Notstandsverfassungsrecht und Krisenregierung für alle Formen außergewöhnlicher Umstände. Umfasst verfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für Ausnahmezustände, Kriegsbefugnisse, Finanzkrisen, Pandemien, Naturkatastrophen und andere Krisensituationen, die außergewöhnliche staatliche Reaktionen erfordern. Umfasst verfassungsrechtliche Regulierung von Notstandsbefugnissen, Krisenmanagement und verfassungsrechtliche Kontinuität während Notlagen jeglicher Art.
President Trump’s declaration of a state of emergency is constitutionally dubious as well as politically irresponsible. But perhaps its most astonishing feature is Trump’s perversion of the traditional temporal justification for executive-centered emergency government.
Trump evidently declared an emergency just because he wanted to do it. But, as I will show here, the emergency may never come into effect. That doesn’t mean that we should think that the constitutional system of the United States is out of danger.
The US has entered a state of emergency that is almost surely unconstitutional. But it says something about the state of US constitutional law that it is hard to see how the president can be stopped.
Declarations of emergency are in bad odor in modern constitutional democracies. the U.S. Constitution makes no provision for emergency declarations. And while the Constitution’s guidance is cryptic at best on many separation-of-powers issues, it couldn’t be clearer that Congress—not the President—has the power to appropriate funds. So: can he really do that? The better argument is that he cannot, but it’s not so open-and-shut a matter as you might suppose.
India's oppositional Congress party wants to impeach Dipak Misra, the Chief Justice of India, who stands accused of allocating cases to the respective benches at his own, politically right-leaning whim. In its fight against the governing BJP party, the Congress party has launched a "Save the Constitution!" campaign. Unfortunately, its leader Rahul Ghandi's family has a history of entanglement with the constitution of its own.
Mit seiner Vorlage zum EuGH in Sachen Quantitative Easing zeigt das Bundesverfassungsgericht einmal mehr, dass es bei der Beurteilung ökonomischer Zusammenhänge fundamental schief liegt. Weiterbildung ist angesagt.
It seems that the BVerfG has learned a lesson. Yesterday’s referral about the the European Central Bank’s policy of Quantitative Easing (QE) sets a completely different tone. It reads like a modest and balanced plea for judicial dialogue, rather than an indictment. Fifty years after the original event, a new Summer of Love seems to thrive between the highest judicial bodies. It shows no traces of the aplomb with which Karlsruhe presented its stance to Luxembourg three years ago.
In July, a government bill against terrorism was adopted to replace the French state of emergency, which is in force since the terrorist attacks of November 2015. Critics have long complained about the lasting of the etat d'urgence. An analysis of the new bill however reveals that it is still a threat for human rights and in that matter rather a softened version of the state of emergency.
Important substantive and institutional guarantees ensure the democratic quality of the general elections. In the case of a referendum these substantive and procedural guarantees are almost completely missing. Only international soft law deals with the question of the democratic quality of the referendum. Recent experience with Turkey, Hungary and other places show that this needs to change.
To what extent does Emmanuel Macron represent a risk for civil liberties in France? Against this background of looming one-party hegemony and executive overreach, especially in security matters, the Conseil constitutionnel, the French Constitutional Council, found it wise to remind the government of the limits of its police powers.
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters