The Key to Ensure Media Pluralism in the EU? A Unified Framework

Media freedom is one of the necessary conditions for democracies to function. Yet media freedom is currently not guaranteed in all European Union countries. The European Media Freedom Act proposed by the European Commission in 2022 aims to protect and foster media pluralism across the EU block and, while some changes would need to be made to strengthen the proposal’s efficacy, monitoring on the ground shows that a common European framework is indeed needed. While there are already several harmonisation measures that revolve around media – such as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) – this is the first text that clearly and specifically addresses the media market in and of itself, which marks a paradigm shift in EU media regulation.

Doing Justice to Poland’s Muzzle Law

On 5 June 2023, the Court of Justice issued its fourth infringement judgment in relation to yet another Polish piece of legislation – informally known as the muzzle law – which aimed to dissuade or punish Polish judges for applying and upholding EU rule of law requirements. As anyone with any basic understanding of EU law could have predicted, the law rushed into force by Poland’s ruling coalition in December 2019 did not survive judicial scrutiny in Luxembourg. As long as the Commission fails to demand full compliance with CJEU case law and decisively address the issue of judicial usurpers, however, just chipping away at the arbitrary disciplinary changes Polish authorities have made will always fail to solve Poland’s fundamental and systemic issues.

An Inconvenient Constraint

On 1 July 2024, Hungary is set to take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament and the Meijers Committee issued reports questioning whether Hungary should be blocked from doing that. These proposals raise questions of political feasibility, however, especially as one may doubt if a Hungarian Council Presidency can do much practical damage to the EU. In addition, they also raise questions of legal feasibility. A logical prerequisite for preventing Hungary from holding the Presidency as long as it breaches the rule of law is that doing so is consistent with the EU’s own rule of law. I doubt it is.

Institutional Corsets and the Question of Timing

There has been a lot of noise around whether Hungary should, and legally could, be blocked from taking over the Council presidency in the second half of 2024, considering the state of the rule of law in the country. On 1 June, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, questioning Hungary’s ability to “credibly fulfill” the tasks of a Council presidency and asking the Council to “find a proper solution as soon as possible”, else Parliament could take “appropriate measures”. Such concerns are legitimate, but another question seems to be sidelined in the debate: How much practical damage can the upcoming Council presidency under Hungary actually do in the EU?

Boiling the Frog

In the wake of Turkey's recent presidential elections, previous blogposts objected to characterizing authoritarian regimes such as Turkey, Hungary and India as ‘competitive’ solely by virtue of regular elections, which are formally free but fundamentally unfair. However, this blogpost argues that the prior ones missed the main problem in Turkey: The playing field in Turkey is not only “massively tilted in favor of Erdogan” now; it has always been tilted in favor of the majority – long before Erdoğan. This blogpost discusses the slow death of Turkish electoral competitiveness. First, I describe the politico-legal context that enabled Erdogan’s rise. Second, I contrast the developments in Turkey regarding election competitiveness to European legal standards and strikingly late political demands.

An Honest Broker?

A characteristic of the functioning of the EU is that the Presidency of the Council of Ministers rotates between Member States every six months according to a previously agreed order. The EU Presidency is responsible for driving forward the Council’s work on EU legislation. In the second half of 2024, Hungary will take over the Presidency, followed by Poland in the first half of 2025. Given their rule of law record, it is highly questionable whether they will act in the Council’s general interest. In order to avoid damage, there are three avenues available to the Council and the Member States.

»Ziviler Ungehorsam – Testfall für den demokratischen Rechtsstaat«

… so lautet der Titel eines Aufsatzes von Habermas, erschienen 1983. Genau diesen Testfall erleben wir derzeit. Es scheint, als ob „der Rechtsstaat“ – nach Wochen des intensiven Protests durch die „Letzte Generation“ in Berlin – nun „andere Saiten aufziehen“ möchte, und erneut nach dem Strafrecht greift, genauer gesprochen nach einem Tatbestand des ohnehin nicht unproblematischen Präventivstrafrechts. Meine These ist jedoch, dass der Versuch, die Klimaproteste „wegzustrafen“, den Rechtsstaat zwangsläufig schwächt, anstatt ihn zu stärken. Da politischer Protest im Ausgangspunkt als wesentliches Element einer demokratischen Kultur ausgehalten werden muss, ist auch der Umgang mit unter Umständen strafbaren Aktionen im Zuge des politischen Protests - freilich im Rahmen des Legalitätsprinzips - mit Augenmaß zu wählen, um diesen Grundsatz nicht zu konterkarieren.

Media Pluralism in KRRiT-ical Condition

In April 2023, the Polish National Broadcasting Council, the so-called KRRiT, imposed a high fine on an indipendent media outlet. It was not the first fine of this kind to independent media organisations. The growing number of KRRiT decisions targeting independent media in Poland is the result of the political nature of the procedure for appointing members of the KRRiT and the broad, unclear legal basis for imposing fines. Since 2005, the decisive voice in the composition of the KRRiT was that of the ruling political majority. This blogpost analyzes and criticizes the vague legal framework for KRRiT and the institution's apparent political capture in recent years.

Showdown zur Asylpolitik in Brüssel

In Brüssel beginnt in Kürze der Endspurt für die EU-Asylrechtsreform. Heftige Kritik erfährt hierbei die deutsche Verhandlungsposition. Nun könnte man die rhetorische Eskalation als typisches Phänomen des Twitter-Zeitalters abtun und meine Einwände – „BVerfG sieht es anders“ – als professorale Besserwisserei. Doch es geht um mehr: Die politische Mitte darf nicht die Fähigkeit verlieren, in der Migrationspolitik widerstreitende Zielvorgaben auszugleichen. Die pragmatische Lösungssuche droht zwischen den binären Alternativen faktisch offener Grenzen und einer gewaltsamen Abschottungspolitik zerrieben zu werden.

A New European Enforcer?

As a key piece of the European Commission’s digital agenda, the Digital Services Act (DSA) is drawing a lot of attention from civil society, industry, and regulators. One particularly interesting development in that regard is the Commission’s current transformation from being the institution leading the DSA’s negotiations to the one enforcing it. This article explores the challenges faced by the Commission in this transformation.