EU-Verfassungsrecht, verfassungsrechtlicher Rahmen der europäischen Integration und Mehrebenenverfassungsrecht. Umfasst EU-Institutionenrecht, Grundfreiheiten, EU-Grundrechte, verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der EU-Mitgliedschaft und das Verhältnis zwischen EU-Recht und nationalen Verfassungsordnungen.
In a recent Advisory Opinion the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that indefinite presidential re-elections constitute a violation of Inter-American human rights standards. In doing so it sets substantive limits to states regarding the design of their political and electoral systems. This is a far reaching and bold move.
On 7 September 2021, the European Commission announced that it will ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to impose financial penalties on Poland for not complying with the Court’s order for interim measures of 14 July 2021 regarding its Disciplinary Chamber. The Commission must be able to threat the member state in question not only credibly, but also with amounts that are high enough to deter them from continuing on their rule-of-law-breaching-path.
Die Idee mit der List(e) „kleiner sicherer Herkunftsstaaten“ mag sympathisch klingen. Tatsächlich verbirgt sich dahinter eine verfassungswidrige Umgehung des Zustimmungserfordernisses des Bundesrats zur Erweiterung der Liste sog. sicherer Herkunftsstaaten unter dem Deckmantel des Unionsrechts.
The European Commission's proposal for a Digital Markets Act is meant to complement EU competition law, in order to guarantee contestable digital markets. However, from a policy point of view, the current self-restriction to behavioural remedies in competition law and merger control, as well as the focus on behavioural ex ante regulation via the DMA, is at best a half-hearted and at worst a misguided way to effectively address the Big Tech challenge. We argue in favour of a competition law toolkit with extended options to use structural measures to tackle entrenched market dysfunctionalities.
In trying to overcome the cross-border enforcement’s pitfalls of the GDPR, the Commission’s proposals for a Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act are largely expanding the Commission’s enforcement powers. Unfortunately, what is touted as a solution for cross-border enforcement issues, might lead to new difficulties and challenges due to the risks of the centralization of power with the Commission.
The package consisting of the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Data Governance Act is about empowering authorities vis-à-vis powerful private market players. Private enforcement is absent in this package, despite its great potential: By engaging in rule enforcement, individuals and companies help to confine key market players’ (unlawful use of) economic power, while also counterbalancing a tendency for state agencies to become the sole decision makers on when and how to sanction what they consider undue conduct.
A central source of Big Tech gatekeepers’ power is their encompassing access to individuals’ personal data. The prohibition of Article 5(a) of the proposed Digital Markets Act, therefore, is a welcome attempt to limit the private power over data held by gatekeeping platforms. However, end-user consent cannot be regarded as an adequate safeguard for keeping data-driven markets competitive.
For the Digital Markets Act to function properly – that is, to dismantle overwhelming private power – enforcement capacities of private actors should be strengthened at the outset: Competitors and customers should be integrated into the enforcement system as complainants, informants and litigants. The digital giants will not tumble because of government intervention but because of innovative competitors and stronger customers that can rely on the framework set by governments. Private power needs to be cured with private empowerment.
The combination of the features characterising gatekeepers in the Digital Markets Act's is likely to create significant power imbalances in the market and lead to unfair practices that the proposal aims to prevent and repair. A service-based approach, over a provider-based one, as well as a functional description of core platform services would remedy this unintended consequence.
Slovenia is the only Member State participating in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office that has not yet made a single nomination for the positions of European Delegated Prosecutors. This post seeks to sketch the legal framework governing the appointment of the EDPs, explain how the blockade came about at the national level in Slovenia, and elucidate why no appointments from Slovenia can be expected for the time being.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters