Verfassungsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für demokratische Regierungsführung, Gewaltenteilung, institutionelles Design und demokratische Prozesse. Umfasst die verfassungsrechtlichen Strukturen für Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative, Wahlsysteme, Föderalismus und verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen demokratischer Rechenschaftspflicht.
By publishing the judgement K 3/21 of the Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021 in Poland’s official journal, the Polish government has notified the European Council of the decision of the Republic of Poland to leave the Union. To avoid the serious consequences this entails for its citizens, Poland has two options.
Vor mehr als 18 Monaten trat in Bayern – zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik – ein flächendeckendes, landesweites Ausgangsverbot in Kraft. In die darauffolgende leidenschaftliche rechtswissenschaftliche Debatte ist zwischenzeitlich deutlich Ruhe eingekehrt. In dieser nun deutlich entspannten Lage entschied am Montag der Bayerische Verwaltungsgerichtshof als erstes Verwaltungsgericht in einer Hauptsache über die Maßnahme, die wie keine zweite für die heikle Wirkmacht der staatlichen Pandemiebekämpfung steht.
On 7 October 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal issued a judgment in case K 3/21 concerning the place of EU law in the Polish legal order. The judgment caused great public concern due to its foreseeable devastating consequences for the position of the Republic of Poland as a Member State of the European Union. The retired judges of the Constitutional Tribunal fully share this concern. In addition, however, they consider it their duty to correct the many false assertions contained in the judgment, its oral reasoning and the comments of representatives of political power.
While we fully agree with the main thrust of the editorial ‘The Exit Door’ on Verfassungsblog last Friday, we would like to warn against its seemingly fatalistic mindset. Yes, a Polexit from the EU is not on the table until the Polish government itself pushes the Article 50 TEU button, but the other EU Member States do not have to idly wait ‘hoping’ for a resolution to the crisis.
The Czech Republic held parliamentary elections this past weekend, on 8 and 9 October 2021. The party of the incumbent Prime Minister Andrej Babiš was defeated, albeit by a small margin, and for the first time in its history, the country will most likely be led by a government composed of no less than five political entities. Constitutionally (and traditionally), the President of the Republic moderates the post-electoral negotiations between the parties, convenes the first meeting of the newly established Chamber of Deputies, and appoints the new Prime Minister and the government. However, President Miloš Zeman was taken to hospital yesterday, on the day after the general elections, and remains hospitalised at an intensive care unit. Could the President’s illness at this very crucial moment cause a constitutional stalemate?
In the Polish, and to some extent also in the German public discourse, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 on the partial unconstitutionality of the ECB's PSP programme is considered to be qualitatively comparable to the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021. In this respect, the Polish judgement is merely seen as a continuation of the established case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. From a legal point of view, however, this is clearly false.
Im polnischen, partiell aber auch im deutschen Diskurs wird das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 5.5.2020 zur partiellen Verfassungswidrigkeit des PSP-Programms der EZB als qualitativ vergleichbar mit dem Urteil des polnischen Verfassungsgerichts vom 7.10.2021 eingestuft. Das polnische Urteil knüpfe insoweit lediglich an die gefestigte Rechtsprechung des BVerfG an. Dem ist aus juristischer Sicht aus verschiedenen Gründen deutlich zu widersprechen.
Nur Polen kann Polen aus der EU werfen. Oder drinbehalten.
Only Poland can take Poland out of the EU. Or keep it in.
In a recent Advisory Opinion the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that indefinite presidential re-elections constitute a violation of Inter-American human rights standards. In doing so it sets substantive limits to states regarding the design of their political and electoral systems. This is a far reaching and bold move.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters