Verfassungsrecht für digitale Technologien, KI-Governance, Plattformregulierung, digitale Rechte und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des technologischen Wandels. Umfasst digitale Grundrechte, Datenschutz als Verfassungsrecht und verfassungsrechtliche Regulierung neuer Technologien.
Politics in a democratic society have long been a glorified popularity contest, which we can all hope the most capable person wins. Hence, politicians have an incentive to artificially boost their online popularity through fakeness – fake comments, fake followers, fake likes. On a fundamental level, a false sense of popularity may affect our election outcomes – so what are the legal limits of fakeness?
Under the GDPR, Article 82 is the only instrument to claim compensation resulting from data protection infringements. So far, it has not been interpreted by the CJEU. To date, nine preliminary references on the interpretation of Article 82 have been made by national courts. On 6 October 2022, Advocate General Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion in one of them. Since it will be the first CJEU judgment on this subject, it will have a profound impact on the further development of EU data protection law, in particular, its private enforcement.
As Turkey is in the process of getting ready for the general and presidential elections of June 2023, a recent legal reform has created much concern regarding freedom of expression and increased threat of online censorship in the country. Citizens have called the amendment a ‘censorship law’, while some prominent civil society organizations have voiced their concern about the law creating avenues for a dystopian crackdown when the elections are just around the corner.
It is rare for two Advocates General of the European Court of Justice to differ on the interpretation of a fundamental legal act of the European Union. This is what recently occurred with regard to the General Data Protection Regulation.
Es kommt selten vor, dass zwischen zwei Generalanwälten des Europäischen Gerichtshofs bei der Interpretation eines grundlegenden Rechtsakts der Europäischen Union grundsätzliche Deutungsunterschiede aufbrechen. Dies ist dieser Tage hinsichtlich der Datenschutz-Grundverordnung geschehen.
On platforms, the protection of fundamental rights is increasingly provided by algorithms. With the Digital Services Act (DSA) at the door, algorithms used for copyright protection were probably only the first step in regard to automated decision-making. Indeed, the DSA, conceived by the Union legislator as the new constitution of the Internet, presupposes the use of algorithmic filtering. Human pre-examination has become impossible due to the sheer amount of user-generated content. Filters are an effective moderation tool that is cost-effective compared to human review. But being fast is easier than being right: the usual method of applying European fundamental rights hangs heavily on the proportionality test, which at least at the current technological level escapes automation: fundamental rights cannot be filtered.
Der „Neustart der Geisterfahrer“, wie Kurt Graulich die nach der Digital Rights Ireland-Entscheidung entfachte Debatte über die Vorratsdatenspeicherung beschrieb und damit die Intensität der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Befürwortern und Gegner gut einfing, hat auf den ersten Blick ihr vorläufiges und erwartbares Ende in Luxemburg gefunden. Dass die Entscheidung hier besprochen wird, bedeutet keinesfalls, dass sie neuartige Impulse bringt oder, wie der Bundesjustizminister meint, (in einem rechtlichen Sinne) „historisch“ sei. Denn die Unionsrechtswidrigkeit der deutschen Vorratsdatenspeicherung war spätestens ab 2016 deutlich.
Part I of this contribution explains how the regulatory design of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) raises issues in relation to the rule of law principle of legality. Essentially, the ETIAS screening rules algorithm illustrates how automation can lead to what I suggest is a new form of arbitrariness. Part II reflects on how these legality issues affect other rule of law principles, including the principle of effective judicial protection. In turn, it raises three accountability issues and calls into question the assumption that the safeguard of manual processing in case of a ‘hit’ is a panacea for all rule of law challenges stemming from this semi-automated decision-making.
This contribution, presented in two parts, offers a predictive glimpse into future rule of law challenges due to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s (Frontex) primary responsibility for the automated processing and screening rules of the soon-to-be-operational European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) at the EU’s external borders. . In Part I on legality, I argue that the ETIAS screening rules algorithm illustrates how automation can lead to what I suggest is a new form of arbitrariness – which I refer to as ‘algorithmic discretion’. This can be defined as a situation where the exercise of power and discretion and their limitations are not sufficiently specified at the legislative level but are delegated to an algorithm instead.
Frontex has become notorious for its multiple fundamental rights violations, including pushbacks. The problem of fundamental rights infringements associated with the Agency has been lasting for years, leading ultimately to the resignation of the Executive Director. What I argue in this post is, first, that the fundamental right to the protection of personal data by Frontex has not yet received sufficient attention by scholars and EU institutions. Second, data protection within the Agency needs to be strengthened to prevent any future new scandals.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters