Five Questions on Brexit to JO SHAW
Edinburgh EU citizenship law expert Jo Shaw's answers to my set of questions on the occasion of the Brexit referendum.
Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische Regierungsführung, Gewaltenteilung, institutionelles Design und demokratische Prozesse. Umfasst die verfassungsrechtlichen Strukturen für Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, Wahlsysteme, Föderalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen demokratischer Rechenschaftspflicht.
Edinburgh EU citizenship law expert Jo Shaw's answers to my set of questions on the occasion of the Brexit referendum.
Former Constitutional Court Judge Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff on why she deeply regrets to see the British go, on the reversibility of the Brexit decision, and on an independent Scotland's prospects to continued EU membership.
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mit seinem Urteil zum OMT-Programm der Europäischen Zentralbank seiner Verantwortung, das (Verfassungs-)Recht in seinem größeren Bezug zu interpretieren (Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG), gerecht geworden. Die Bundesregierung und der Bundestag werden dabei aber in die Rolle von Rechtshütern gedrängt, die sie funktional und institutionell-gewaltenteilig nur schwer spielen können. Dies gilt vor allem für das Parlament.
Two months ago, the European Parliament and the Council have enacted the European General Data Protection Regulation as the result of a 4 years running legislative procedure. For a long time, it was uncertain whether the regulation could be passed at all: Not only has there been considerable opposition by EU Member States, but there have also been about 4.000 amendments by Parliament, accompanied by an enormous engagement of lobby groups.
Hungary was the first country in the post-Soviet bloc that joined the Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and this remains a matter of national pride. While the Convention is perceived as a yardstick in human rights protection that may not be circumvented, still lively debate surrounds the authority of the case-law of European Court of Human Rights. The recent constitutional reform has left the status of the Convention largely untouched. The Convention still enjoys a supra-legislative rank: it is subordinated to the Fundamental Law but is superior to all other pieces of legislation.
As calls for a political check of the TTIP mandate multiply, time has come to pinpoint where the problem in the on-going negotiations lies.
The EU constitutionalism has been transformed. For the worse. The causes for that are well known. They are the sum of consecutive, unresolved financial, economic, political, humanitarian and security crises. This post is not interested into causal relationship between the crises. It centers instead on their aggregate negative outcome and the possible way ahead. It asks what exactly the EU constitutionalism, as a dominant narrative of European integration, has (d)evolved into and what can be done to fix its fissures?
Über die heutige Entscheidung aus Karlsruhe zur Geld- bzw. Wirtschaftspolitik der EZB und das darin zur Vollendung gelangte "Grundrecht auf Demokratie".
EU law not only protect fundamental rights and freedoms, but also the national identities of the Member States. Perhaps for “Little England”, that is not enough. But after Brexit, who would protect the national identities of the other nations of the UK?