Notstandsverfassungsrecht und Krisenregierung für alle Formen außergewöhnlicher Umstände. Umfasst verfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für Ausnahmezustände, Kriegsbefugnisse, Finanzkrisen, Pandemien, Naturkatastrophen und andere Krisensituationen, die außergewöhnliche staatliche Reaktionen erfordern. Umfasst verfassungsrechtliche Regulierung von Notstandsbefugnissen, Krisenmanagement und verfassungsrechtliche Kontinuität während Notlagen jeglicher Art.
Despite the horrors of the Corona disease, and indeed in order to combat it efficiently as a society, Sweden requires a robust and healthy constitutional and democratic debate. Corona is a human disaster and the suffering it spreads has yet to be accounted for. It is also an unprecedented challenge to our political and constitutional institutions and our almost nonexistent public discourse.
To date, in Australia, there have been over 5,350 confirmed COVID-19 cases, 26 deaths and over 275,000 tests conducted. The majority of the confirmed cases were acquired overseas. Australia is a Federation with a national government and state and territory governments. This adds complexity to responding to a national crisis. So far, Australia’s response has been characterised by cooperative federalism, at least nominally, primarily through a newly formed National Cabinet. There has been a staged ratcheting up of border controls and executive powers to prevent and control the spread of COVID-19, and a ‘hibernation’ approach to the conduct of business and exercise of fundamental rights. In this post, we discuss the governance model through the National Cabinet, the hard law response at Federal and State and Territory level and the extensive economic interventions.
On 23 March 2020, Bulgaria’s Parliament enacted a Law on the Measures and Actions during the State of Emergency Announced by Parliament on 13 March 2020 (hereby referred to as Law on Emergency for brevity). This was the second attempt to enact this piece of legislation after Bulgaria’s President vetoed some of its provisions. This new Law entered into force retroactively on 13 March 2020 when Parliament declared a state of emergency (izvunredno polojenie) in light of COVID-19. The peculiar situation that Parliament can declare a state of emergency, define its scope and provide guidance on the measures which could be taken later, and apply the law retroactively to justify measures and actions taken by the executive in the period before defining these terms is troublesome from a rule of law perspective. Moreover, some of the measures go beyond healthcare concerns and create opportunities for arbitrariness and human rights violations. B
Many argue that derogations, permitted under many human rights instruments, provide a useful framework for assessing whether any human rights infringements that arise from emergency provisions adopted in response to Covid-19 are justified. Drawing on jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court) in relation to Northern Ireland, this post argues that it is likely that the vast majority of cases exploring derogation will be found in a government’s failure.
Kaum ein Land ist zurzeit so hart getroffen von der Corona-Pandemie wie die USA. Ist es Unfähigkeit , dass Trump und die US-Republikaner ihre Möglichkeiten zum Krisenmanagement weitgehend ungenutzt lassen? Oder ist es Strategie? Die Rechtssoziologin und Verfassungsrechtlerin KIM LANE SCHEPPELE kennt sich mit dem autoritären Populismus aus wie kaum sonst jemand, und ihre – ziemlich düstere – Antwort auf diese Frage verrät sie Max Steinbeis in der heutigen Folge unseres Krisenpodcasts.
All Italian institutions established at different levels of government have been at the forefront in the health emergency to fight the spread of the coronavirus disease (see Diletta Tega and Michele Massa). Yet, they had to take action in the absence of a consistent legal framework establishing a clear division of competences and chain of command in the management of the emergency. The resulting legal uncertainties have been delaying the timely adoption and effective implementation of the containment measures which led to the national lockdown.
2 years and less than 5 months after the end of the two-year state of emergency triggered on the wake of the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, a brand new “state of health emergency” was activated in France on the 23rd March to cope with a new attack led, this time, by a small and invisible enemy, Covid-19. The so-called “state of health emergency” currently constitutes the legal framework and basis of the measures in force to cope with the epidemic, including nationwide lockdown. What is this new regime? Is it a threat to individual freedoms? What are its limits and guarantees? Was it legally necessary?
Not surprisingly, those of us who write about emergencies have been far more concerned about overreaction than underreaction and we have been far more concerned about politically caused emergencies rather than natural disasters. History is littered with the cautionary tales of overreaction to politically caused emergencies. But the dangers of state failure evident in underreaction are underestimated.
Die verfassungsrechtswissenschaftliche Begleitung der Corona-Krise als Metathema über zahlreichen Posts zu einzelnen Rechtsfragen ist ein wichtiges Thema für diesen Blog. Ich möchte hiermit zur Herangehensweise medial wie nie gefragter Expert*innen – täglich muss ja eine Vielzahl von Sondersendungen bestückt werden – drei kritische Beobachtungen anbringen.
Die 3. Kammer des Ersten Senats des Bundesverfassungsgerichts hat kürzlich einen Antrag auf Erlass einer einstweiligen Anordnung gegen die bayerischen Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Corona-Epidemie abgelehnt. Ist damit gesagt, dass all diese ungeheuer grundrechtsbeeinträchtigenden Maßnahmen vom Bundesverfassungsgericht als verfassungsgemäß betrachtet würden?
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters