A Threat to the Core

On May 13, 2025, just before midnight, a FIDESZ deputy tabled a new bill before the Hungarian Parliament. The bill seeks to enhance “sovereignty protection measures” by introducing sweeping transparency instruments targeting foreign-funded interference in Hungarian public life. These restrictions purposefully shrink civic space further, roll back protections of fundamental rights and impair the functioning of constitutional democracy in a retrogressive fashion. When adopted, Hungary’s constitutional order will fundamentally regress from the state that existed at the time of its accession to the European Union.

Legality Over Accountability?

On April 23, 2025, public prosecutors in Guatemala executed an arrest warrant against Luis Pacheco, the Deputy Energy Minister. This case is only the latest in a series of politically motivated prosecutions that place the Attorney General at the center of Guatemala’s democratic backsliding. She has systematically targeted journalists, public officials and civil society actors, undermining democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights. What can be done when legal mechanisms to hold public officials accountable are effectively blocked? When there are credible grounds to believe that a public official is abusing their mandate, accountability must take precedence in legal and political debate.

Grenzgänger

Kaum im Amt, hat der neue deutsche Innenminister die Pläne zu einer strikteren Kontrolle an den deutschen Staatsgrenzen umgesetzt. Die aktuelle Praxis der Bundespolizei wirft Fragen mit Blick auf die Vereinbarkeit mit der Dublin-III-Verordnung und dem Schengener Grenzkodex auf und ist nicht mit Art. 72 AEUV zu rechtfertigen. Unilaterale Abweichungen würden zudem das in Art. 3 Abs. 2 EUV formulierte Ziel der Realisierung eines unionsweiten Mobilitätsraums gefährden.

Undoing the American Rechtsstaat

Donald Trump’s return to the forefront of U.S. politics brings an urgent constitutional question back into focus: Can the American administrative state survive another presidency driven by executive absolutism? Recent developments before the Supreme Court, especially in Trump v. U. S., suggest that long-standing norms and legal safeguards are under siege. This post explores how a second Trump term might exploit structural vulnerabilities in U.S. public law, with consequences that extend far beyond American borders.

Safe for whom?

The EU’s notion of “safe countries of origin” is on increasingly shaky ground. In a recent Opinion, Advocate General de la Tour suggests that a country can still be deemed safe even when specific groups face serious threats there. This reinterpretation breaks with established case law and risks hollowing out core procedural protections for asylum seekers across Europe. It remains to be seen how this stance will influence the delicate balance between efficient processing and safeguarding fundamental rights.

Dobrindts Rechtsbruch

Der neue Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt hat am 7. Mai 2025 die Bundespolizei angewiesen auch Schutzsuchenden bei Binnengrenzkontrollen die Einreise basierend auf § 18 Abs. 2 Nr. 1 AsylG zu verweigern (und diese in den jeweiligen angrenzenden Staat zurückzuweisen). Damit sind die bei Schutzsuchenden verpflichtend durchzuführenden Dublin-Verfahren für diese Personengruppe faktisch ausgesetzt. Davon ausgenommen sind nur „erkennbar vulnerable Personen“, die „weiterhin an die zuständigen Stellen oder Erstaufnahmeeinrichtung weitergeleitet werden.“ Diese Aussetzung des Dublin-Verfahrens an den deutschen Binnengrenzen ist evident rechtswidrig – also ein klarer Rechtsbruch.

Tilting the Scales

On April 10 2025 AG Norkus delivered his Opinion in the appeal of Hamoudi v Frontex (Case C-136/24). In it, he tackles a question that is pivotal not only for Mr. Hamoudi’s right to compensation but also for the evolution of the EU legal system: how should the CJEU address stark power imbalances in evidentiary matters? In formulating EU procedural rules for cases involving collective expulsions, the CJEU should take into account the blatant asymmetry in accessing evidence existing between asylum seekers adrift at sea and an EU Agency equipped with cutting-edge surveillance technology. Yet, the reasoning of the AG on the allocation of the burden of proof misfires in some crucial respects.

Law and Political Economy Beyond the State

The study of European Union Law from the perspective of Law and Political Economy (LPE) offers valuable insights from two perspectives. This post shows that on the one hand, LPE as a scholarly movement provides a critical framework for analysing fundamental legal aspects of the EU’s political economy and brings to the debate a much needed renewal of the importance of the critique of the political economy. On the other hand, investigating the EU from a perspective sensitive to LPE analysis is also a potentially enriching challenge for the scholarly movement itself.

Academic Vertigo

What is therefore needed is a much thicker description of the current phase of semantic destabilization. This implies to build a new questionnaire able to grasp the dynamics of contemporary legal controversies allowing to bring historical depth and socio-legal […] While there is certainly a large variety of methodologies able to address this questionnaire, […] I contend however that a socio-genetic approach is better equipped when it comes to unpack the notion of “context” and reconstitute the complex “hermeneutic space” of legal concepts that continuously move back and forth from the legal and the political fields.

Wenn Richter:innen sich dumm stellen

Im Koalitionsvertrag heißt es: "Im Asylrecht muss aus dem Untersuchungsgrundsatz der Beibringungsgrundsatz werden." Viele asyl- und migrationskritische Bürger:innen werden der Meinung sein, eine solche Eigeninitiative der Geflüchteten sei ja wohl das Mindeste für den Erhalt eines Schutzstatus. Verwaltungsrichter:innen hingegen hadern zu Recht mit der Abschaffung des Amtsermittlungsgrundsatzes im Asylrecht. Positive Erfahrungen aus dem Zivilprozess lassen sich auf den Verwaltungsprozess – und insbesondere auf das Asylverfahren – nicht übertragen.