From Paper to Practice

The CSDDD requires companies to carry out due diligence on actual and potential human rights and environmental adverse impacts. This means companies have to identify harmful impacts in their value chains and take appropriate measures to prevent, mitigate, or bring them to an end. In this two-part blog post, we will look at which environmental impacts are covered by the CSDDD and how they are addressed. In this second part, we will discuss how the CSDDD negotiations influenced the design of its environmental provisions and identify missed opportunities. We will conclude by analysing what factors are important to ensure that transposition and implementation remain true to the CSDDD’s objectives.

Waiting for Kinsa

On 18 June 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union will sit as a Grand Chamber in a hearing addressing the compatibility of the so-called Facilitators Package with the principle of proportionality set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). The Kinsa case (previously named Kinshasa) provides an opportunity for the CJEU to counteract the trend towards overcriminalisation of humanitarian action that has taken hold across the EU. This blog highlights the ways in which the Facilitator Package fails to take account of important fundamental rights and why the criminalization of solidarity that it has facilitated is not an inevitability but a political choice.

Towards Planetary Boundaries for Business?

While the material scope of the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) fell behind civil society demands, it does mandate a degree of environmental due diligence that constitutes a tentative shift towards real corporate environmental accountability. Despite its conceptual restrictions, which are the result of a somewhat polarised legislative process, the CSDDD’s environmental annex provides a provision with potential for the protection of biological diversity: the reference to the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Militant Public Administration

An unprecedented scandal surrounding a Polish governmental fund established to aid crime victims highlights the role of civil servants in authoritarian state capture. The revelations surrounding the Justice Fund show broad levels of bureaucratic acquiescence with shocking abuses of power, and only belated effort to document and report these abuses. The Polish case shows it is time for a democratically militant public administration – the new vision of civil service better prepared to fend off authoritarian encroachment from elected politicians.

Trans Rights and Gender Recognition before the CJEU

On May 7, 2024, the Advocate General of the CJEU issued his Opinion on the Mirin case concerning the right to Legal Gender Recognition (LGR) for transgender persons. Yet, the solution offered by the AG deviates from the Court’s previous case-law on LGR, by making it about free movement rather than protection against discrimination, or fundamental rights. It also places the applicant, and those in a similar position, in an administrative situation that is defeating the very purpose of LGR – an issue that the AG himself acknowledges. A more satisfactory and ambitious alternative would instead be to frame the LGR as protected under the EU Charter.

From Strasbourg to Luxembourg?

KlimaSeniorinnen has established a remedy which, in EU law, is not easy to locate and may actually be unavailable in light of restrictive CJEU case law.  Whatever one’s views on this restrictive case law, it is a fact that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights now obliges the CJEU to do as much as it can to accommodate the KlimaSeniorinnen remedy and to interpret the relevant TFEU provisions flexibly.  One may assume that, sooner or later, the CJEU will be confronted with a KlimaSeniorinnen claim.  If the CJEU were to declare such a claim inadmissible, it will put itself in the corner of courts refusing to engage with climate change policies.  That would be unfortunate for a court that has long been at the forefront of legal progress.

Zur Gestalt Europas

Die Debatte über die Finalität der Europäischen Union ist in eine Sackgasse geraten. Die letzte Vertragsrevision liegt bald 15 Jahre zurück, ernsthafte politische Initiativen sind nicht erkennbar oder nicht Erfolg versprechend. Die Konferenz zur Zukunft Europas präsentierte Mitte 2022 ihre Ergebnisse, vermutlich dürften aber auch diese alsbald verpuffen. Wir tippeln auf der Stelle, seit dem Vertrag von Lissabon, eigentlich aber schon seit dem Scheitern des Verfassungsvertrages scheint die Debatte festgefahren. Anstatt über die weitere Entwicklung der Integration zu sprechen, scheint es eher darum zu gehen, das Bestehende zu bewahren und zu verhindern, dass es zu signifikanten Integrationsrückständen kommt.

Soft law, hardcore?

Soft Law bietet die Möglichkeit der agilen und flexiblen Regulierung, die sich gerade an die dynamische digitale Entwicklung anpassen kann. Allerdings gilt Soft Law durch seine unverbindliche Natur als wenig effektiv. Mit dem Digital Services Act (DSA) beschreitet die EU jedoch einen unkonventionellen Weg, indem sie Hard Law und Soft Law in – zumindest aus dogmatischer Perspektive – eigentümlicher Weise miteinander verbindet. Der DSA ist selbst eine rechtsverbindliche EU-Verordnung, welche jedoch Soft Law Instrumente vorsieht und sogar Vorschriften zu ihrer rechtlichen Durchsetzung enthält. Derlei Regelungstechniken sind im Unionsrecht zwar durchaus bekannt, doch stellen sie zumindest der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung des DSA als ‚Verfassung des Internets‘ in Frage. Wie weitreichend kann eine solche Verfassung sein, die wesentliche Fragen an (exekutiv initiiertes, privat gesetztes) Soft Law auslagert?