The Court of Justice of the EU goes (almost) public

While the broadcasting of the delivery does not add much value (the texts are generally made available online at the time of their live reading in Luxembourg) to its declared goal of facilitating “the public’s access to its judicial activity”, that of the public hearings appears a major game-changer in the Court’s stance vis-à-vis the public-at-large. And that despite the many precautions accompanying the introduction of such a major rehaul of the Court’s publicity policy regarding its hearings,

Keeping the Past and the Present Apart

The mere fact that a judge was appointed for the first time under undemocratic conditions does not automatically determine that the court in which that judge adjudicates lacks the necessary independence under EU law. The CJEU has answered to this effect a question of Mr. Kamil Zaradkiewicz, appointed to Poland's Supreme Court in 2018 on recommendation of the new government-controlled National Council of Judiciary and thus lacking independence himself. Importantly, the CJEU emphasized that the referring court did not submit any evidence that may rise legitimate and serious doubts, in the minds of individuals, over independence and impartiality of the particular judge. With this decision, the Court refused to be drawn into the inner-Polish dispute about decommunization, and reinforced its jurisprudence on judicial independence standards in the EU.

Hungary’s Lesson for Europe

There seems to be a disturbing discordance in the European Commission’s response to the Hungarian elections. On the one hand, the Commission triggers the rule of law mechanism. On the other, it refuses to comment on the fairness of the Hungarian elections. This contradicts the fact that, just like the rule of law, democracy is also part of  Europe’s constitutional identity. But what does democracy require from Member States? Hungary’s elections make clear that the value of democracy, as given expression in Article 10 TEU, should be justiciable.

Sexualverbrechen sind nicht grenzüberschreitend

Pünktlich zum Internationalen Frauentag am 8. März 2022 hat die EU-Kommission ihren Vorschlag für eine EU-Richtlinie zur Bekämpfung von Gewalt gegen Frauen und häuslicher Gewalt vorgelegt. Auch wenn der Inhalt der Richtlinie politisch wünschenswert ist, hat die EU hierfür nicht die Kompetenz, da Vergewaltigungen (und Femizide) keine grenzübergreifende Kriminalität darstellen. Vor diesem Hintergrund dürfte die Bundesrepublik der Vergewaltigungs-Vorgabe in Art. 5 des Richtlinien-Entwurfs nicht zustimmen, will sie nicht die Vorgaben aus dem Lissabon-Urteil des BVerfG ignorieren.

The Blame for Defeat and the Morality of Politics

The increased support of Fidesz by the majority of voters, who casted votes on 3 April despite Orbán’s immoral stance towards Putin’s war, and also these voters’ little appreciation of freedom and almost none for limiting power, raises the question whether, besides the autocrat, the opposition, and the elite, we cannot blame also the ‘people’ for the opposition’s defeat and Fidesz’s victory.

A Backdoor Exit from the European Convention on Human Rights

Russia left the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022. The European Court of Human Rights declared that Russia will remain a Party to the Convention until 16 September 2022. This resolution is inconsistent with applicable termination rules. But even beyond technicalities, it reveals fundamental defects in the design of the ECHR denunciation clause. Forced withdrawal and expulsion from the Council, as mechanisms to sanction severe violations of human rights, should not have the effect of relieving the delinquent State of its conventional human rights obligations.

The Council of Europe as an AI Standard Setter

On 4 April 2022, Member States of the Council of Europe commences negotiations on the world’s first international binding legal instrument in the field of artificial intelligence. The CoE has a large reservoir of both experience and expertise in the field of standard setting, as far as the three key priorities are concerned: promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Given the undisputed need for regulating AI activities, the CoE appears a prime candidate for this undertaking.

Letters from Brussels with Love and the Issue of Mutual Trust in Nationality Matters

In a recent article on this blog, I have set out that the spotlight will soon be turning on the European passportization of Russian oligarchs. And well, what shall I say, it did not take long for the Commission to come out swinging. In a recommendation issued on March 28, the Commission urged “Member States to immediately repeal any existing investor citizenship schemes and to ensure strong checks are in place to address the risks posed by investor residence schemes”.

The Council of Europe’s Sharp Turn

The Council of Europe (CoE) responded promptly to Russia’s act of aggression against Ukraine first by suspending Russia’s representation rights on 25 February 2022, and then by expelling it on 16 March 2022 in accordance with Article 8 of the Statute. The Committee of Ministers used the Article 8 procedure for the first time in the history of the CoE. This might have crucial implications for the broader CoE context and could make the threat of suspension and expulsion more credible for other member states as well.