Ultra-vires-Kontrolle durch Bundesregierung und Bundestag – Für eine materielle Subsidiarität des Vorgehens gegen das Parlament

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mit seinem Urteil zum OMT-Programm der Europäischen Zentralbank seiner Verantwortung, das (Verfassungs-)Recht in seinem größeren Bezug zu interpretieren (Art. 23 Abs. 1 S. 1 GG), gerecht geworden. Die Bundesregierung und der Bundestag werden dabei aber in die Rolle von Rechtshütern gedrängt, die sie funktional und institutionell-gewaltenteilig nur schwer spielen können. Dies gilt vor allem für das Parlament.

The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Powerful Tool for Data Subjects?

Two months ago, the European Parliament and the Council have enacted the European General Data Protection Regulation as the result of a 4 years running legislative procedure. For a long time, it was uncertain whether the regulation could be passed at all: Not only has there been considerable opposition by EU Member States, but there have also been about 4.000 amendments by Parliament, accompanied by an enormous engagement of lobby groups.

The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s case with the ECHR: an ambivalent relationship

Hungary was the first country in the post-Soviet bloc that joined the Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and this remains a matter of national pride. While the Convention is perceived as a yardstick in human rights protection that may not be circumvented, still lively debate surrounds the authority of the case-law of European Court of Human Rights. The recent constitutional reform has left the status of the Convention largely untouched. The Convention still enjoys a supra-legislative rank: it is subordinated to the Fundamental Law but is superior to all other pieces of legislation.

Transformation of EU Constitutionalism

The EU constitutionalism has been transformed. For the worse. The causes for that are well known. They are the sum of consecutive, unresolved financial, economic, political, humanitarian and security crises. This post is not interested into causal relationship between the crises. It centers instead on their aggregate negative outcome and the possible way ahead. It asks what exactly the EU constitutionalism, as a dominant narrative of European integration, has (d)evolved into and what can be done to fix its fissures?