Terrible Order
On Hong Kong, Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the necessity of taking sides.
EU-Verfassungsrecht, verfassungsrechtlicher Rahmen der europäischen Integration und Mehrebenenverfassungsrecht. Umfasst EU-Institutionenrecht, Grundfreiheiten, EU-Grundrechte, verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der EU-Mitgliedschaft und das Verhältnis zwischen EU-Recht und nationalen Verfassungsordnungen.
On Hong Kong, Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the necessity of taking sides.
We know Brexit means Brexit but should it also mean violating EU Primary Law? Eleanor Sharpston QC, one of the Advocates General of the European Court of Justice, launched an unprecedented legal action "against the EU and her own judicial colleagues after attempts were made to sack her": The national governments of 27 EU Member States decided to terminate her appointment early. Why? Because Brexit ought to mean Brexit or so it seems.
Earlier this week, 32 leading scholars of EU law and politics signed the statement that national courts cannot override CJEU judgments, in response to a demonstration by the BVerfG that it actually can. We share the signatories’ concern that Weiss might (and most probably will) be used as a pretext for refusing to comply with the CJEU’s rulings and the EU rule of law requirements in Member States such as Poland or Hungary. We are also critical of the conclusion to which the BVerfG arrived in its decision, though we accept some of its premises (i.e., that the national disapplication of EU acts may be justified in some rare and exceptional cases). However, even though we are not all constitutional pluralists, we take issue with some aspects of the reasoning behind the original statement and question the doctrinal and empirical arguments it invokes in favour of EU law’s unconditional supremacy.
The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the European Central Bank’s PSPP program did not come as a shock. All the critical arguments of that decision can be found explicitly or implicitly in the BVerfG’s referral to the Court of Justice of the EU on 18 July 2017. The real object of the decision of the BVerfG is the economic governance of the Eurozone or rather the big bet of European solidarity and European integration, in the midst of a pandemic even.
Über das EZB-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts haben wir schon viel gestritten. Aber wie genau soll es jetzt weiter gehen? Um das herauszufinden, hat der Bundestag gestern eine Gruppe Sachverständiger eingeladen. Einer von ihnen war CHRISTIAN WALTER, Professor an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Mit ihm spricht Max Steinbeis in der heutigen Podcastfolge über die komplizierten Folgen des umstrittenen Urteils.
The European Union is a community based on the rule of law. The EU legal order is the backbone that holds the EU together, and the German Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling in Weiss poses a profound threat to that legal order. This threat goes far beyond the potential consequences of the Weiss ruling for European monetary policy. We write this statement to express our shared view that the German Court’s assertion that it can declare that a CJEU judgment “has no binding force in Germany” is untenable and must be forcefully rejected. We also write to challenge those versions of scholarship on constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity that would defend the authority of any national court to make such a ruling and that helped (even if unintentionally) encourage it to do so.
Among the many unintended consequences of the PSPP judgment, the most unforeseen of all was to thrust the Court of Justice of the European Union into the limelight. All of a sudden, the media coverage is no longer limited to what the CJEU decides but how it decides and operates.
If there is a situation undermining the rule of law, then it is exactly this: The Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to ignore the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (under EU law), and the Bundesbank is under a legal obligation to follow the PSPP Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (under German constitutional law). How has it come to this?
As a political slogan, and a guideline in times of crisis, ‘whatever it takes’ undoubtedly has enormous appeal, and may in certain circumstances justify novel and untried forms of action. However, in a polity governed by the rule of law, there are limits to this approach which, if not respected, may cause greater problems than those which provoked the action in the first place.
Why is Viktor Orbán suddenly making nice with the ECJ and closing the Röszke camp? I don't know. But I have some suspicions.