How Viktor Orbán Challenges the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Since the start of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán pursued an active foreign policy. He went to Kyiv for a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, made a surprise visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, attended an informal summit of the Organisation of Turkic States hosted by Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan, and then flew to Beijing for a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Orbán’s self-declared ‘peace diplomacy’ illustrates – once more – the challenges surrounding the EU’s external representation. His visits are nothing else than an expression of Hungarian national foreign policy. Also in that capacity, however, his actions are problematic in view of Hungary’s obligations under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

A Legal Trap for Freedom of Expression

More than seven years ago, 406 academics and researchers have been permanently dismissed from their positions at Turkish universities for signing a peace petition condemning the military operations by Turkish security forces in areas heavily populated by the Kurdish minority. The case raises critical questions about the limitations of international human rights bodies in safeguarding freedom of expression. In this blog, I demonstrate how the pragmatic considerations of the Council of Europe (CoE) contributed to the creation of a judicial trap disguised as a legal remedy.

Einstimmig für alle, alle für einstimmig?

Angesichts der Bestrebungen, das Bundesverfassungsgericht besser zu schützen, drängt sich unweigerlich die Frage auf, ob auf europäischer Ebene ähnliche Maßnahmen erforderlich sind. Derzeit sind rechtspopulistische und potenziell unionsfeindliche Parteien europaweit im Aufwind. Insbesondere das Verfahren zur Ernennung von Richter*innen des EuGH und des EuG weist Schwachstellen auf, die Feind*innen einer unabhängigen Gerichtsbarkeit ausnutzen könnten.

Soccer Meets Geopolitics

Two competitions are currently predominating Europe’s agenda – the UEFA Euro 2024 in Germany and the brute reality of geopolitics. While the former will decide over Europe’s next soccer champion, outcomes of the latter will arguably shape whether Europe will champion the new geopolitics of the 21st century. To win this competition, we argue that the European Union (EU) does not need a unified military force, but rather a new defense commissioner who would act as a dual security manager, bringing together the EU’s global entanglements with its economic clout to enhance the military power of its Member States.

Putting the Record Straight About the Spitzenkandidaten 

In the last few weeks, a great deal of nonsense has been said about the concept of the Spitzenkandidat. Some accuse the European Parliament of a power grab, subrogating the lawful role of the European Council in choosing the new Commission President. Others trivialise the role of the Parliament and doubt the democratic credentials of the process. Many believe that the candidate must always be drawn from the largest party come what may. All these assertions are wrong. The election of the Commission President is a joint endeavour between Parliament and Commission, democratically legitimate, and fully in conformity with EU law.  

Im »Westen« viel Neues

Der EuGH hat in seinem Urteil vom 11. Juni 2024 einen geschlechtsspezifischen Asylgrund bestätigt: Frauen, die jahrelang in einem Umfeld der Gleichberechtigung zwischen Frauen und Männern gelebt haben, können unter Umständen einen Anspruch auf Asyl haben, wenn sie diese Lebensweise in ihrem Heimatland aufgeben müssten. Das Urteil stärkt damit nicht nur die Stellung von Frauen in Asylfragen. Es könnte sich auch auf den Schutzstatus von sogenannten „Klimaflüchtlingen“ auswirken.

Aufgeschoben ist nicht aufgehoben

Der Versuch der belgischen Ratspräsidentschaft, ein Verhandlungsmandat für die Umsetzung der umstrittenen Chatkontrolle-Verordnung zu erzielen, ist letzte Woche unter anderem am Widerstand Deutschlands gescheitert. Das sind gute Nachrichten für die Grundrechte, doch trotz der Umwälzungen durch die Europawahl ist es noch zu früh für eine Entwarnung.

The Lighthouse of EU Law Shines on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal

Last week, legal scholars from all over the world met in Freiburg at the ConTrans conference. On the one end of the spectrum, scholars like Woijcech Sadurski advocated for a revolutionary approach, simply dismantling the current Tribunal and re-building it from scratch. On the other end stands Adam Bodnar, who stressed the importance of legality in the transition process. In my view, EU law shines a possible way ahead – it can justify disregarding the Tribunal’s decisions and empower ordinary courts to assume the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Eventually, this would lead to a decentralised constitutional review.

In Favour of the Hungarian Council Presidency

On the 1 July 2024, Hungary will start its second EU Council Presidency. In light of Hungary’s continuous breaches of the rule of law, questions have been posed whether the Presidency could be postponed or cancelled (also here). However, given the mere informal powers of the Presidency, I argue that the real damage is rather limited, especially because the Hungarian Presidency takes place just after the European elections. Finally, the Hungarian Presidency may even improve the connection of its citizens with the EU and show the best version of itself to the other Member States.

Rule of Law Chickens Coming Home to Roost

Ongoing assaults by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz administration on the rule of law in Hungary have produced manifold reactions, generally of depressingly limited effectiveness. Last week, on 13 June 2024, in Case C-123/22 European Commission v Hungary, the Court ordered a record lump sum payment of €200,000,000 and a penalty payment of €1,000,000 per day of delay until an earlier 2020 Court ruling is complied with. Hungary thus received a stinging reminder that the Court of Justice is not toothless when it comes to the rule of law.