›The Place of the Constitution Is Empty‹: Chinese Political Aesthetics of Commanding Constitutional Faith

‘The document emblazoned with the Chinese characters the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the constitution in its material form, was gingerly held and escorted by a military guard of honour onto the lectern at the centre of the podium of the Great Hall of the People in the First Session of China’s 13th National People’s Congress on 17 March, 2018.’  This is the snapshot of a video cap about the inauguration of the PRC’s (new/amended) constitution, which was part of the so-called core leadership’s constitutional oath-taking ceremony before the audience of the members of the National People’s Congress for the first time in the PRC history. Watching that video, I cannot help but attempt an aesthetic read of the unsubstantiated Chinese political order in the light of Claude Lefort’s famous ‘empty place’ thesis.

Gehört der Islam zu Deutschland? Beyond Böckenförde

Kritik an der CSU und ihrem Eifer, dem Islam die Zugehörigkeit zu Deutschland abzusprechen, ist ebenso angebracht wie leicht. Schwieriger, aber mindestens ebenso wichtig, ist es, genauer zu analysieren, wie sich diese Position zum liberalen Staat verhält, so wie wir ihn heute verstehen. Das soll hier geschehen, mit Schwerpunkt auf das Werk von Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, das für das deutsche Selbstverständnis in diesen Fragen prägend ist.

A Bridge over Troubled Water – a Criminal Lawyers‹ Response to Taricco II 

The recent CJEU judgment in M.A.S., M.B. (hereinafter Taricco II) raises more questions than it answers on when Member States can apply higher standards of rights in criminal proceedings. Previous case law, i.e. Taricco I and Melloni, pervaded the primacy of EU law, but from Jeremy F. we also know that Member States enjoy a margin of discretion to apply their own standards of fundamental rights protection, where the rules at stake – an appeal suspending the execution of a European arrest warrant – have not been harmonised by EU law. In Jeremy F., it concerned a limited discretion; Member ... continue reading

Belittling the Primacy of EU Law in Taricco II

The Taricco II judgement handed down by the CJEU on 5 December 2017 is a telling and worrying example of a weakly reasoned court decision and the high price at which such weakness comes. It is a judgement that disregards legally problematic questions, seemingly subordinating argumentative consistency to the constraints of legal policy in a climate increasingly critical towards EU law and institutions. The (potential) collateral damage of this approach is considerable.

Defusing the Taricco Bomb through Fostering Constitutional Tolerance: All Roads Lead to Rome

As Mauro Cappelletti perceptively wrote in 1986, ‘unlike the American Supreme Court and the European Constitutional Courts, the Court of Justice has almost no powers that are not ultimately derived from its own prestige, intellectual and moral force of its opinions’. In other terms, the Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) cannot take obedience to its judgments by Member States and the respective authorities as granted or constitutionally-mandated since, in Weiler’s words, this is a voluntary obedience which goes hand in hand with the exercise of constitutional tolerance in the Member States. In other words, there is a time for the enforcement of the radical primacy of EU law as in Melloni and Taricco I, and a time for internalizing the counterlimits, as in the Taricco II decision (M.A.S. and M.B. case) handed down today by the ECJ.

A Constitution of Fear

A new brand of constitutionalism is on the rise in Poland, defined by a „constitution of fear”. Fear is the leitmotif of the constitution-making process defined by suspicion, exclusion, drive for retribution and settling the scores. As such it reflects the main tenets of populist constitutionalism: distrust in the institutions and rejection of the liberal status quo and culture of self-constraints.

Hungarian Constitutional Identity and the ECJ Decision on Refugee Quota

The outcome of the lawsuit launched by the Hungarian Government against the EU Council’s decision on compulsory relocation of asylum seekers before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took no-one by surprise, neither in Budapest nor elsewhere. Some may have hoped that the complaint would succeed legally, but nevertheless it has always been primarily a part of a well-devised political strategy based on the idea of national identity as a concept of constitutional and EU law.