To Define Is Just to Define

Social media allows users to share content worldwide. This also enables users to distribute illegal content. The laws of the EU Member States vary greatly when it comes to what content they consider to be illegal, especially regarding hate speech. Thus, it is important which national law applies in cross-border cases concerning online content. Ultimately, this question is closely linked to the broader reshuffling of power in the digital sphere: will it be actual ‘law’ that platforms enforce online or norms made by platforms themselves? So far, the law of 27 Member States plus the EU itself remains utterly chaotic compared to the more uniform Terms of Service (ToS) of the internet giants.

Moderation Made in Europe

The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) has been fully applicable for a little more than a month now. The conditions are thus in place for the emergence of the out-of-court dispute settlement (ODS) ecosystem envisaged in Article 21 DSA, arguably the DSA’s most original contribution to securing digital platform users’ rights. In this post, we try to envision the shape such an ecosystem might take over the next few years in the key area of social media content moderation (SMCM). We argue that the DSA may create an adjudication system dominated by a few ODS providers backed by public-private partnerships and ready to work in concert with the complaint-handling mechanisms set up by the platforms themselves.

Daniela Klette und die Frucht der vergifteten Maschine

Am 26. Februar 2024 hat die Polizei die mutmaßliche Terroristin Daniela Klette festgenommen. PimEyes, eine KI-basierte, biometrische Gesichtserkennungssoftware, hatte Klette im Netz gefunden. Dieser Beitrag plädiert aus verfassungs- und unionsrechtlicher Perspektive dafür, dass der Einsatz von offensichtlich rechtswidriger Software wie PimEyes im Strafprozess ein Beweisverwertungsverbot begründet, das auch eine Fernwirkung entfaltet.

PimEyes User auf den Spuren der RAF

Ende Februar hat die Polizei die mutmaßliche RAF-Terroristin Daniela Klette in Berlin festgenommen. Dies haben Hinweise ermöglicht, an die ein Journalist mittels der Gesichtserkennungssoftware PimEyes gelangt war – allerdings unter Verstoß gegen das Datenschutzrecht. Dass die Polizei die Hinweise verwendet, ist verfassungsrechtlich problematisch, denn sie selbst dürfte PimEyes nicht einsetzen. Dies hindert die Polizei aber nicht daran, aufgrund von Hinweisen durch Private, die PimEyes generiert hat, gegen bestehende Gefahren einzuschreiten und auch nicht daran, strafprozessuale Ermittlungen aufzunehmen.

The Fall of The Great Paywall for EU Harmonised Standards

In case C-588/21 P, the CJEU dismantled a foundational axiom of the European Standardisation System: the paywall of harmonised standards. The Court confirmed that harmonised standards are an integral part of EU law, mandating their free accessibility. In this commentary, I posit that the Court’s decision imposes a proactive publication obligation and challenges the existing copyright protection afforded to harmonised standards.

Shipwreck after Shipwreck

On 26 February 2024, the European Ombudsman issued a decision OI/3/2023/MHZ on the fundamental rights obligations of Frontex with regard to search and rescue in the context of its maritime surveillance activities. While affirming Frontex’s compliance with the applicable rules and protocols, the inquiry exposed significant shortcomings in how the Agency handles maritime incidents, including the issuance of emergency signals. Given the persistent scale of recurrent shipwrecks, I argue that integrating AI systems into Frontex’s activities has the capacity to significantly improve the decision-making process in responding to boats in potential distress and the overall SAR system.

The Digital Services Act as a Global Transparency Regime

On both sides of the Atlantic, policymakers are struggling to reign in the power of large online platforms and technology companies. Transparency obligations have emerged as a key policy tool that may support or enable achieving this goal. The core argument of this blog is that the Digital Services Act (DSA) creates, at least in part, a global transparency regime. This has implications for transatlantic dialogues and cooperation on matters concerning platform governance.

Towards a Digital Constitution

The DSA exemplifies the EU's efforts to create a fairer, more responsible digital environment. Through the DSA, the EU appears to be advancing a process of constitutionalisation of Internet governance, as an important milestone in the evolving landscape of “digital constitutionalism”, aiming to establish a unified framework of rights, principles, and governance norms for the digital space, while also contributing to the development of new governance structures and regulatory bodies dedicated to effectively safeguarding fundamental rights online.

From the DMCA to the DSA

On 17 February 2024, the Digital Services Act (DSA) became fully applicable in Europe. The DSA's new approach fundamentally reshapes the regulation and liability of platforms in Europe, and promises to have a significant impact in other jurisdictions, like the US, where there are persistent calls for legislative interventions to reign in the power of Big Tech. This symposium brings together a group of renowned European and American scholars to carry an academic transatlantic dialogue on the potential benefits and risks of the EU’s new approach.

Absolute Truths and Absolutist Control

Last week, the Bombay High Court delivered its judgment in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, comprising a split verdict on the constitutional validity of the Information Technology Rules, 2023. The rules install an institutional regime for determining – and warranting takedown by social media intermediaries – of content relating to the Central Government deemed “fake, false or misleading”. This regime was challenged on three main grounds – first, its violation of citizens’ free expression due to “fake, false, or misleading” speech being constitutionally protected; second, the pedestalization of state-related information, such that it enters public discourse with a single, truthful formulation, as being an illegitimate and disproportionate measure; and third, the violation of natural justice in enabling the state to determine truth and falsity concerning itself.