Thema: Autoritarismus & Populismus

Verfassungserosion, demokratischer Rückschritt, verfassungsrechtliche Herausforderungen demokratischer Regierungsführung, populistischer Konstitutionalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Antworten auf Autoritarismus. Umfasst wehrhafte Demokratie, verfassungsrechtliche Selbstverteidigung und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen gegen demokratische Erosion.

The Iron Cage of Veneration

From my perspective, the most fundamental question that Arato and Sajó are asking is precisely how committed lawyers and constitutionalists should be to particular political systems that do not, at least on the surface, offer any grounds for optimism that the next election will “vote the rascals out of office” and enable forward movement to achieving the grand aspirations of a liberal constitutional order. Paradoxically or not, one might have more hope about Hungary, Poland, Chile, Brazil, or other countries unafflicted by “veneration” of a constitutional system that, left unreformed, serves as an iron cage, a “clear and present danger” to the actual achievement of liberal constitutional aspirations.

27. Dezember 2021

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Removing the Cement from Hungary´s Constitutional Edifice

It seems to me that we are asking two questions: First, is Hungary´s constitutional system so damaged that it no longer reflects the core tenets of democratic constitutionalism? My short answer is, yes, but the case needs to be made comprehensively. The second questions is: Could the current constitution be repaired although it is set-up to impede repair? My short answer is: It depends on the post-election context and we should not jump too easily to leave the current legal framework.

24. Dezember 2021

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Why Throw a Constitution out of the Window Instead of Making it Work?

If the constitution-making and amending by Fidesz with their legally obtained two-thirds majority counted as illegitimate, constitutional revision with a simple majority cannot be acceptable. If the sudden redesign of institutions gave reason for serious concern eleven years ago, it cannot be welcomed now.

23. Dezember 2021

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Handle with Care

I will, in what follows, seek to answer the overarching question of this symposium, starting from a cautionary Romanian rule of law (RoL) reform tale. Other things being equal, its lessons may be extrapolated to the specific case of hopefully post-Orbánite Hungary. The specific context of Hungary presents, at least apparently, the Romanian problem in reverse, namely, the transition from an authoritarian nationalist regime to a pluralist, European, rule of law order.

22. Dezember 2021

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Do We Want a Constitution?

I argue that especially in highly polarized social contexts and in divided societies, triggering a new constitution-making procedure requires certain conditions that are necessarily lacking in such circumstances. Oddly, even though these initiatives are motivated by the idea of constitutional restoration, they could easily fail for the same reasons as the constitution they try to mend. When – against the usual and unusual odds – new constitutions are adopted in socially adverse circumstances, the outcome will unavoidably carry the deep tensions and one-sidedness of its environment.

20. Dezember 2021

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Four Recommendations for Constitutional Restoration in Hungary

For the first time ever in Hungary, a national primary was held to elect the prime ministerial candidate for the opposition, sparking discussions on constitutional restoration, in particular on amending or replacing the 2011 constitution, the Fundamental Law (FL). Following a brief description of the Hungarian institutional and constitutional landscape, I outline several suggestions as to how the question of constitutional restoration in Hungary might be addressed.

19. Dezember 2021

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Governance or Revolution?

The call from Andrew Arato and Andras Sajó starts an important and timely debate. It is indeed a thorny question in which cases a formal breach of constitutional norms is the only way to restore constitutionalism. I make three claims: First, while the potential opposition government’s legislative power will indeed be constrained, it will not be entirely powerless. Second, many of these constraints do not stem from constitutional provisions per se, but from informal practices within constitutional organs, and thus cannot be addressed by only formal constitutional changes, revolutionary or otherwise. Third, in the present situation a calculated formal breach of the constitution will most likely lead to civilian strife, political paralysis and radicalization. It will also have the potential to destabilize the European Union.

16. Dezember 2021

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The Conference on the Future of Europe as an Institutional Illusion

The Conference on the Future of Europe is currently underway on the basis of the joint Declaration of 10 March 2021. Nine months after the Joint Declaration there is ample evidence from the Conference that allows us to assess this institutional event. The Conference might best be described as a campaign to stimulate public interest for EU politics. It is clear that the Conference has neither the legal basis nor the institutional character to address the Union's structural problems in the face of great challenges.

16. Dezember 2021

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Restoring Self-Governance

Sometimes, probably often, the new anti-authoritarian majority will not be large enough to satisfy the requirements of the nation’s amendment rule for constitutional change. What can be done under those circumstances? One possibility, of course, is simply to push through constitutional change without regard to the pre-existing amendment rule. Sometimes that will be enough. Sometimes it won’t – particularly where the idea of legality has powerful political support. Where simply bulling ahead with constitutional change seems unlikely to be productive, what can be done? The answer, I believe, combines foundational constitutional theory and practical political reality.

14. Dezember 2021

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