Thema: Demokratie & Institutionen

Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische Regierungsführung, Gewaltenteilung, institutionelles Design und demokratische Prozesse. Umfasst die verfassungsrechtlichen Strukturen für Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, Wahlsysteme, Föderalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen demokratischer Rechenschaftspflicht.

Rationalising political representation within the European Parliament: the Italian Constitutional Court rules on the threshold for the European elections

In December 2018, the Italian Constitutional Court found the national 4% threshold for elections to the European Parliament to be constitutional. Unlike the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which focused in-depth on the European state of affairs at a given stage, the Corte costituzionale has pointed to a gradual evolutionary development towards “a rationalisation of the representation of political forces within the European parliamentary assembly”. According to this interpretation, both the national parliaments and the European Parliament face similar challenges.

11. Januar 2019

, ,

Brasiliens neuer Superjustizminister und das drohende Ende des Rechtsstaats

Brasiliens demokratischer Rechtsstaat hat gerade seinen 30. Geburtstag gefeiert. Doch mit der Wahl des seit dem 1. Januar 2019 amtierenden Präsidenten Jair Bolsonaro ist sein Fortbestand gefährdet wie nie. Vergleichsweise wenig Beachtung fand in den internationalen Medien, was die neue Regierung in Bezug auf die Justizverwaltung Brasiliens plant: Ein „Superjustizministerium“ soll gegründet werden, das vom ehemaligen Bundesrichter Sergio Moro geleitet wird, und ein strenges Antiterrorgesetz soll verabschiedet werden. Beides ist geeignet, die rechtsstaatliche Ordnung Brasiliens zu beeinträchtigen.

10. Januar 2019

,

Zurück zu den Wurzeln der Wesentlichkeitslehre!

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seiner kürzlich ergangenen Entscheidung in dem von der AfD-Bundestagsfraktion betriebenen Organstreitverfahren den Rechtsbruchmythos nicht aus der Welt geräumt. Das mag politisch bedauerlich sein, ist aus juristischer Perspektive aber richtig, denn nicht alle wesentlichen Entscheidungen unterliegen einem Parlamentsvorbehalt.

7. Januar 2019

, ,

Unitäres Volk oder Parität? Für eine materiale Perspektive auf die Demokratie

Im Deutschen Bundestag liegt der Frauenanteil nach der letzten Wahl bei nur noch 30 Prozent. Bundesjustizministerin Barley hat deshalb eine Wahlrechtsreform angeregt, die die Parteien verpflichtet, eine gleiche Anzahl von Frauen und Männern für Wahlen aufzustellen. Von Staatsrechtlern werden seitdem verfassungsrechtliche Bedenken angemeldet. Dies überrascht wenig, denn im gegenwärtigen verfassungsrechtlichen Diskurs wird die fehlende Repräsentation von Frauen nicht als demokratisches Problem verstanden. Um dies zu ändern, bedarf es einer materialen Perspektive auf Demokratie und Repräsentation.

4. Januar 2019

, ,

An Advanced Course in Court Packing: Hungary’s New Law on Administrative Courts

The design and establishment of the new Hungarian administrative judiciary provides insight into a new style of engineering illiberal constitutional democracy through dialogue with European constitutional actors. It is not simply the case that Hungary is undertaking judicial reform while the Article 7 TEU process is on its way. Rather, a new phase of judicial reform is passed under European supervision despite the clear threat it presents for the rule of law.

2. Januar 2019

,

The Democratic Backsliding and the European constitutional design in error. When will HOW meet WHY?

When is the constitutional design of any (domestic, international, supranational) polity in error? On the most general level such critical juncture obtains when polity’s founding document (treaty, convention, constitution) protects against the dangers that no longer exist or does not protect against the dangers that were not contemplated by the Founders. While discussion of the evolution of human rights and international actors in response to social change (LGBT, euthanasia, abortion) is well documented, such evolution with regard to political change (transition from one sort of government to another) is less well documented. Constitutions not only constitute but should also protect against de-constitution. For supranational legal order to avoid a deadlock of „being in error” in the above sense, the systemic threats coming from within the polity’s component parts must be recognised and constitutional design be changed accordingly.

18. Dezember 2018

, ,

Combatting TINA-Rhetoric through Judicial Review: Dealing with Pay Cuts in Times of Financial Consolidation

Recently, the German Federal Constitutional Court has decided that certain cuts on wages for civil servants in the Land Baden-Württemberg are unconstitutional. The judgment establishes a constitutional answer to the so-called “there is no alternative” (TINA) rhetoric that has largely dominated the political discourse on budgetary consolidation in the past. From this perspective, this line of jurisprudence allows for opening up a political and constitutional discourse that has become somewhat colonized by purely economic and financial considerations.

11. Dezember 2018

, , ,

Constitutional Resilience to Populism: Four Theses

Let us make a plea for modesty. Constitutional democrats need to be clear-eyed and realistic about what good constitutional design can do. We need to steer a middle course between constitutional idealism and nihilism. Constitutional idealists argue that thoughtful and intelligent constitutional design can largely eliminate the risk posed by populism; constitutional nihilists respond by arguing that there is little, if anything, that constitutional design can do in the face of the populist challenge that secures victory at the ballot box and captures the state from within.

11. Dezember 2018

, ,

How to Abolish Democracy: Electoral System, Party Regulation and Opposition Rights in Hungary and Poland

When it comes to Poland and Hungary, everyone is talking about the judiciary, about the independence of the courts, about the rule of law. But hardly anyone talks about parliaments. Yet they are at the heart of our democracies. And they are no less at risk. This became clear in the third panel of our workshop, which dealt with the electoral system, party regulation and opposition rights in Hungary and Poland. What may sound technical at first glance are surprisingly effective instruments in the hands of autocrats. It is precisely with these instruments that the governments of both countries have set the course for a “democracy” that primarily benefits the ruling parties and undermines political plurality.

10. Dezember 2018

, , ,