Carl Schmitt und die Pandemie. Teil II

Angesichts häufiger Bezugnahmen Bezugnahmen auf Carl Schmitt im Kontext der Corona-Krise ist es sinnvoll, noch einmal genauer auf Schmitts Leben und Werk zu blicken. Hier sollen einige von Schmitts Kategorien für die Analyse der deutschen Corona-Politik adaptiert werden. Da die verfassungsrechtliche Bewertung der Corona-Politik noch aussteht und auch keineswegs einfach und eindeutig ist, ist die neuerliche Auseinandersetzung mit Schmitts Verfassungslehre im Kontext der Corona-Politik sinnvoll. Deren Kategorien können freilich die differenzierte dogmatische Beschreibung nicht ersetzen.

Carl Schmitt und die Pandemie. Teil I

Unsere gegenwärtigen Corona-Zeiten werden weithin alltagssprachlich als große Katastrophe, Krise und „Ausnahmezustand“ wahrgenommen. Deshalb verwundert es nicht, dass in den Debatten gelegentlich auch der Name Carl Schmitts fällt. Sein Werk steht vor und nach 1933 für die extensive Rechtfertigung diktatorischer „Maßnahmen“ im „Ausnahmezustand“. Mit seiner Theorie und „Verfassungslehre“ verbindet sich die Erwartung, grundbegriffliche Orientierung in den Lücken des Gesetzes, rechtsfreien Räumen und im unübersichtlichen Gelände zu finden. Im ersten Teil dieses Beitrags werden als Basis einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Anwendung von Schmitts Kategorien auf Maßnahmen in der Corona-Pandemie die biographischen Bezüge Schmitts zur Spanischen Grippe beleuchtet.

Croatia’s Response to COVID-19: On Legal Form and Constitutional Safeguards in Times of Pandemic

Analysing national responses to the coronavirus, the University of Oxford study found that Croatia was the most rigorous of all the examined countries considering the actual number of infections. Overall, the Croatian response to Covid-19 might not pose an autocratic threat to the rule of law as in certain European countries. This is far, however, from suggesting there have not been significant constitutional challenges, or that we should not require an enhanced constitutional oversight over apparently quite restrictive governmental action.

Ecuador – Constitutionalism and Covid-19

When referring to the rule of law and constitutionalism we must be extremely cautious: Ecuador was founded in 1830 after the dissolution of Great Colombia, and in just 190 years has adopted 20 constitutions. The current Ecuadorian Constitution dates from 2008. This means that the nation does not possess a strong constitutional tradition nor a culture of promotion of the rule of law. On the contrary, Ecuador has a long history of institutional breakdowns and coup d'états which were caused by political and economic crisis. However, these were nothing compared with the situation all Ecuadorians are currently facing.

The Netherlands: Of Rollercoasters and Elephants

The Dutch authorities take a quasi-legal, quasi-rhetorical approach to shape their intelligent lockdown and try to tame the pandemic beast, with questionable constitutional practices as a result. While the reliance on medical and other expertise might be a welcome difference compared to some other countries, overreliance on experts in communication may hide real political and legal choices that have been made.

Sweden and COVID 19: A Constitutional Perspective

The Swedish government’s ways of handling the Corona crisis have drawn a lot of international attention. Sweden has tried to limit the spread of the disease by means of recommendations, rather than quarantines and curfews. There is no provision in the Swedish constitution for the declaration of a state of emergency in peacetime, only in war or where there is an imminent danger of war. Instead, the Swedish approach is to have delegations to the government, and sub-delegations to administrative agencies in a variety of statutes.

The Right Question about the FCC Ultra Vires Decision

Instead of re-opening the old debate on the merits and demerits of constitutional pluralism, the FCC decision should be actually taken up as an opportunity to concentrate on another systemic feature of the EU constitutional governance. The decision of the FCC is not a sign that we have a problem with constitutional pluralism in Europe but warns us that we have a major constitutional problem with the constitutional role of the ECB.

Effective but Constitutionally Dubious

Although the pandemic is far from over, Greece has been praised so far for its fast and firm response to the crisis. The country’s efforts to contain the dissemination of the virus seem to have achieved а flattening of the curve, i.e. the slowing of the spread so that fewer people need to seek treatment at any given time. Greece owes much of its – to date – accomplishment to a number of dubious applications of the rules laid down in the Constitution.