he, as President, nor the European Council have the power to exclude democratically unaccountable representatives of a Member State from that institution. But President Michel’s apparent recourse to a literal reading of Article 15(2) TEU – which fails to consider its relationship with other provisions relating to the composition of the European Council – is not convincing.
The Role of Referenda in Orban’s Regime
Following the parliamentary elections and the national referendum in April 2022, the OSCE found that the legal framework was inadequate for the conduct of a democratic plebiscite. Even though the observers noted several shortcomings of the legal regulation and documented many serious anomalies of the electoral system, they failed to put their analysis in a broader political and legal context. The aim of this short piece is to briefly describe the role that the referenda play in Orbán’s regime.
The Blame for Defeat and the Morality of Politics
The increased support of Fidesz by the majority of voters, who casted votes on 3 April despite Orbán’s immoral stance towards Putin’s war, and also these voters’ little appreciation of freedom and almost none for limiting power, raises the question whether, besides the autocrat, the opposition, and the elite, we cannot blame also the ‘people’ for the opposition’s defeat and Fidesz’s victory.
Why They Win
It is difficult for us to acknowledge that populist illiberalism is successful and, until it is confronted by a serious economic crisis, cannot be replaced by elections. That, however, seems to be the case, at least in a society where there is little appreciation for freedom and almost none for limiting power. Let us at least be honest with ourselves: such electoral victories can hardly be explained by anything else.
Why We Lost
The united opposition in Hungary has suffered a crushing defeat at the parliamentary elections yesterday. Some of my friends and acquaintances will blame for the outcome the new electoral rules produced by Viktor Orbán’s government, and his high degree of control over electronic and printed media. They will be wrong, as they often were before. We lost! And by numbers that completely falsify the electoral rule thesis, that suggested in all its versions that the rules give Fidesz 3-5 % advantage.
