New Forces for Greek State Reform
Current attempts to solve the crisis in Greece aim at economic solutions. With a new bailout programme being stalled and the next tranche once more postponed, the search is on for new solutions off the beaten paths.
EU-Verfassungsrecht, verfassungsrechtlicher Rahmen der europäischen Integration und Mehrebenenverfassungsrecht. Umfasst EU-Institutionenrecht, Grundfreiheiten, EU-Grundrechte, verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der EU-Mitgliedschaft und das Verhältnis zwischen EU-Recht und nationalen Verfassungsordnungen.
Current attempts to solve the crisis in Greece aim at economic solutions. With a new bailout programme being stalled and the next tranche once more postponed, the search is on for new solutions off the beaten paths.
On 20 February 2017, the Polish government has replied to the European Commission’s rule of law findings. That reply is so clearly absurd, rude and full of ‘alternative facts’ that the case to trigger the sanction mechanism in Art 7 TEU promptly is more compelling than ever. It is time for Member State governments to get their act together and make explicit their disapproval of a government that finds it acceptable not only to violate its national Constitution and EU values in plain sight but also to bully and disrespect EU representatives such as Frans Timmermans and Donald Tusk.
The UN statelessness convention obliges member states to grant citizenship to persons born on their soil who would otherwise be stateless. Denmark, with very little success so far, is pushing for a renegotiation of that obligation, allegedly for security reasons. What is behind this effort? Could maybe the Danish initiative prove even beneficial by laying the ground for more international cooperation on citizenship law matters?
On Valentine’s day, the European Commission proposed “four targeted amendments” to the Comitology Regulation. In this blogpost it will be argued that while the proposal contains interesting elements, it is largely flawed from an institutional and constitutional point of view.
Political responsibility of Member States for sensitive EU executive action will be hard to get. But it is worth trying.
2016 was not a good year for the EU. Among many other things, one of the EU’s proudest achievements, its judiciary, has shown the first signs of worrying instability: In Germany, Denmark and Italy, high-level courts have openly and harshly declared their dissatisfaction with rulings by the European Court of Justice. I would not say that these are nationalist overreactions. These are worrying (and I would add justified) signs of something going wrong.
Given the short timeframe for negotiating an exit agreement, the UK and the EU-27 may not be able to agree on new terms for their future trade relations before the UK’s formal exit from the EU takes effect. Consequently, many experts are pushing for a transitional arrangement.
It is a sign of unconventional times when earnest people wish you a less exciting year 2017 compared to the one that has just, luckily, passed. Starting a new year, a less exciting one then, is an opportunity for reckoning about the past and for charting the plans for the future. For those who care about the project of European integration, these are no easy moments. By looking back we are reminded about the chain of crises that has been strangling the Union. By looking forward we cannot help ourselves but to wring hands at what is yet to follow. It is high time that this self-destructive European (indeed Western) narrative and, unfortunately, praxis were put to a halt. It is high time to present a positive alternative to the present status quo and to the populist decay. It is high time to re-launch the process of European integration.
Ever since the 2010 parliamentary elections Hungary has set off on the journey to became an ‘illiberal’ member state of the EU, which does not comply with the shared values of rule of law and democracy, the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. The new government of Viktor Orbán from the very beginning has justified the non-compliance by referring to national sovereignty, and lately to the country’s constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU. This constitutional battle started with the invalid anti-migrant referendum, was followed by the failed constitutional amendment, and concluded in early December last year by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in which the packed body in a binding constitutional interpretation rubber-stamped the constitutional identity defense of the Orbán government.
As Poland has careened away from the rule of law, the European Commission has struggled to work out its response. Given Europe’s multiple crises at the moment, the internal affairs of a rogue government or two may seem less critical to Europe’s well being than crises that affect multiple states at the same time, like the refugee crisis, the Euro-crisis or the fallout from Brexit. But the proliferation of governments inside the EU that no longer share basic European values undermines the reason for existence of the EU in the first place.