Wenn Wissensquellen versiegen

Die ersten 100 Tage von Trumps zweiter Amtszeit wirken sich nicht nur drastisch auf den Welthandel und die liberale Weltordnung aus – sondern auch auf Asylverfahren in Deutschland. Vor allem das Defunding von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verändert die Informationslage zu asylrelevanten Herkunftsländern radikal: Etablierte Quellen von Herkunftslandinformationen verschwinden, das Verständnis von zentralen Konzepten (wie Terrorismus) wandelt sich und die Informationslage wird noch volatiler. Dies stellt deutsche Gerichte bei der Tatsachenaufklärung in Asylverfahren vor neue Herausforderungen.

Just Asking

Have you ever wondered why a legal text is the way it is, or whether its implementation actually works as intended? Typically, one would approach such questions by consulting existing textual material. If one is extraordinary inquisitive, one might even file access-to-document requests. However, sometimes one cannot escape the feeling that something is missing. In that situation, I suggest, one should do the obvious: talk to people who know better – ideally, the people working on or embodying the phenomenon one intends to research.

Glancing Beyond Europe

On 9 May 1831, a young French aristocrat trained as lawyer arrived in Rhode Island for a nine-months visit to the United States. Officially tasked by the French government with studying the American prison system, his ambition and desire for political and literary fame propelled him to conduct a much broader study of the character of the American Republic. Based on his observations, the young lawyer wrote Democracy in America; a book that holds as much insight about the European Union today as it did about the early American Republic back then.

Local Meanings of EU Law

Law can be viewed not as a universal (or European) science but, following Geertz, as local knowledge. To illustrate the relevance of this perspective for understanding EU law, its effects, and the limits of integration through law, this text draws on the findings of a “classical” comparative study on the application of proportionality as an EU law principle in three national contexts: France, England, and Greece. This type of approach has the potential to evolve – and indeed is already evolving – into an interdisciplinary exploration of the diverse ways in which EU law is understood, applied, and experienced in settings as varied as the Paagalayiri market in Ouagadougou, the train-line connection between Paris and Marseille, or the camp of Moria on Lesvos.

(De)coloniality and EU Legal Studies

In EU legal studies, time, space, place, and knowledge are locations for contestation, deliberation and reconstruction. Other submissions in this symposium have elaborated on the limitations in understanding and accounting for the ‘what was’ as a fundamental blind spot of EU law. Extending from this starting point, I will show how decolonial approaches can bridge the gap between history, theory, and action, offering practical and alternative solutions for reconciliation. To do so, I will use the rule of law as one such site for contestation.

The Human Factor in EU Law

This post emphasizes the human factor as a critical method of analysis for legal scholars specializing in European Union law. The aim is to critically analyse the evolution of the rules governing the CJEU, shedding light on its composition, organization, and functioning, while also proposing reform initiatives. Some of these reforms prioritize greater transparency within the CJEU. Furthermore, by focusing on the human factor in EU law, this method reveals how individuals are positioned within the institution, helping to identify potential phenomena of invisibility or exclusion in decision-making processes.

It’s solidarity, stupid!

Few cases have triggered as stark reactions as Commission v Malta. In the ruling’s aftermath, many legal scholars and practitioners were quick to discard the decision. While the ruling is bold, innovative, and goes far beyond established precedent, the Court’s reasoning remains brief, ambiguous, in some parts even obscure and sibylline. Yet, most of the Court’s “great” judgments have left room for interpretation. No doubt, Commission v Malta will be subject to many, very different, affirmative or critical interpretations. In the following, I will provide one – of several possible! – readings, which seeks to square the ruling with constitutional reasoning.

Longing for Safety before the European Court of Justice

On 10 April 2025, Advocate General de la Tour delivered his Advisory Opinion in the joined cases Alace and Canpelli dealing with the powers of Italy – and, by extension, other EU Member States – to legislate on what constitutes a “safe third country” and a “safe country of origin”. The AG confirmed that Italy can list a third country as “safe” when it is “generally” deemed as such, provided that this designation is compliant with EU law. This piece discusses how the human rights of applicants seeking international protection are likely to be hindered by this approach.

The Silent Engine of European Citizenship

In its ruling on 29 April 2025 in Case C-181/23 Commission v Malta, the Grand Chamber held that Malta’s investor citizenship scheme, which grants Maltese nationality in exchange for predetermined payments or investments, was contrary to EU law. Although the judgment has been criticised (perhaps not without reason) for its lack of doctrinal foundation, it does demonstrate that the EU principle of mutual trust has constitutional character and is normatively capable of challenging national administrative mechanisms, such as the Maltese naturalisation scheme, that are incompatible with the values in Art. 2 TEU.

The »Crisis of Critique« in EU Law

Critique has become one of the latest buzzwords in EU legal studies. Who, after all, would not want to be identified as a critical scholar if the danger is that one’s work might otherwise be labelled as reactionary, unsophisticated, naïve or whatever other signifier could be used to demolish the value of scholarly enterprise? But the down-side of this growing interest in being critical as an EU law scholar is that the idea of critique itself is in danger of becoming inflated.