One Act to Rule Them All

Soon Brussels' newest big thing - the Artificial Intelligence Act - will enter the Trilogues. In order to better understand what’s at stake, who are the main actors and their motivations, and how to make one’s mind about all the conflicting claims we need to dive into the legal, economic and political aspects of the AI Act. The aim of this piece is to contextualize major milestones in the negotiations, showcase some of its critical features and flaws, and present challenges it may in the near future pose to people affected by “smart” models and systems.

Warum Fehlinformation, Desinformation und Hassrede nicht gleich behandelt werden sollten

Der Umgang mit Fehlinformationen, Desinformationen und Hassrede im Internet ist ein hochaktuelles Thema. Eine im Juni 2023 vorgestellte Politikrichtlinie der UN zielt darauf ab, eben jene Phänomene zu bekämpfen. Es erscheint jedoch nicht sachdienlich Fehlinformationen, Desinformationen und Hassrede ähnlich bzw. gleich zu behandeln, wie es der UN Entwurf momentan vorsieht. Dieser Blogpost vertritt daher die These, dass zumindest Fehlinformationen - also unabsichtlich unrichtige Aussagen - anders behandelt werden müssen als bewusste falsche oder verletzende Äußerungen im Internet.

A Scandal on AI in Administration, Again

After the infamous Dutch benefits scandal, the Netherlands are yet again the scene of wrongful application of an algorithm by the government. This time, the main actor is the Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs (DUO), the Dutch agency responsible for the allocation and payment of student loans to those enrolled in Dutch higher education. Specifically, DUO used an algorithm in their enforcement task, namely to verify whether the student loans have been rightfully allocated. In 2012, DUO commenced the use of this ‘in-house’ algorithm, which the Minister of Education – under whose responsibility DUO falls – halted on 23 June. The developments in the Netherlands epitomize the promises and pitfalls of further integrating automated decision-making (ADM) into public administration. On the one hand, ADM – sometimes labelled ‘artificial intelligence’ – is cheap and promises efficiency gains. On the other hand, ADM systems may be error-prone when facing the complex realities of societal life and legal ambiguity.

Rechtsgut Datenschutz?

Während materielle Schadensersatzansprüche für Datenschutzverletzungen in der Praxis eine untergeordnete Rolle zu spielen scheinen und verhältnismäßig einfach festzustellen und zu beziffern sind, bereitet die in Art. 82 DSGVO vorgesehene Ersatzfähigkeit immaterieller Schäden den Gerichten Kopfzerbrechen. Eine richtungsweise Entscheidung zu immateriellen Schadensersatzansprüchen für DSGVO-Verletzungen fällte der EuGH Anfang Mai 2023 in der Rechtssache C‑300/21. Es ist das erste Urteil aus einer langen Reihe an Vorabentscheidungsersuchen zur Auslegung des Art. 82 DSGVO. Nach wie vor interpretationsbedürftig bleibt jedoch, wie ein immaterieller Schaden nun konkret festzustellen und zu bemessen ist. Nach einer kurzen Zusammenfassung der Kernaussagen des EuGH befasst sich dieser Beitrag daher mit diesem praxisrelevanten Problem und möchte – insbesondere unter Berücksichtigung etablierter Instrumentarien der deutschen und österreichischen Rechtspraxis – Lösungswege für die mitgliedstaatlichen Gerichte aufzeigen.

More than Formal Recognition?

The Commission’s proposal for a Platform Work Directive contains a number of provisions recognising collective labour rights for platform workers, mostly revolving around information and consultation rights for workers’ representatives. This suggests that, at least in principle, extending workplace representation and industrial relation practices to the platform economy is part of the Commission’s policy agenda. However, this blogpost argues that even if certain collective labour rights are formally recognised, the proposed directive does not offer adequate basis for their effective exercise. Trade union organising, collective bargaining and workplace democracy do not find sufficient support in the directive, thus limiting their development within the platform economy.

How the Platform Work Directive Protects Workers‘ Data

The Commission's proposal of the new platform labour directive came with a core promise to platform workers in the EU: to recognize the impact algorithmic management has on their working conditions. In doing so, the directive seeks to clarify and strengthen data rights of workers, regardless of whether they are classified as employees or not. This blog post argues that the main achievement of the proposed Directive is to clarify and reframe existing norms about automated decision-making in a way that shifts attention from data to working conditions. While the specific proposed provisions do not go far beyond norms already established in the General Data Protection Regulation, they are reframed in a way that clarifies that digital labour platforms have the responsibility to ensure fairness, transparency and accountability when making decisions that rely on algorithms.

Competition law as a powerful tool for effective enforcement of the GDPR

It looks like a good week for data protection. On Tuesday, the Commission presented a new proposal for a Regulation on additional procedural rules for the GDPR, and a few hours later, the ECJ published its decision C-252/21 on Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office). While the Commission's proposal to improve enforcement in cross-border cases should probably be taken with a pinch of salt, the ECJ ruled on some things with remarkable clarity. The first reactions to the ruling were quite surprising; few had expected the ECJ to take such a clear stance against Meta's targeted advertising business model. It does however represent a consistent interpretation of the GDPR in the tradition and understanding of power-limiting data protection.

A Constitution without Constitutionalism

“Digital constitutionalism” has attracted a good deal of scholarly attention in recent years, much of it enthusiastic, some more sceptical. Just what constitutionalism means, and how this meaning can be transposed into a realm of private ― albeit increasingly regulated ― interactions rather than traditional public law, is part of the debate between the enthusiasts and the sceptics. All agree, however, that it is a normatively charged idea, a shorthand reference to certain values which include ― whether or not they are limited to ― respect for certain human rights. In this post, I argue that while we can indeed think of internet regulation in constitutional terms, we must first understand what I shall call the constitution of cyberspace. A descriptive effort must precede any normative projects directed at imposing values allegedly inherent in the notion of constitutionalism onto cyberspace. And further, understanding the constitution of cyberspace should at least make us wary of digital constitutionalism’s normative ambitions.

Politicians don’t dance? AI doesn’t either!

“Why don’t politicians ever dance? – Because they have too many steps to backtrack on!” Chat-GPT answered this when we asked the program to tell a political joke. While this example is somewhat worrying since the underlying assumption might perpetuate existing stereotypes about politics and politicians, the joke also highlights that AI has become witty and incredibly good at behaving in a way we perceive as human. Thus, we take the recent advancements of generative AI as a motivation to analyze its potential effects on political campaigns and democratic elections.

Gefährdung via Retweet

„Die verstreut auf ihren Pferden galoppierende Polizei bändigt die Tiere und drängt Euch zurück. Lasset sie, die leeren Gassen werden sie unglücklich machen, ich weiß es“, spricht der Kaufmann in Franz Kafkas gleichnamiger Erzählung aus dem Jahr 1913 im Lift zu seinem Spiegelbild. Im Jahr 2023 setzt ein sächsischer Sozialarbeiter mit dem Spitznamen Pudding einen Tweet ab. Er schreibt über einen anderen Beitrag: „falls er euch in den leeren Gassen #grimma|s mal über den Weg läuft“ – und bekommt daraufhin Besuch von der Polizei. Zu Recht?