Articles for tag: EPPEUKonditionalitätMFFOrbán, ViktorRechtsstaatlichkeit

Ein Freund, ein guter Freund

Der Kompromiss mit den Regierungen Ungarns und Polens bezüglich des Rechtstaatsmechanismus hat eine Menge – berechtigter - Kritik erfahren. Das Appeasement von Regierungen, die gegen die Grundwerte der EU verstoßen, ist zwar in der Logik der Institutionen und des politischen Handelns in der EU tief verwurzelt. Aber die zahme deutsche Reaktion auf die Eskapaden der ungarischen Regierung hat durchaus strukturelle Gründe, die weit über die Logik der EU-Entscheidungsprozesse hinausgehen. Der perpetuierte Empörungsloop über das ungarische Regime in deutschen Feuilletons und Polit-Talkshows, an dem regelmäßig auch Regierungspolitiker teilnehmen, verbirgt die Realität: Nämlich, dass die deutsche Regierung, und vor allem die deutsche Wirtschaft, sich längst mit dem ungarischen Regime zum gegenseitigen Interesse und Nutzen arrangiert hat.

So It Goes – Part II

This week, the Hungarian and Polish governments vetoed the critical elements of the European Multi-Annual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund that required the unanimous consent of European Union Member States. Prime Minister Orbán had been threatening this veto ever since the European Commission proposed to link the distribution of these funds to comply with the rule of law. The Brussels veto this week coincided with a domestic legal blitz in Budapest as a major constitutional amendment, and a flurry of new laws and decrees appeared all at once. The two legal events are related.

So It Goes – Part I

The Hungarian government is now so routinely using unconstitutional emergency powers to circumvent constitutional constraints that one must conclude that the government’s main aim is to govern outside the very constitution that it wrote for itself a mere decade ago. At this point, it seems irrelevant whether this limitless power is achieved with or without the declaration of a constitutionally authorized state of emergency. Government unconstrained by the constitution in Hungary has become the norm and not the exception.

A New Chapter in the Hungarian Government’s Crusade Against LGBTQI People

On 10 November 2020 - the same day the Hungarian National Assembly authorized the Government to rule by decree for 90 days in the state of danger - the Minister of Justice submitted a whole package of legislative reforms. Among them, the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary. Two proposed amendments would directly detrimentally affect the rights of the LGBTQI community, which, we argue, would make it extremely difficult to deconstruct the institutionalized trans- and homophobia which the government has been further entrenching for years.

Power Grab in Times of Emergency

In the late hours on 10 November, the National Assembly adopted an Enabling Act authorizing the Orbán cabinet to govern by decree for 90 days, even though the executive already had very broad legislative power due to the introduction of the medical state of emergency. The ink was barely dry on the approval of the delegation of extraordinary legislative power to the government, when the Minister of Justice introduced several bills on important legislative reforms, such as the Ninth Amendment to the Fundamental Law and changes to the electoral system.

No Doubt, Lots of Benefit

The Hungarian government demanded the dismissal of Commissioner Vera Jourová over a quip she made in an interview in the German press. The day before the Commission’s first annual report on the rule of law is scheduled to land, the EU finds itself steeped in a high level inter-institutional conflict — sown by a self-proclaimed illiberal democrat. This is what being stranded by one’s own self-deception looks like.

Blaming the People is not a Good Starting Point

A few days ago a very thought provoking article written by Prof. J. H. H. Weiler was published on ICONnect blog. I very much agree with the core of his argument that we need to pay more attention to the popular support enjoyed by the Orbán government and we cannot blame everything and anything on him alone. However, there are several points in his argumentation which I would like to address.

Defending the Open Society against its Enemies

On 18 June 2020, in the case of Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that Hungarian authorities “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations” when it adopted a new legislation on NGO in 2017. How will the Hungarian government react? Six potential scenarios can be outlined from not doing anything (scenario 1) – an unlikely option due to the threat of pecuniary sanctions – to full and good faith compliance with the judgment resulting in the total repeal of the Lex NGO (scenario 6) – equally unlikely. Between these two, four additional ones may be foreseen.

From Emergency to Disaster

This week, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government put before the Hungarian Parliament two draft laws that, if passed, would end the state of emergency and create a new legal framework for handing the pandemic from here on out.  In doing so, the government was responding to those who criticized the unlimited power that the government had been given in the law creating a pandemic emergency, the Enabling Act of 30 March 2020.  That law allowed the government to override any law by decree, a power that was unlimited in both scope and time and that violated Fidesz’ own “illiberal” constitution the Fundamental Law.  

The new laws are no better, and may even be worse.   One of the draft laws is less than one page long accompanied by two pages of justification.   It purports to repeal the initial Enabling Act (about which, more below).    The other one is called the law on “transitional provisions” and at first it seems only to provide lots of technical answers to questions that arise about how to reset deadlines for various legal processes that were delayed when the economy stopped. The new laws are no better, and may even be worse.