Articles for tag: ArbeitsrechtCrisisMigrationsrechtVerfassungsrechtVölkerrechtWissenschaft

Crisis and Legal Scholarship

References to crisis abound. Since the 2008 financial crash and with the popularisation of the term “polycrisis” after the COVID-19 pandemic, the idea that we live in times of crises shapes public opinion, political discourse, and academic debates. A review of posts published on Verfassungsblog between January and July 2025 reveals an average of 15 posts per month mentioning some kind of crisis. Crisis is certainly a catchword, and these are hard to resist. But the pervasiveness of this term can also tell us something about the kind of knowledge produced by legal scholarship.

The “Best Available Science”

Two recent fisheries disputes reveal that the “best available science” standard is neither singular nor straightforward. Instead, science emerges as contested terrain, shaped by power, uncertainty, and competing truths. These cases could have important implications for the future application of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and its growing relevance for biodiversity and animal protection.

Why Climate Science Matters for International Law

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion on May 21, 2024 in response to a request submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (COSIS). While various aspects of the advisory opinion have already been discussed in this joint blog symposium, this post focuses on a feature of the opinion that has so far received little emphasis: the strong role of science. The scientific evidence presented by the tribunal provides a solid basis for its conclusions on State obligations to prevent, reduce, and control climate pollution.

Facing Up: Impact-Motivated Research Endangers not only Truth, but also Justice

All (but one) responses to my reflections on the ethics of activism as scholars in this blog symposium have been thoughtful, engaged, and charitable. For them, I am very grateful. If my rule-consequentialist worries have any truth to them, we should worry more rather than less about having the relevant motivation I castigate. When the moral stakes are higher (such as in vast areas of the Global South), one has to be even more careful about not making moral mistakes. The debate is not about whether one should be moral (by definition, we should be). It is about what is the most effective means in which the constitutional studies academy can contribute to a more just world. 

What’s wrong with good “scholactivism”?

There is a fine line between suspicion based on the nature of the motivation (seeking direct material change), and the substance of the motivation (commitment to a particular normative position). Once the “scholactivist” label gets thrown around, it may be hard to maintain that distinction. And it is to normative positions which advocate new ideas or change – including those that are reflective or well-considered – to which the label is most likely to attach.

Scholactivism and Academic Self-Awareness

In the past decade, the U.K. has seen the overwhelming influence of the populist right. It manifests most famously in the Brexit process, but also in continuous calls for a reversal of liberal constitutionalism. Notably this process is bolstered by a group of scholars, many of whom were in my own faculty at Oxford, who serve as legitimation of government policy and spur its development. Importantly, though clearly highly effective ‘scholactivists’, these scholars would never describe themselves as such. We need to follow the money, we need to follow its route to power and to understand the role the academy plays in legitimating and building these ideological (and often religious) positions.

‘Activism’ Is Not the Problem

My claim and critique of Khaitan’s position is that constitutional law scholars must produce actual answers to questions of legality, constitutionality or feasibility. Scholars may differ in whether or not they start their inquiry with a ‘material outcome’ as their hypothesis but the quality of work by both ‘activist’ and ‘non-activist’ scholars is to be assessed on the basis of the outcome and their academic integrity.