Demoralisierung als Verfassungs­funktion

Bis zum 1. Juli 2020 findet nun in Russland die ursprünglich für den 22. April 2020 geplante, durch die Corona-Pandemie aber verschobene Volksabstimmung über die Verfassungsreform statt. Das Änderungsverfahren sagt viel aus über die Bedeutung der Verfassung im autoritär regierten Russland. Es zeigt auch den starken Zynismus in der russischen Verfassungspolitik und führt die Machtlosigkeit des politischen Gegners vor. Dies gilt auch für den Europarat.

Frankenstein’s Court

Due to Brexit, the remaining 27 EU Member States would like to remove Eleanor Sharpston, an Advocate General nominated by the United Kingdom, from the CJEU. Many have criticized this idea, claiming that a removal would undermine the judicial independence of the Court. This post argues that the position taken by the EU 27 to remove Eleanor Sharpston from the Court is actually well-reasoned and lawful while leaving her in office would lead to strange consequences e.g. that the Judges of the Court are less protected than its Advocate Generals.

Loyalty vs. Sovereignty

The German Constitutional Court’s Weiss ruling has led to a major debate as to whether a national supreme court may disregard ECJ case law, asserting that the ECJ had acted ultra vires. Similar debates have existed for quite some time in the EFTA pillar of the EEA, consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. A relatively small but powerful group of lawyers in the Norwegian administration (led by the Government Attorney), orthodox dualist professors and judges loyal to the government has used Norway’s dominant position to attempt to redefine EEA law. One of the most effective strategies is the suppression of the notion of loyalty or good faith and its replacement by a strategy of creating “room for manoeuvre” (“RFM”) for Norway.

Was ist die europäische Rechtsgemeinschaft? Nichts. Alles!

Spätestens mit dem PSPP-Urteil ist die „Rechtsgemeinschaft“ zu einem europarechtlichen Grundbegriff aufgestiegen. Die Berufung auf diesen Ausdruck ist ein theoretischer Reflexionsstop. Der Beitrag geht Sprachspielen nach und stellt aus rechtshistorischer Perspektive die These auf, dass unter „Rechtsgemeinschaft“ ein Primat der Praxis verhandelt wird.

Defending the Open Society against its Enemies

On 18 June 2020, in the case of Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held that Hungarian authorities “introduced discriminatory and unjustified restrictions on foreign donations to civil society organisations” when it adopted a new legislation on NGO in 2017. How will the Hungarian government react? Six potential scenarios can be outlined from not doing anything (scenario 1) – an unlikely option due to the threat of pecuniary sanctions – to full and good faith compliance with the judgment resulting in the total repeal of the Lex NGO (scenario 6) – equally unlikely. Between these two, four additional ones may be foreseen.

Who is ultra vires now?

For decades, and until a few weeks ago, Article 310 TFEU has been seen as prohibiting the EU from borrowing to finance its expenditure. The Commission’s Next Generation EU proposal reverses that interpretation and raises fundamental questions of EU law and its dynamic interpretation. With such a sudden change of heart, are the Member States under a duty to follow? What constitutional limits remain to their membership obligations?

Judicial Responses to Bolsonarism: The Leading Role of the Federal Supreme Court

Criticism against the Brazilian judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, has been on the rise in the past couple of decades. Under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, however, courts are experiencing a more radical and dangerous form of opposition, which transcends the borders of legitimate criticism and undertakes a direct attack on the judicial branch. This must be understood in light of the Federal Supreme Court’s backlash against Bolsonaro’s maneuvers to flame his supporters and violate the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. This article aims at recollecting the most important rulings and procedures that take part in this reaction.

Ein Schiedsgericht für die Gerichte?

Der Ultra-vires-Konflikt zwischen dem Bundesverfassungsgericht und dem Europäischen Gerichtshof begründet eine Verfassungskrise, die sich nicht rechtlich, sondern nur politisch überwinden lässt. In diesem Sinne hat Armin Hatje hier jüngst einen begrüßenswerten rechtspolitischen Vorschlag für einen Gemeinsamen Rat der obersten Gerichtshöfe der Europäischen Union vorgestellt. Nachdem Hatje bereits die Funktion und mögliche Ausgestaltung eines solchen Gremiums beschrieben hat, möchte ich seinen Vorschlag im Folgenden um die Beobachtung ergänzen, dass ein Gemeinsamer Rat nur dann Erfolg verspricht, wenn alle Beteiligten die politische Natur seiner Entscheidungen akzeptieren.

Ultra vires and constitutional identity control – apples and oranges or two drops of water?

The PSPP decision raised the question of how to deal with competence and jurisdictional conflicts in the EU. Once suggestion is to install a Mixed Appeal Chamber of the CJEU. Apart from ultra vires control, the New Chamber could also engage in constitutional identity review of EU law. In order to do that I will propose, what I call, the “sequential” model of adjudication on Art. 4(2) TEU, which in my opinion can be applied in the current legal setting, but which could be potentially complemented with the establishment of the new chamber.