Verfassungsrecht für digitale Technologien, KI-Governance, Plattformregulierung, digitale Rechte und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des technologischen Wandels. Umfasst digitale Grundrechte, Datenschutz als Verfassungsrecht und verfassungsrechtliche Regulierung neuer Technologien.
This post unpacks the implications of Schrems II for this new, unstable, and in many instances, illiberal political landscape. A number of excellent posts on this blog have already examined the impact of Schrems II on the corporate actors that transfer EU data globally. My focus here is on how Schrems II and the CJEU’s evolving jurisprudence on the right to privacy can be read as targeting the political developments of recent years.
On July 25, Twitter ‘withheld’ or disabled access to two tweets made by activist lawyer Prashant Bhushan. Prashant Bhushan had posted two tweets in the end of June, criticizing the Supreme Court and especially its current Chief Justice. Based on the Tweets, the Supreme Court initiated suo moto contempt proceedings against Bhushan on July 21 and Twitter’s withdrawal comes two days after the first hearing in the case.
Regierungen von Caracas bis Jakarta setzen zunehmend auf Internetblockaden, um die Vernetzung politischer Oppositionsgruppen zu unterbinden und die Arbeit von Menschenrechtsorganisationen und unabhängigen Journalist*innen zu behindern. Allein 2019 wurde der Zugang zum Internet in Äthiopien, Bangladesch, Ägypten, Indien, Indonesien, Iran, Irak, Sudan, und Simbabwe und weiteren Staaten ganz oder für einzelne Landesteile beschränkt. Auch in diesem Jahr erweist sich der virtuelle Shutdown als das Repressionsmittel der Wahl, wie ganz aktuell in Äthiopien, wo seit dem Tod des Sängers Hachalu Hundessa und den damit in Verbindung stehenden Unruhen im Land seit Wochen kaum eine Verbindung hergestellt werden kann. Im Schatten dieser Entwicklungen hat der ECOWAS-Gerichtshof im Westen Afrikas am 25. Juni 2020 ein Urteil gefällt, das Vorbildwirkung für den gesamten Kontinent und darüber hinaus entfalten könnte: Er hat einen Internetshutdown in Togo vor drei Jahren für rechtswidrig erklärt.
On July 16, 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield – a framework that regulated Trans-Atlantic data transfers. Further, even though the court upheld the validity of Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC) - an EU-approved template to safeguard EU citizens’ data-transfer, it put forth important qualifications for data controllers to adhere to when using such SCCs. This article analyses the ECJ’s ruling, now known as Schrems II, in three parts. The first section sets the stage for the analysis by providing a brief history of EU-US data-flow arrangements and the developments leading up to Schrems II. The second section analyses the ECJ’s decision in Schrems II and finally, the third section concludes by exploring the implications of the ruling and evaluating the way forward.
As Genna Churches and Monika Zalnieriute wrote here on 16 July, the day on which the Schrems II decision was published, reading the judgment gives more than a simple feeling déjà vu; it rather looks like a full-blown Groundhog Day: One has the impression of being trapped in a time loop that forces us to relive the day – 6 October 2015 – on which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) adopted Schrems I and invalidated the European Commission’s Safe Harbour Decision (Safe Harbour) adopted on 26 July 2000. More than a week after the Schrems II judgment was adopted, following the hundreds of comments made on the subject, I shall modestly attempt to consider the judgment (and the underlying saga) from two particular viewpoints.
On June 30, 2020, the Brazilian Senate approved Draft Bill No. 2.630 of 2020, also known as “The Fake News Bill”. This bill applies to internet platforms with over 2 million users and seeks to address the warranted concerns presented by the recent spread of online disinformation and defamatory content. As it currently stands, the bill does little to address the individuals and organizations who finance the spread of fake news across social media platforms in Brazil. It also poses threats to user privacy, access to the internet, and freedom of association.
16 July 2020 feels like Groundhog Day in Brussels. For those, who did not see the famous film Groundhog Day, it’s about reliving the same experience again and again until the main protagonist gets ‘why’. Similarly, the much anticipated Schrems II decision, delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) today, is almost a ‘reliving’ of its earlier decision in Schrems I. How many ‘Schrems’ are we going to have — and who is the protagonist that needs to get ‘why’? Let’s look at it all in more detail.
Die Ausweitung polizeilicher Befugnisse im neuen Bremer Polizeigesetz ist vergleichsweise moderat ausgefallen. Zahlreiche in jüngerer Zeit bundesweit publik gewordene Skandale lassen jedoch vermuten, dass der Polizeiapparat Rassismus, Sexismus, Gewaltexzesse und das Vorgehen gegen ohnehin marginalisierte Gruppen wenn nicht gar strukturell begünstigt, so doch jedenfalls deren effektive Aufklärung erschwert. Der Bremer Entwurf enthält allerdings verschiedene Instrumentarien zur Kontrolle und rechtsstaatlichen Einhegung dieser Probleme.
Imagine you‘re at the onset of a global pandemic, and one of the nation‘s leading hospitals falls victim to a debilitating cyberattack, crippling its medical infrastructure for days. This is exactly what happened to Brno University Hospital on March 13, then home to one of the largest COVID-19 testing facilities in the Czech Republic. Now imagine further that your national security authorities identify a command and control server through which the attackers execute the malicious cyber operation, which would end immediately if you were to hack “back” into that system to render it inoperative (this part is fiction). Technically, that would be feasible. Alas, you realise that the server is located abroad. Shouldn't you be allowed to go ahead and heroically save the nation?
Das Urheberrecht wird von der Bundesregierung genau wie von Privaten zur Unterdrückung von Presseberichterstattung eingesetzt. Es kann derart missbraucht werden, weil die Zivilgerichte bei der Prüfung eines urheberrechtlichen Unterlassungsanspruchs jenseits eines engen Ausnahmekatalogs keine einzelfallspezifische grundrechtliche Interessenabwägung vornehmen. Über 60 Jahre nach dem Lüth-Urteil ist die mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte im deutschen Urheberrecht noch nicht angekommen.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters