Why Germany Should Join Sides with Israel before the ICJ in its Defense against South Africa’s Accusation of Genocide

Yesterday and today, the ICJ heard an application for provisional measures brought by South Africa, in which Israel is accused of the particularly serious crime of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza due to its reactions to the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. This participation in the proceedings, as well as other reasons to be explained below, speak in favor of also declaring an intervention in the proceedings between South Africa and Israel – in this case, however, with the aim of supporting Israel as defendant and countering the South African argumentation.

Warum Deutschland vor dem IGH dem von Südafrika gegen Israel erhobenen Vorwurf des Völkermords entgegentreten sollte

Heute und morgen verhandelt der IGH im Verfahren des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes über eine Klage Südafrikas, in der gegen Israel aufgrund seiner Reaktionen auf die Anschläge der Hamas vom 7. Oktober 2023 der besonders schwere Vorwurf des Völkermords an Palästinenserinnen und Palästinensern erhoben wird. Die prozessuale Beteiligung der Bundesregierung an zwei weiteren Verfahren wegen Völkermords sowie weitere, nachfolgend zu erläuternde Gründe sprechen dafür, für das Hauptsacheverfahren zwischen Südafrika und Israel ebenfalls eine Nebenintervention zu erklären – hier allerdings mit dem Ziel, Israel beizustehen und der südafrikanischen Argumentation entgegenzutreten.

The Missing Party

South Africa’s argument today was historic and extremely important. If you missed it, I recommend that you go back and look for the recording. For the Israeli viewer, at least, the South African argument was a real service because at last, we could connect to a very dominant narrative in world politics, which is completely concealed by Israeli media. However, the hearing also exposed a problem in South Africa's argument, which was also apparent in the written application. The South African case brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is highly selective. Prof. John Dugard, in an impressive performance, described how observers watched the events of October 7th “with horror”. But people reading the documents and listening to the oral arguments, without otherwise following the events, might think that before and after October 7, Palestinian forces did not shoot a single bullet.

The Body of the Judge and the Suffering of the Collective

The widespread prediction among experts right now is that Israel’s chances of prevailing at the ICJ in its response to South Africa’s genocide application are slim. Let’s assume, for a moment, that the prediction is accurate. As has been reported, Israeli authorities, too, have acknowledged that there’s a real risk of an ICJ decision against Israel. What does this mean for Israel’s legal strategy? When a party is preparing to lose in a proceeding, one relevant question is what the minority opinion will look like. Aharon Barak’s appointment as an ad-hoc judge for the ICJ proceedings may reveal some of the outlines Israel is preparing for this minority opinion: even if we lose, we may still try to convince the world that the issue at hand is none other than the memory of the Holocaust. But this is a morally and politically risky choice to make.

Eine überfällige, aber unvollständige Reform

Die Bundesregierung hat am 1.11.2023 ihren Regierungsentwurf zur Reform des Völkerstrafrechts vorgelegt und der Bundestag hat ihn am 30.11.2023 in erster Lesung beraten. Nun ist der federführende Rechtsausschuss am Zug! Der Regierungsentwurf sieht vor allem Änderungen des VStGB, der StPO sowie des GVG vor, um „Strafbarkeitslücken zu schließen, Opferrechte zu stärken und die Breitenwirkung völkerstrafrechtlicher Prozesse und Urteile zu verbessern.“ (S. 10). Er schweigt aber zum zentralen Grundsatz der (funktionalen) Immunität. Diese Lücke sollte im Gesetzgebungsverfahren geschlossen werden.

Der lange Schatten der Autokratie

Am 4. Dezember 2023 entschied das Verfassungsgericht der Republik Peru, dass der ehemalige Präsident Alberto Kenya Fujimori Inomoto unverzüglich aus der Haft zu entlassen sei. Dies ist inzwischen geschehen. Fujimori verbüßte seit 2009 eine eigentlich 25-jährige Gefängnisstrafe wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen während seiner Amtszeit. Es war zum Zeitpunkt der Verurteilung der einzige Fall weltweit, in dem sich ein demokratisch gewählter Staats- oder Regierungschef wegen solcher Rechtsverstöße strafrechtlich verantworten musste. Die verfassungsgerichtliche Entscheidung steht am vorläufigen Ende politischer und rechtlicher Auseinandersetzungen um das Schicksal von Alberto Fujimori. Auch wenn es sich bei der Haftentlassung nicht formell um eine Aufhebung der Verurteilung handelt, so ist sie doch eine Niederlage für die Menschenrechte in Peru und ganz Lateinamerika.

Constitutional Identity vs. Human Rights

In two recent Latvian cases concerning the Russian-speaking minority decided respectively in September and November 2023, the ECtHR made clear that protection of constitutional identity has now been elevated to a legitimate aim for a differential treatment under the Convention. This post explores how the protection of constitutional identity has been deployed to enable a collective punishment by association with a former occupier, and how the ECtHR’s reasoning has effectively endorsed such a punishment, which is unbefitting of a liberal democratic system the ECHR aspires to represent. Until the three cases were decided, no liberal European democracy could argue without losing face that suppressing a large proportion of its population was its constitutional identity – one of the goals of its statehood. Today, this claim is seemingly kosher, marking a U-turn in the understanding of what the European human rights protection system is for minorities in Europe.

A European Dialogue on Strike Action

With its decision in Humpert and others v Germany of 14 December 2023, the European Court of Human Rights settled a long-standing debate: The ban on strikes for German Civil Servants does not violate the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This decision ends the strategic litigating efforts of the applicants and their union to obtain the right to strike for the approximately 1.7 million civil servants in Germany. The judgment is also the culmination of an extraordinarily intense dialogue between Strasbourg and Karlsruhe.

Not Just Abortion

On 14 December 2023, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case M.L. v. Poland. The ECHR decided that the restrictions on abortion rights that Poland had violated Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Contrary to the hopes of the initiators of the case, this is not a European Roe v. Wade moment. The ECHR again refused to affirm that Article 8 can be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion. Nevertheless, the ECHR made significant findings regarding Polish rule of law violations.

Between Return and Protection

Last month, the ECJ responded to a preliminary reference of the Regional Court in Brno concerning Czechia’s so-called return procedure. The ECJ ruled that a third country national cannot be subject to a return decision if they applied for international protection and a first-instance decision on that application has not yet been delivered. Curiously, the ECJ thereby answered a question it had not actually been asked, while contradicting the conclusion of the Grand Chamber of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (“SAC”), rendered shortly before. While the ECJ’s ruling will nonetheless improve some of the problems that have inhered within Czechia’s approach to international protection and return procedures, its failure to answer the referred question constitutes a missed opportunity to facilitate a productive dialogue with referring courts in an area of law where preliminary references have been exceedingly rare.