Two Heads, One Crisis

The President of the Chamber of Deputies has just authorized the creation of a working group to discuss the possibility of adopting a semi-presidential system of government in Brazil. With the successive political crises since the promulgation of the constitution culminating in two successful impeachments, a growing number of voices are expressing support for the adoption of a semi-presidential system. It is unlikely, however, that such reform will bring political stability by itself.

Reimagining a European Constitution

At this point, it is almost trite to say that the invasion of Ukraine has thrown the world order into tailspin. Unimaginable steps have been taken by the European Union and its Member States in the weeks since the invasion. These steps have already started to have significant consequences for discussions on the future of EU constitutionalism. Arguably, the appetite and political will for change is unprecedented and could serve to unplug EU constitutionalism from its sclerotic tendencies – it must be capitalised on.

Mutual (Dis)trust

Last week, the General Court of the European Union, in its judgment T-791/19 Sped-Pro, recognized for the first time the impact that systematic rule of law deficiencies have on national competition authorities. The judgement is seminal, in that it openly questions the ability of national authorities impacted by rule of law backsliding to effectively enforce EU law. The judgement also goes to the heart of explaining the pivotal constitutional role played by competition law within the EU legal order.

Restoration without the Constitution

After what is now almost a two-decade long rule by the governing party, there are strong indications that a strong reshuffling in Turkish politics is in the works. Support for President Erdogan and his party is declining. I argue, firstly, that it is a combination of factors that has led to this moment of changing fortunes in Turkish politics – a combination that sheds light on what tactics may successfully be employed by opposition forces who wish to put an end to autocracies. Secondly, I claim that constitutional restoration in Turkey does not require formal constitutional change.

Beware of the Bulldozer

The case of Russia teaches us how dangerous extra-constitutional constitution making can be – and that it should always be just a last resort. No substantive institutional changes should be made outside of the constitutional bounds. Otherwise, there will always be the danger that breaking the rule of law will continue even after constitutional change has taken place. This is precisely what Russian intellectuals and jurists, who supported Yeltsin in 1993, learned under the rule of Vladimir Putin. We should try to avoid repeating their mistakes.   

Restoring the Validity of Law in Democratic Societies

The questions posed by Professors Andrew Arato and András Sajó in their open letter Restoring Constitutionalism are pressing and of utmost public importance. Many of the issues and controversies raised in the letter arise after “democratic backsliding has taken place” and when the constitution already includes “entrenched authoritarian enclaves”. Taking this context into consideration, I will examine a more basic issue, namely the validity of law in a democratic society.

A Matter of Pragmatism rather than Principle

Taking into consideration that the backsliding of Turkish democracy during the last ten to fifteen years happened in a piecemeal and often erratic way, only partially based on constitutional amendments, the reverse process should also be possible by gradual legal and, eventually, constitutional changes. Political pragmatism, based on a clear commitment to basic democratic values and societal reconciliation, might be more important for the sustainable recovery of Turkish democracy than a radical constitutional restart.