Thema: Demokratie & Institutionen

Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische Regierungsführung, Gewaltenteilung, institutionelles Design und demokratische Prozesse. Umfasst die verfassungsrechtlichen Strukturen für Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, Wahlsysteme, Föderalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen demokratischer Rechenschaftspflicht.

Menschenwürde schlägt Anerkennungsgrundsatz

Europa fußt auf Vertrauen. Aber was, wenn manche europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten aufhören dieses Vertrauen zu verdienen? Ist die Vertrauenswürdigkeit ihrerseits Vertrauenssache? Angesichts der Mir-doch-egal-Haltung, die einige mittel- und osteuropäische Regierungen gegenüber dem Europarecht und den fundamentalen Verfassungsgrundsätzen Europas mittlerweile an den Tag legen, ist das keine theoretische Frage, sondern eine, von der Europas Zukunft abhängt. Heute hat der Europäische Gerichtshof sie auf eine Weise beantwortet, die mir einen Stein vom Herzen fallen lässt.

5. April 2016

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The Panama Papers: What Should Be Done?

If the U.S., the European Union, and Japan were to agree to impose a tax on income flows to tax havens, the tax-evasion problem would largely be solved without the need for cooperation from the havens. Using a 30 percent tax will do the trick. What prevents this obvious solution from happening is that the U.S. is willing to aid and abet tax evasion by Europeans, while the EU is willing to aid and abet tax evasion by Americans. This reflects the political power of the rich on both sides of the Atlantic.

4. April 2016

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The Panama Papers: Six Preliminary Observations

The Panama papers is a treasure trove of information on the activities and clientele of a large, but not atypical, legal firm operating in an offshore financial centre or the tax haven of Panama. It follows a series of spectacular leaks by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists that included the Lichtenstein leak, HSBC, the Lux-leaks and now the Panama papers. What have we learned from this latest leak so far?

4. April 2016

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How to protect European Values in the Polish Constitutional Crisis

Does the Polish development concern us — the European citizens and the European institutions we have set up? There is a functional and a normative argument to state that it does. The normative argument is that the European Union organizes a community of states that profess allegiance to a set of fundamental values—among others, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The functional reason is that the European legal space presupposes mutual trust. European law operates on the presumption that all institutions are law-abiding. Otherwise, the legal edifice crumbles.

31. März 2016

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Paradoxes of Constitutionalisation: Lessons from Poland

This comment aims to explain a number of paradoxes of constitutionalization on the example of the current constitutional crisis in Poland. It attempts to demonstrate that this crisis is not only political in its nature, but structural as it results from the inherent tension between the concept of rule of law, democracy and human rights. It is also argued that the success of constitutionalization as a global project depends on strong social endorsement of constitutional institutions and practices, including judicial review.

30. März 2016

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»Emergency Constitutional Review«: thinking the unthinkable? A Letter from America

With the constitution and the rule of law in Poland under systemic attack and the Constitutional Court weakened by the refusal of the government to publish its decisions, ordinary judges should step in and, if need be, declare unconstitutional laws inapplicable by themselves. An example for this sort of emergency constitutional review has already been set by the Polish Supreme Court in a decision of March 17th.

29. März 2016

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Hungary’s Struggle: In a Permanent State of Exception

The Hungarian government has called for a referendum on EU relocation quota plan and declared a “nationwide migrant crisis”. The justification given by the government for these measures was the “massive immigration” which “endangers the jobs of Hungarians and redraws Hungary’s cultural and religious identity”. The argument went that, due to a “migrant crisis” the Hungarian government needed a greater room for maneuvre, not limited by constitutional constraints, in order to manage the crisis. This argument presupposes that, as a result of the migrant crisis, Hungary has ended up in a state of exception, when constitutional guarantees have to be limited or suspended; essential powers have to be concentrated in the hands of the prime minister, until the crisis is overcome.

17. März 2016

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Poland, Hungary and Europe: Pre-Article 7 Hopes and Concerns

The European Commission’s opening of a rule of law dialogue with Poland in the new pre-Article 7 format developed last year is an important test of European constitutionalism both on the EU and on the Member State level. The mechanism is meant to address systemic violations of the rule of law in several steps, in the format of a structured dialogue. The new procedure does not preclude or prevent the launching of an infringement procedure by the Commission. The probe into Poland’s measures against the Constitutional Tribunal and its new media regulation is expected to test the viability of an EU constitutional enforcement mechanism against a Member State.

14. März 2016

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Aus Anlass Polens: einige Überlegungen zum Recht auf Widerstand

Ab heute ist es amtlich: Die Mittel, zu denen Polens Regierung, Präsident und Parlamentsmehrheit im Konflikt mit dem polnischen Verfassungsgericht gegriffen haben, sind nicht einfach nur ein Verfassungsverstoß. Das ist ein Angriff auf die Grundlagen der Verfassungsstaatlichkeit selbst – auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und Menschenrechte. Wäre eine Konstellation, wie sie im Augenblick in Polen zu finden ist, ein Anwendungsfall für ein Art. 20 Abs. 4 Grundgesetz entsprechendes Recht auf Widerstand? Mir scheint, das wäre sie – wenn die polnische Regierung sich dem Gutachten der Venedig-Kommission nicht beugt.

11. März 2016

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