Verfassungsinterpretationstheorie, verfassungsrechtliche Methodik, theoretische Grundlagen der Verfassungsanalyse und Verfassungsphilosophie. Umfasst Originalismus, dynamische Verfassungsauslegung, Verfassungskonstruktion und methodische Ansätze der Verfassungsinterpretation. Auf spezifisch verfassungsrechtliche Themen fokussiert, allgemeine akademische Themen sind nun unter Wissenschaft und Recht kategorisiert.
Poland’s constitutional crisis is caused by the power of those who attack the rule of law, but also by the weakness of those who defend it. This weakness derives from courts taking a traditional formalist approach, excluding purposive and functional argumentation and leaving themselves prone to attack by the abuse of power through the other branches of government.
The wind of populism is blowing across Europe and courts (including constitutional and supreme courts) are not immune therefrom. Within this context, the enforcement of the constitutional identity clause to contrast the application and, sometimes, the primacy of EU law would be a powder keg waiting to be lit. In the latest act in the Taricco saga, Advocate General Bot in his opinion in Taricco II does nothing to defuse it – on the contrary.
Kaum hat der Bundestag das Gesetz über die Öffnung der Ehe beschlossen, wird es schon verfassungsrechtlich diskutiert. Dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht es für verfassungswidrig erklären wird, ist wenig wahrscheinlich. Und das lässt sich auch ohne Rückgriff auf den historischen Willen des Verfassungsgebers überzeugend begründen.
The saga continues: again have regions in Italy governed by the right-wing party Lega Nord tried to use an administrative law to restrict the building of new mosques in the regions. This time, Veneto came up with something new: they made it mandatory to speak only Italian in religious buildings. But the Constitutional Court took a clear stance, for religious freedom and for the importance of language as a cultural good.
Will Democrats be able to block Neil Gorsuch's confirmation as Supreme Court Justice, and how will it affect the Court if they won't? Mattias Kumm on the latest developments in the nomination process and the judiciary's role in holding the Trump administration in check.
Es war wohl zu erwarten. Die europäischen Rechtspopulisten haben unlängst in Koblenz den grenzüberschreitenden Schulterschluss geübt. Anwesend im Geiste war ohne Zweifel auch Donald Trump, der in vielerlei Hinsicht gegenwärtig der Posterboy der rechten Populisten ist. Mit seinem Einreisestopp vom Januar ist Trump zwar bislang krachend an den rechtsstaatlichen Prinzipien gescheitert, die die Gerichte ihm entgegengehalten haben. Dieses Scheitern hielt aber weder Trump davon ab, am Montag einen zweiten Anlauf zu unternehmen, einen Einreisestopp zu verankern, noch hindert es seine Epigonen daran, ähnlich krude Vorschläge für andere Staaten in die Welt zu setzen.
The Italian Constitutional Court’s Tarrico judgement is worded in apparently much milder terms than the BVerfG’s preliminary reference in Gauweiler. The content of the ICC’s decision, though, seems loaded with much more dynamite. In Gauweiler, the CJEU was called to interpret an act of another EU institution. In Taricco, the CJEU is called to reinterpret its own decision, after the ICC essentially asked “please, say it again?”
Is Italy obliged by EU law to pursue criminal acts longer than provided by Italian law? This question might cause a fundamental clash between the Italian Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. Unlike the CJEU, the Italian Constitutional Court interprets a retroactive suspension of the limitation period as a matter of principle of legality, and thereby as a matter of a core principle of Italian constitutional law. By referring the case to the CJEU, the Italian Constitutional Court gives the European Court a chance to revisit its jurisdiction while avoiding the identity language of the German Constitutional Court - good news for cooperative constitutionalism in Europe.
Ever since the 2010 parliamentary elections Hungary has set off on the journey to became an ‘illiberal’ member state of the EU, which does not comply with the shared values of rule of law and democracy, the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. The new government of Viktor Orbán from the very beginning has justified the non-compliance by referring to national sovereignty, and lately to the country’s constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4 (2) TEU. This constitutional battle started with the invalid anti-migrant referendum, was followed by the failed constitutional amendment, and concluded in early December last year by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in which the packed body in a binding constitutional interpretation rubber-stamped the constitutional identity defense of the Orbán government.
After the unconstitutional capture of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland, ordinary courts will have to step in to provide constitutional review. Polish judges are faced with the most fundamental challenge since 1989. Are they ready to be constitutional judges in times of constitutional emergency?
13. September 2025
Giovanni Capoccia
12. September 2025
Anne Peters
12. September 2025
Anne Peters