Erdogan’s Wish List Come True?

On 1 June 2023, the new Swedish anti-terrorism legislation entered into force whose primary novelty is the criminalization of membership in terrorist groups. While it thereby aligns Swedish counter-terrorism law with the EU 2017 Counter-terrorism Directive, the move has been controversial for several reasons. In particular, the legislation is widely seen as an attempt to win Erdogan’s support for Sweden’s still pending NATO application. This, in turn, has raised concerns that the new law is exceeding what is required by the Directive.

The Brave New World of Areios Pagos

These are exciting times for Greek constitutionalists. In its capacity as electoral judge, the first section of the Greek Supreme Civil and Criminal Court (Areios Pagos) recently banned the participation of the neo-Nazi Hellenes National Party in the elections of 21 May. In order to accept the constitutionality of the legislative ban on Hellenes National Party, Areios Pagos had to provide not only a new interpretation of Greek constitutional provisions, but also a whole new vision of democracy, of the Greek and the European Constitution and of Greek constitutional politics. The brave new world of Areios Pagos is part of a new constitutionalist approach that is likely to affect the application of constitutional provisions in future cases, as the more recent decision concerning the elections of 25 June shows.

Anwohnerparken in falschem Gewand

Das Bundesverwaltungsgericht hat die Freiburger Bewohnerparkgebührensatzung am Dienstag für unwirksam erklärt. Als Anreiz für weniger beziehungsweise kleinere Autos galt der Text in Sachen Mobilitätswende als eine Art Leuchtturmprojekt. Ein Rückschlag also für all jene, die sich den nach wie vor nicht ansatzweise umgesetzten Ankündigungen der Ampel zum Trotz auf ihre Weise engagieren, die Verkehrswende mitzugestalten? Nur teilweise. Hohe Parkgebühren und eine Bemessung anhand der Fahrzeuglänge bleiben möglich. Man muss es nur anders verpacken.

Taking Separation of Powers Seriously

In Turkey's recent election, 15 ministers from the Justice and Development Party, chaired by President Erdoğan, were nominated as parliamentary candidates and elected as MPs on 14 May. Since none of the presidential candidates won an overall majority, two leading candidates, Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu competed in a runoff vote on 28 May, in which Erdoğan secured the victory. Thus, the new ministers were neither appointed nor took office until after the runoff vote. Throughout this process, the former ministers, including the 15 elected as MPs, preserved their executive posts and titles. Should the 15 Erdoğan government ministers have resigned to run for parliamentary candidacy? And is there a constitutional incompatibility between ministerial and MP titles? The law is not always clear on these questions. This lack of clarity, we argue, can have serious consequences for the balance of power in a newly established governmental system.

Der falsche Weg

Jüngst hat das VG Dresden den rechten Referendar Matthias B. zum Examen zugelassen (Urt. v. 04.04.2023, Az.: 11 K 1918/21). Diesen Weg hatte ihm der Sächsische Verfassungsgerichtshof mit seinen argumentationsgleichen Entscheidungen aus dem Oktober und November 2021 sowie Oktober 2022 geebnet. Um ihn wieder zu schließen, strengt die Landesjustizministerkonferenz Berichten zufolge nun eine Reform der Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO) an. Damit legt die Ministerkonferenz die Axt an die freie Advokatur an und leistet einen Bärendienst im Kampf gegen Rechts.

Rechtsstaat in Gewahrsam

Samstag, der 03.06.2023 in Leipzig. Hunderte von Menschen stehen zusammengedrängt am Alexis-Schumann-Platz in der Südvorstadt. Stets unter den Augen behelmter Polizist*innen, die sie umringen. Solche „Kessel“ gibt es immer wieder auf Demonstrationen in der Bundesrepublik. Und immer wieder wurden sie von deutschen Gerichten für rechtswidrig erklärt, weil sie die Versammlungsfreiheit und andere Grundrechte der Eingekesselten in unverhältnismäßiger Weise verletzten.

Geldsäcke im Parlament?

Die BGH-Entscheidung zu den „Maskendeals“ hat – wieder einmal – gezeigt, dass der Straftatbestand der Mandatsträgerkorruption (§ 108e StGB) dringend reformbedürftig ist. Die politischen Zeichen hierfür stehen günstig, schließlich wollen die Regierungsfraktionen ausweislich ihres Koalitionsvertrags „den Straftatbestand der Abgeordnetenbestechung und -bestechlichkeit wirksamer ausgestalten.“ Wir plädieren dafür, einerseits § 108e StGB partiell zu entschärfen (speziell im Hinblick auf Kommunalpolitiker), andererseits aber ergänzende Strafvorschriften einzuführen, die sich an die etablierten Strukturen des allgemeinen Korruptionsstrafrechts und die bereits geltenden Zuwendungsverbote des § 44a AbgG anlehnen.

YouTube Updates its Policy on Election Misinformation

Last Friday, YouTube announced that it ‘will stop removing content that advances false claims that widespread fraud, errors, or glitches occurred in the 2020 and other past US Presidential elections’. This development has upsides and downsides, a few of which are worth sketching out, and all of which further accentuate why the US constitutional framework regarding online platform regulation requires updating. The nature of this update requires transcending a governance approach of overreliance on expecting good faith self-regulation by companies providing these intermediaries.  

Institutional Corsets and the Question of Timing

There has been a lot of noise around whether Hungary should, and legally could, be blocked from taking over the Council presidency in the second half of 2024, considering the state of the rule of law in the country. On 1 June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, questioning Hungary’s ability to “credibly fulfill” the tasks of a Council presidency and asking the Council to “find a proper solution as soon as possible”, else Parliament could take “appropriate measures”. Such concerns are legitimate, but another question seems to be sidelined in the debate: How much practical damage can the upcoming Council presidency under Hungary actually do in the EU?

Democratizing Switzerland

About 25% of Switzerland’s permanent population do not possess the red passport necessary to vote due to one of the most restrictive citizenship law’s in the Western world. The Democracy Initiative is trying to change this. While unlikely to succeed, they are nonetheless starting an important conversation about how to fix Switzerland’s semi-democracy.