It’s not about a seat at the table.
It’s about the table.
On Germany, UK, Ireland, refugee protection and a respectful request to Friedrich Merz.
Thema: Autoritarismus & Populismus
Verfassungserosion, demokratischer Rückschritt, verfassungsrechtliche Herausforderungen demokratischer Regierungsführung, populistischer Konstitutionalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Antworten auf Autoritarismus. Umfasst wehrhafte Demokratie, verfassungsrechtliche Selbstverteidigung und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen gegen demokratische Erosion.
It’s not about a seat at the table.
The Hungarian »Lex NGO« before the CJEU: Calling an Abuse of State Power by its Name
On 14 January 2020, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in Case C-78/18 on the restrictions incorporated into a 2017 Hungarian law on the financing of NGOs from abroad. He makes clear that Hungary’s “Lex NGO” not only restricts the free movement of capital but also violates several fundamental rights, and is therefore incompatible with EU law.
Polen, die EU und das Ende der Welt, wie wir sie kennen: ein Interview mit FRANZ MAYER
Was, wenn Polen den Konflikt mit der EU immer weiter eskaliert? Was, wenn die PiS-Regierung die vom EuGH gegebenenfalls verhängten Bußgelder einfach nicht bezahlt? Ein Gespräch über europäische Rechtsstaatlichkeitspolitik in extremis.
EU Rule of Law Dialogues: Risks – in Context
On January 16, 2020 the European Parliament passed a resolution about the state of the Article 7(1) TEU hearings with Hungary and Poland, noting with concern that “the reports and statements by the Commission and international bodies, such as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, indicate that the situation in both Poland and Hungary has deteriorated since the triggering of Article 7(1) of the TEU”. The resolution is a plea for a structured and more meaningful process in which each EU institution would exercise its existing powers in a meaningful and cooperative manner. The resolution emphasizes that the Article 7(1) TEU preventive process is one of risk assessment and one that may have actual – including budgetary – consequences.
Herrschaft über die Verfassung
Die Nachricht kam überraschend. Am Mittwoch unterbreitete der russische Präsident Putin in seiner jährlichen Botschaft an die Föderalversammlung einen Katalog von Vorschlägen zu einer Reform der Verfassung. Und nur fünf Tage später brachte Putin einen entsprechenden Änderungsvorschlag in die Duma ein. Die Änderungsvorschläge wirken aus verfassungsjuristischer Sicht widersprüchlich und kaum durchdacht. Obwohl die Bedeutung des Vorrangs der Verfassung in Putins Rede stark betont wird, zeugen die Ausführungen von einer Geringschätzung ihrer freiheitsschützenden Inhalte und wirken in Teilen gar „sarkastisch“.
Personal instead of Institutional Power
The gist of the constitutional reform suggestions in Russia is to cement the power of Vladimir Putin once he leaves the office, and to make this in a safe, controlled environment. The latter aim cannot be achieved within the boundaries established by the Constitution. Thus, the constitutional requirements are thrown into the litter bin of necessity. However, circumventing formal procedures still calls for a sort of justification. That is why the proposed plan relies on substitutes that would mask its deficiencies.
The Choice of Our Time
In which I worry an awful lot about the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Round Tables in Czechoslovakia and the Future of Post-Sovereign Politics of Constitutional Change
Petra Gümplová on the Round Table in Czechoslovakia and the potential of round tables as political tools to address current challenges in the Czech Republic and on a global scale.
Between Constitutional Romance and Real-World Politics
The Chilean process for a new constitution is a reminder that constitutional processes are not necessarily ideal scenarios of high deliberation, but processes that can include risks, self-interested politicians, the threat of violence, and competing views that try to defeat each other. In Chile, the romantic notion of constitution-building as a sort of new beginning quickly faced the challenges of real-world politics in a situation of institutional fragility.
Coup, Revolution, or Negotiated Regime Change
All my Latin American students and not a few radical friends strongly claim that what took place in Bolivia was a coup, focusing on the military role. I hesitate to concede the point, to begin with because the previous extra-constitutional manipulation by President Evo Morales, concerning the most important legal issue under presidential governments, that of term limits, very much prepared his own down-fall.
